


HAIDAR ALI

N. K. SINHA

By the same author

RISE OF THE SIKH POWER

RANJIT SINGH



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HAIDAR ALI

VOLUME I

1721-1779



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PREFACE

The idea of writing a monograph on Haidar Ali occurred to me in 1936. The first thing I did, was to read the volumes of Wilks as minutely as possible to ascertain whether the proposed work would be of any use. It struck me that Wilks had not utilised the contemporary Marathi, Portuguese, Dutch and French sources. The portion relating to Haidar Ali, though excellent by itself, is based on two main sources, English and Persian, local tradition and 'the information possessed by living characters' giving his narrative the atmosphere and the directness which no neutral retrospect can ever have. I felt, however, that I would be justified in undertaking a work on Haidar Ali, if I could utilise the sources not available to Wilks. This work is not a history of Mysore from 1721-1782, nor specifically a biography of Haidar. It is a study in biographical form of a typical figure of 18th century Indian History. While not neglecting personal details, this work is concerned primarily with military and diplomatic activities.

The great Mysorean's career falls into three unequal parts. Between 1749-1761, we have the history of his rise from obscurity to power. Between 1761-1778, there is the predominantly anti-Maratha phase of the career of this warrior and statesman.

By 1779, the anti-British feeling had gathered a momentum that was irresistible and for the rest of his life up to 1782 and for the duration of the rule of his dynasty, the anti-British aspect of the foreign policy was the dominant factor of the situation. In the first volume which is now given to the public, I have dealt with the first two phases. I propose to deal with the third phase, so far as it concerns the career of Haidar Ali, in the second volume, in which I would also give a description of his administration, his military system, the extent of French influence in his court and a picture of him in council and conversation. In order to form an estimate of his statesmanship, it may also be necessary to sketch the history of the anti-British foreign policy initiated by him up to its culmination under his son.

When I began my researches on this subject, I was well aware of the difficulties I would have to face. Some of the materials are in languages with which I had no acquaintance and I had to face the problem of collecting and utilizing them. I must put here on record that many scholars helped me in my quest in the best tradition of Indian scholarship. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Kt., C.I.E., lent me some of his rare books, helped me to collect some of my materials and was kind enough to read most of the chapters before the submission of the manuscript to the press. Prof. K. A. Nilkantha Sastri, M.A., of the Madras University supplied me with all the materials on Haidar Ali that could be gleaned from

Tamil, Telegu and Kanarese manuscripts in the Mackenzie collection. Thus some useful information was made available to me in a form in which I could utilize them. Chevalier Panduranga Pissurlencar sent me reprints or transcripts of all the relevant Portuguese documents he had collected from Lisbon and Nova Goa. I have indicated in my bibliography how valuable his help has been. Mr. C. V. Chandrasekharan, M.A. (Oxon.), Pro-Vice-Chancellor, Travancore University, sent me an extract from Malayalam records in Travancore. Prof. Venkata Subba Sastri, M.A., Ph.D. (Lond.), of Mysore guided me to some places of historical interest in Mysore and helped me to acquire some sense of locality which not even the most thorough knowledge of the Gazetteers can convey to an outsider. I should also acknowledge the debt which I owe to Dr. S. N. Sen, Ph.D., B. Litt., Keeper of the Records of the Government of India, who always took a very keen interest in my work and was ready to introduce me to scholars who might be of help to me. In the meetings of the Indian Historical Records Commission I got very useful information on records. I should also acknowledge my obligation to Dr. B. S. Baliga, M.A., Ph. D. (Lond.), Curator, Madras Record Office, and his staff for the help I got in Madras in studying the records.

Dr. S. P. Mookherji, M.A., D.Litt., Barrister-at-Law, President, Council of Post-Graduate Teaching in Arts, took a sympathetic interest in my work


and the Calcutta University Library acquired for me transcripts of many valuable documents from England and from different parts of India. In this connection I acknowledge with gratitude the debt I owe to Dr. Nihar Ranjan Ray, M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt. (Leyden), the Librarian, without whose promptness I might have to wait indefinitely for the arrival of transcripts of records from England. I take this opportunity of thanking him as also Mr. B N Banerjee, M.Sc., the Deputy Librarian, for their invaluable assistance, generously given. My friend Dr. S. C. Sengupta, M.A., Ph.D. of the Presidency College kindly read the manuscript and suggested improvements. Another invaluable helper is my friend Mr. Anil Chandra Banerjee, M.A, who has aided me in many different ways from the inception of this work in 1936 to its passing through the press.

Senate House,
Calcutta,
October 25,
1941.

N. K. Sinha

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CHAPTER I

Birth and Ancestry

Haidar was born at Budicote in the jagir of his father in 1721.¹ His father, Fateh Muhammad, was a man of some consequence. The great grandfather of Haidar, Wali Muhammad, had migrated from Delhi to Gulbarga in the Nizam's Dominions. It is claimed on behalf of the family that it belonged to the Quraish tribe though it had no rank and name in India. Haidar's grandfather, Muhammad Ali, who migrated to Sera, cultivated the soil and rented fields and gardens. He said to his sons who had worldly aspirations, "Our forefathers were pious holy men, and though they were competent to distinguish themselves in the world, they nevertheless strove to separate themselves from its ties and connections."² Fateh Muhammad was the fourth son of Muhammad Ali. He and his brothers became soldiers of fortune, refusing "to remain like foxes lurking in the holes and corners of obscurity,"³ but Fateh Muhammad took some time to settle down.

1 At Dod Balapur according to *Nishan-i-Haidari*, Ms., f. 6a.

2 *Nishan-i-Haidari* translated by Miles, p. 5; Ms., f. 5a.

3 Ibid.

He was a soldier of fortune, serving one chieftain after another. There is some difference of opinion as to the sequence of his service under different chieftains, but it can perhaps be affirmed without fear of contradiction that he served for some time in Arcot and in Mysore and came to some prominence as a commander of 400 foot and a hundred horse under Nawab Dargah Quli Khan of Sera. After the death of Dargah Quli Khan he attached himself to his son Abdul Rasul and was killed in a fight between Tahir Khan, the Subadar of Sera, and Abdul Rasul Khan. This event took place in 1728.

The family of Fateh Muhammad, which was at Dod Balapur, was persecuted by Abbas Quli, a son of Dargah Quli, who beat and imprisoned Haidar and his elder brother Shahbaz in order to extort more money from the family. The widow succeeded in sending information to Haidar Saheb,⁴ a nephew of her deceased husband, who was an officer under the Mysore Government, commanding 100 horse and 200 foot. He petitioned the ruler of Mysore, who wrote to the Chief of Sera and he secured the release of the

4 Haidar's mother was the daughter of a Navayat merchant. The Navayats or New comers were the descendants of Arab settlers who came to the south between the 8th and 16th centuries. According to Wilks, she sought the protection of Ibrahim Saheb, her brother, who was in the service of the Mysore Government at Bangalore and it was Ibrahim who later got Shahbaz into Mysore service. Wilks, however, makes mention of a Haidar Naik, a distant relation of Haidar Ali, as helping Devraj in his successful usurpation in 1734.

family after holding out threats to Abbas Quli. The family, now almost destitute, sought the protection of the Government of Mysore. Haidar Saheb, the elder, gave shelter to the family, presented his elder cousin, when the latter had grown up, to Nanjaraj, the *Dulwai* of Mysore. His own son, Ali Saheb, was at Madgiri, commanding a body of 300 foot and 70 horse. On the death of Haidar Saheb, his detachment was placed under the care of Shahbaz, the elder brother of the future ruler of Mysore. Thus the family came to have a secure footing in Mysore, after passing through many vicissitudes of fortune.

Haidar Ali's illiteracy is said to have been due to the misfortunes of his family. "For ten years he was moved from place to place, the most convenient for the countries where his relations happened to serve, but so very unfortunate was he that though the Moormen in general are at great pains to instruct their children in reading and writing, he is utterly unacquainted with either owing to the low circumstances of his friends or to his own idleness, but to the latter it is imputed." His illiteracy is thus explained in one of the earliest English accounts about him.⁵ As he grew up, he pursued the pleasure and sports of the chase. We are told that Haidar was too wild to

⁵ Orme Ms. *, Vol. 72, pp. 131-132.

This account of the early years of Haidar Ali is based on the Persian Mss. *Nishan-i-Haidari*, Or. 1865, *Tuzuk-i-Walajabi*, and a Canarese *Haidarnama*, Orme Ms. (Vol. 72) and the account of Wilks.

conform to the restraints of a military life and for the first time saw military service at Deonhalli in 1749, as a volunteer horseman in his brother's detachment. Hossain Ali Kirmani, however, tells us that before entering Mysore service, Shahbaz for some time served under Abdul Wahab Khan at Chittur and there his brother Haidar served under him at the head of his cavalry detachment of 200 horse. Haidar was successful in a shooting competition at Deonhalli, caught the eye of Nanjaraj, the *Sarvadhikari* of Mysore, and was raised to the command of 50 horse and 200 peons. The mist that envelops the early years of Haidar is now lifted and henceforth there is no difficulty in finding the steps by which he rose to power.

There is no doubt about the humble position of Haidar's parents and his family. He had not the advantage of birth or wealth. When we compare his obscure beginnings and think of the arts and accidents that enabled him to rise so high, we are reminded of the Fatimite Caliph, who silenced an indiscreet question on lineage by drawing his sword and saying, "This is my pedigree," and, casting a handful of gold coins to his soldiers, said, "These are my kindred and my children."

CHAPTER II

Rise to Prominence, 1749-1755

Haider's rise, like that of many other great men, was as much due to his energy, enterprise and daring as to his opportunities. A detailed study of his career from 1750 to 1760 leads logically to the conclusion that he had a nicely calculated programme which unfolded itself stage by stage. But so much of his success he owed to external complications with their quick turns and sudden changes in the course of events that it is very difficult to say what he owed to his own foresight and how much to circumstances. Intrepid and swift, he was always ready to take advantage of his opportunities.

The Government of Mysore was in the hands of two brothers, Devraj and Nanjaraj. Their usurpation was almost complete, though they had left to the nominal King 'the exterior appendages of royalty.' The position of the reigning monarch, Chick Kissen Raj, was humiliating and fraught with danger. He was merely a shadow but a shadow in whose name potent conjuring tricks might be performed by any unscrupulous intriguer. Devraj was the *Dulwai* or commander-in-chief and Nanjaraj was the *Sarvadhi-*

kari, controlling revenue and finance. But from 1746, Devraj, grown old and decrepit, allowed his brother to lead distant expeditions, himself undertaking during his absence the temporary charge of revenue and finance. This produced a confusion of authority which could be utilised against both if they quarrelled and separated as they actually did later on.

Mysore was a small state in a far off corner at the junction of the Eastern and Western Ghats. In normal circumstances, it would not have been drawn into the power politics of those days. It was very far from the scene of the strife of the Mughals and the Marathas. But Shivaji had at one time under his control the forts of Gingi, Kolar, Hoskote, Bangalore, Sera, Bellary, Dharwar and the table land of Mysore. A group of politicians around Shahu thought that Maratha expansion should proceed southward and not northward, and traditionally the Mysore State was included within the sphere of Maratha influence. The Marathas could have easily conquered the whole of the region south of the Krishna. The chiefs of Cuddapah, Kurnul, Sera, Savanur and the rulers of Mysore, Arcot, Tanjore, Travancore, Cochin and Calicut could not have offered any serious resistance to the full weight of Maratha arms. But the North with its historical setting, the glamour of Mughal magnificence, had a much greater attraction. The South was a comparatively neglected bypath. Baji Rao, as also Balaji

Baji Rao and with them Shahu, thought that the imperial highway led northwards. What strikes a student of Maratha imperialism is the diffusive nature of Maratha conquests from "the Krishna to the Attock (Chenab?)." In their eagerness to strike at the trunk of the withering tree, they embarked upon a policy that would not certainly have affected the history of the South. It may be, as Grant Duff puts it, that Baji Rao comprehended the nature of predatory power and perceived its growth in turbulence and anarchy. As it was, under the inspiration of Baji Rao, Maratha imperialism made a choice and pursued a career that left Mysore alone. By the treaty of Warna (1731) between Shahu and his cousin Sambhuji of Kolhapur, the region between the Tungabhadra and Rameswaram became the field for the expansion of the Kolhapur branch, which was completely cut off from the North, Shahu reserving to himself half of the territory to be conquered. Kolhapur was not a powerful state and from it Mysore had not much to fear. But under Balaji Baji Rao the policy of southward expansion suddenly received the powerful support of the Peshwa himself as also of his cousin Sadasiva Rao Bhau.¹ Without abandoning their forward

1 S.P.D., Vol. 28, letters no. 63 and 65.

Murari Rao's letter to Sadasiva Rao Bhau complimented his cousin, the Peshwa, on his cleverness in securing the transfer of the whole of the Karnatak from Babuji Naik to him as his sphere of action and assured him of his hearty support in his southern enterprise.

policy in the North, the Marathas at the same time pushed southward. This Maratha menace to Mysore became very real from 1753 and the series of Maratha invasions during the Peshwaship of Balaji Baji Rao, begun that year, were repeated in 1754, 1757 and 1759. But Nizam-ul-mulk, too, claimed that he had the right to enter into the full territorial legacy of Aurangzeb and regarded Mysore as Mughal territory. "Aurangzeb's empire on the west coast stretched in theory up to the northern frontier of Goa and inland to Belgaon in the Bombay Karnatak and the Tungabhadra river. Thereafter the boundary passed west to east in a disputed and evershifting line through the centre of Mysore dipping south-eastward to the Koleroon river north of Tanjore."² The Nizam claimed sovereignty, the Marathas demanded the *chauth* over all the states and principalities to the south of the Tungabhadra that had once submitted to Aurangzeb. Thus was Mysore suddenly drawn into the vortex of the rivalry between the Peshwa and the Nizam. The Marathas could not also be oblivious of the fact that some of the most important forts south of the Tungabhadra had at one time belonged to Shivaji.

In view of the Maratha menace, it might naturally be expected that Devraj and Nanjaraj would rely more and more on the Nizam. Nizam-ul-mulk's son, Nasir Jang, realised tribute from Mysore in 1746. The Mysore Government supported Nasir Jang in the

² Sarkar, *A Short History of Aurangzeb*, p. 476.

war of succession that ensued on the death of Nizam-ul-mulk. But Nasir Jang was murdered in December, 1750, his successor Muzaffar Jang in January, 1751. It was only with the support of Bussy and his trained battalions that the power of the Nizam seemed to be securely established. Bussy was not recalled until July, 1758. The Mysore Government, however, failed to get the support of the Nizam in opposition to the Marathas. The reputed riches of the treasury of Seringapatam lured the courtiers of Salabat Jang, who forced on him a policy of plundering Mysore and Bussy, to save his position, acquiesced. They invaded Mysore in 1755 and imposed on it a tribute of 56 lakhs.

A further complication was introduced into Mysore politics by the ambition of Nanjaraj. The French and English East India Companies were at war, backing rival claimants to the Subahdari of Hyderabad and the Nawabi of Arcot. The French succeeded in installing their nominee, Muzaffar Jang, and after his murder Salabat Jang, at Hyderabad. They succeeded also in killing Anwaruddin, the Nawab of Arcot, took his eldest son Mahphuz Khan prisoner, his second son Muhammad Ali flying to Trichinopoly, only to be besieged there by the French and their nominee, Chanda Saheb. But the war lingered on at Trichinopoly. At Muhammad Ali's suggestion Clive seized Arcot and held it out for fifty days against detachments sent by Chanda Saheb, thus proving, as Murar Rao said, that the

English also could fight. But all this did not materially improve the prospects of Muhammad Ali because of the deficiency of his funds. His own troops were without pay and he had very little prospect of preventing a mutiny. Before Clive's Arcot exploit he had appealed to the inconsiderate ambition of Nanjaraj. Haidar's biographer compares the condition of Muhammad Ali to a "lamp the light of which glimmers and dies at the approach of morning." In such circumstances a more prudent man would not have agreed to come to his help, and least of all the *Sarvadhikari* of the Mysore State that was so much menaced by the Marathas and the Nizam. But the cession of Trichinopoly with all its dependencies was a bait which the greedy Nanjaraj could not but swallow. Orme wrote five years after, "It is a characteristic of Muhammad Ali that in his adversity he will make any concession as he did to Mysore and on the glimpse of prosperity his views of acquisition are as extravagant." Devraj, more experienced and less headstrong, forbade him, but Nanjaraj was not to be dissuaded. He embarked on this venture in which he wasted three years at the head of an army of 20,000 men and was obliged to return without receiving the least compensation or any security for its reimbursement. It is difficult to estimate exactly how much money was spent in this fruitless expedition. He must have spent at Trichinopoly 3-4 crores of rupees.³ The very solvent

3 *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, Vol. IX, pp. 369-70

Mysore State found itself faced with bankruptcy as a result of this expedition. The money paid to Muhammad Ali, the subsidies paid to the Maratha associate Murar Rao, the upkeep of an army of 20,000 for a period of three years, the money paid to seduce men in the service of Muhammad Ali, the Tanjore chief, the Pudukottai Poligar—all this must have totalled a colossal sum. The King of Tanjore wrote in 1754, when Nanjaraj, conscious of the fraud perpetrated by Muhammad Ali, had already joined the French, "Nanjaraj is very rich. He does not value money. He sends advances to the people and draws them on his side." Nanjaraj might have dazzled people with his offers but his obstinacy at Trichinopoly was the cause of his own undoing and the proximate cause of the rise of Haidar Ali. The sums spent at Trichinopoly and the drafts twice made by the Marathas and once by Salabat Jang made the Mysore State unable to meet its treaty obligations, pay its soldiery and defray its own expenses, resulting in troubles and

"Nandaraja spent 3 crores of state treasure in attempts to capture Trichi." P. 239—"Nandaraja has spent 4 crores without the raja's permission." Kirmani's estimate—3,000,000 pagodas—is dismissed by his translator as gross exaggeration but the estimate of Wilks is that Trichinopoly alone cost the British 35 lakhs of pagodas. Kirmani's is an underestimate.

Kaifiyat of Haidar (Mackenzie Ms.)—three crores of Kanteray varaha. This seems to be an exaggerated estimate.

A Kanteray pagoda=3 rupees

A Hikerry pagoda=4 rupees

confusion that provided Haidar Ali with his first opportunity.

Between 1749-1750 Mysore troops numbering 5000 horse and 10,000 foot, commanded by Barakki Venkat Rao, were in attendance on Nasir Jang. Shahbaz and Haidar were in the retinue of Venkat Rao. Haidar was, at this time, at the head of 500 matchlock peons and 5 horsemen⁴ besides some irregulars. Nasir Jang was assassinated by the Nawab of Cuddapah. The Mysore troops withdrew. But Haidar's Bedar peons took advantage of the confusion caused by the assassination and succeeded in taking two camels laden with gold coins to Haidar's residence at Deonhalli. The author of *Nishan-i-Haidari* says, "On his route homewards Haidar fell in with 3/4 camels laden with treasure which the rebels had seized and were taking away. Haidar took possession of the treasure which he added to his own." The sudden affluence of Haidar is thus explained. Looting was a normal adjunct of war operations and Haidar was not the only party to profit by it. It has been asserted that the French share of this spoil was so considerable a sum "that everyone from the councillor to the writer, from the Captain to the private, had his share and officers who only joined the service later looked back with regret to the happy days when a mere ensign received 60,000 rupees. Never had so much gold

been seen at Pondicherry. It was comparable with the solid gains of Plassey.”⁵ In view of the importance of looting, Haidar made a systematic organisation of what was promiscuous and made the looters work for his benefit. It is also asserted by Wilks that in course of the operations that ended with the assassination of Nasir Jang, Haidar’s men had succeeded in taking to his residence at Deonhalli 500 muskets and 300 horses ‘occasionally picked up in the field or stolen in the quiet of the night.’⁶ But even more important than this acquisition of wealth that must have been responsible for the beginnings of his ambition, was the high opinion which he must have formed of the abilities of the French as a result of his first contact with them.⁷ Up to now the British had not done much to impress him. As Ananda Ranga Pillai writes, “They were like the jackal who burnt his skin in stripes in order to imitate the tiger and perished in anguish.”⁸ On his return to Mysore Haidar began to drill his recruits with the aid of a few French sepoy deserters. “He raised 500 sepoys and 200 horse, the former armed with European flintlocks which he

5 *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, Vol. VII, Introduction I.

6 Wilks, Vol. I, p. 270.

7 Bowring says in his book *Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan* (p. 25) that Haidar even went to Pondicherry on his way to Mysore, where he became even more impressed by the discipline of the French troops and the skill of the French engineers. I do not find this statement corroborated by any contemporary account.

8 *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, Vol. VII.

had from time to time possessed himself of.”⁹ Nanjaraj was impressed by the exhibition of these new firearms and Haidar Ali with his ‘invincibles’ accompanied him to Trichinopoly when he embarked on this foolish venture.

Trichinopoly was Haidar’s great training ground. There, amidst constant strife and turmoil, his fibre was hardened, his observation quickened, his resourcefulness increased and his character developed. He gained his experience of the art of warfare at Trichinopoly. Possessing sound sense, clear insight and resolution, he came to understand the western system of attack and defence. He was badly in need of such a training school if he was to play his part. The Mysore army command was so inefficient that Nanjaraj’s troops made a night march to avoid the enemy with 10,000 lights as in a wedding procession. From February to December, 1752, the Mysoreans and the British were allies. But after the surrender and murder of Chanda Saheb Muhammad Ali gave to the Mysoreans only the island of Seringham, and sent messages and apologies without the least sign of handing over Trichinopoly. What is called ‘the fraud of Trichinopoly’ stood fully revealed. The English associated themselves with his fraud by pleading that they were merely auxiliaries. Nanjaraj had thus to join the French who were the enemies of the English and of Muham-

mad Ali. During this shortlived period of Anglo-Mysore friendship, Haidar could see for himself the brilliance and daring of Clive and the ability and spirit of Lawrence. He was an eyewitness of many of their attacks and counter-attacks. These were excellent object lessons to a man accustomed to see only the pusillanimities, makeshifts and blunders of his generals. Haidar Ali was at that time too inconspicuous a man to have his deeds recorded by Anglo-Indian chroniclers. Kirmani is prone to exaggeration. But we may perhaps agree with his statements that he took part in several night attacks on the French and Chanda Saheb and the predatory troops attached to his battalions brought from the French Companies arms, tents and cattle and, in course of a night attack, even two guns. The politics of this period, a strange embroidery of half friendships and hungry ambitions, however, brought Haidar into some sort of touch with two men who were his famous antagonists in later life—Muhammad Ali and Murar Rao Ghorpade. We read in a contemporary Persian manuscript that Haidar was sometimes present with Nanjaraj in the *Durbar* of Muhammad Ali where, performing his '*taslim*' (salutation) to Muhammad Ali, he would stand apart. But he caught the eye of the Arcot chief, who is said to have recommended him to his ally for further promotion.¹⁰ Haidar Ali, who was

a very good judge of men, must have formed his own opinion of the Khan, but he kept it to himself. When he became big enough to be the rival of Muhammad Ali, this knowledge acquired by close association must have stood him in good stead. Murar Rao, the Maratha chieftain of Gooty, had come to Trichinopoly with a detachment of 6,000 troops. His army presented a remarkable contrast to that of Mysore and Arcot. "The whole army seemed as one family, the spirit of exploit he contrived to keep up amongst them by equitable partitions of plunder. This rendered them fond of their fatigues and they never complained but when they had nothing to do. The choice he made of his officers still more discovered his capacity. For there was not a commander of 100 horse who was not fit to command the whole, notwithstanding which every one was contented in his particular station and they all tried in perfect harmony with each other and in perfect obedience to their general..... Besides the qualities common to the rest of the Maratha nation, such as activity, stratagem, great dexterity in the management of their horses and sabres, they by their conflict against the Europeans surmounted in a great degree the terror of fire arms; what is more extraordinary, they were even capable of standing against the vivacity of a cannonade from field pieces although this terrible annoyance struck all other Indians with as much terror as their ancestors felt when regular musketry was first employed against

them."¹¹ This brilliant condottiere chief, paid by the Mysorean, fought at first on behalf of the English and Muhammad Ali and later on behalf of the French. Haidar was his comrade in arms in many a night attack and in many attempts to cut down convoys. But in his later life there is very little to show that at Trichi Haidar learnt the secret of Maratha success in attack. He was perhaps too much dazzled by the discipline, the skill, the inventive power of the westerner as contrasted with the supineness and want of cohesion of his own people to make a study of any other method of warfare. He came to understand the natural difficulties and dangers of war with a European power in the excellent school at Trichi. But somehow he failed to understand the other method of attack that was destined to give him much greater trouble. We have no means of ascertaining the exact nature of his contact with Murar Rao, but if the Canarese record *Haidarnama* is to be believed, they were far from friendly. Haidar is said to have actually vowed vengeance against Murar Rao "for the loss of a splendid gun called Vishunchakra" which Haidar had captured and which Murar Rao's protest to the *Dulwai* compelled him to disgorge.¹²

Throughout 1753 and 1754, Nanjaraj continued his attempts to seize Trichinopoly from Muhammad

¹¹ Orme, Vol. I, pp. 363-64.

¹² *Haidarnama*, quoted in Mysore Archaeological Report.

Ali and the English, the French co-operating with him in these attempts until their suspension of arms in October, 1754, and Murar Rao co-operating with them up to July, 1754, when he went back to Gooty. In these operations around Trichinopoly two officers of the Mysore army were very forward—one was Hari Singh, the other Haidar Ali. These rivals soon developed into sworn enemies.

When hostility first began between Nanjaraj and the British in December, 1752, Captain Dalton from Trichinopoly wanted to establish a post to harass Nanjaraj at Seringham. Dalton was foiled by the sudden and unaccountable panic of a portion of his troops of which Hari Singh, the Rajput *Jamadar* of cavalry in the Mysore army, took the fullest advantage, "charged the fugitives with fury and cut down the whole party of Nabob's sepoy excepting 15 men."¹³

After the "fraud of Trichinopoly" had become fully revealed and before hostilities actually began between Nanjaraj and the British, Haidar did a good turn to Nanjaraj. Major Lawrence had given his advice to seize Nanjaraj and Murar Rao in one of their conferences with Captain Dalton. Mill says, "the danger which might have been averted by securing the persons of those enemies was of considerable amount."¹⁴ If the British themselves

¹³ Orme, Vol. I, p. 271.

¹⁴ Lawrence's Narrative, p. 52.

Mill, *History of British India*, Vol. III, p. 116.

could entertain such an idea, Muhammad Ali, who was not certainly very conspicuous for his moral scruples, would readily have agreed. It is said that Muhammad Ali asked Nanjaraj to go with his principal sardars to take possession of the fort in person. He had already passed the first gate when Haidar Ali conveyed his apprehensions to Nanjaraj and said that it was not safe to enter the fort as it must be only a trap to capture them.¹⁵ Nanjaraj then contented himself with sending only a detachment of 700 men into the fort. It is not unnatural to assume that Haidar was responsible for inculcating into the mind of Nanjaraj suspicions about the honesty of the British and the genuineness of their assurances. This caution Nanjaraj, who was so eager to seize Trichinopoly, very badly needed, and after the first wave of his enthusiasm had subsided, Nanjaraj himself must have realized how sound Haidar Ali's warnings were.

On the 10th May, 1753, an attempt was made by Major Lawrence from Trichi to pass over to the island of Seringham and offer battle. In the operations of the day Hari Singh was conspicuous for his bravery; galloping at the head of his cavalry, he charged on the left of the British line breaking through sword in hand.¹⁶

On the 13th February, 1754, 12,000 Maratha and Mysore horse, 6,000 sepoy and 400 French

¹⁵ *Haidarnama*.

¹⁶ Orme, Vol. I, p. 344.

troops with seven guns attacked a British convoy approaching Trichinopoly through the woods belonging to the Poligar Tondiman (modern Pudukottai territory). Hari Singh is said to have led the charge, cutting down the marching platoons. "When the hurry of the action was over, Haidar, always attended by his Bedar peons, was found to be in possession of all the guns and tumbrils and Hari Singh claimed them as his own having actually carried them and such was the state of fact. The honour of the day perhaps belonged to Hari Singh but the guns were in possession of his rival and after a long discussion he was obliged to compound for one and leave the remaining three to Haidar as substantial trophies of a victory he had not gained."¹⁷

On the 14th August, 1754, a considerable British and Tanjorean detachment was marching to reinforce the British garrison of Trichinopoly. The French and Mysore troops attacked this detachment. They could not create much impression, but in the hurry of the fight the English rearguard by some mistake left the protection of the convoy. Haidar saw this and with a body of his troops fell on the rear of the convoy seizing 35 carts, some laden with arms and ammunition and others with baggage belonging to the British officers.¹⁸

¹⁷ Wilks, Vol. I, p. 322.

¹⁸ Orme, Vol. I, p. 369.

Hari Singh was conspicuous for his dash and daring, Haidar Ali for coolness and circumspection besides personal bravery. What was more, each attack on a convoy added considerably to Haidar's resources, but merely added to Hari Singh's reputation for his zeal in his master's cause. We should also note that Orme describes Haidar Ali as the best Mysorean officer at Trichinopoly. The 'Bishop of Halicarnassus' wrote that Dupleix sent Haidar a present in appreciation of his astuteness and zeal at Trichinopoly.¹⁹ Hari Singh might sneer at him as a man who owed his rise to fawning and flattery but Haidar could look back with satisfaction upon the period of his stay at Trichinopoly in which he created a great impression on the mind of Nanjaraj as also earned the appreciation of the French on whom he had to depend very much for the success of his ambitious projects. The invasion of Mysore by Salabat Jang, with Bussy in his company, led to the recall of Nanjaraj by Devraj and he moved from Seringham on the 9th April, 1755, handing it over to the French. His own troops were in arrears for nine months and he had to discharge 1/3rd of them on account of his financial difficulty. So great was his financial distress that the agents of Nanjaraj in order to meet their financial obligation to the French offered in July 1753, "a parcel of jewels set with precious stones amounting to 5 lakhs of rupees and

19 Portuguese Document No. III.

Nanjaraj's own turra set with precious stones, his sarpech, pendant and chains as a pledge for one lakh."²⁰ Towards the end of his stay here, Haidar was officially at the head of 15,00 horse, 3,000 regular infantry, 2,000 peons and 4 guns. He was now appointed the *Foujdar* of Dindigul and he added to his corps the best of the soldiers whom Nanjaraj had to discharge on account of his financial embarrassment. He came to Dindigul at the head of 5,000 regular infantry, 2,500 horse, 2,000 peons and six guns.²¹

Dindigul was conquered for Mysore by Barakki Venkat Rao from the Poligar of Uttamapalaiyam in 1745. The fort was situated on a rock 65 miles south-east of Trichinopoly and 45 miles north-west of Madura. About this time an English force was attempting to establish the authority of Muhammad Ali in the Madura-Tinnevely region. Instigated by Muhammad Ali the Poligars of Kannivadi, Palni and Virupakshi, who were dependent on Mysore, were withholding tribute.²² The Mysore Government had thus to appoint somebody who could

20 *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, Vol. IX, Introduction. When Nanjaraj, disgusted with Muhammad Ali and the British, joined the French, Dupleix by his diplomatic dexterity obtained an agreement from him that he would get Trichi on condition that he would pay the expenses of the French detachments helping him and also 3 lakhs of rupees a year.

21 Wilks, Vol. I, p. 352.

22 *Kaifiyat* of Haidar, MS. p. 32. (Mackenzie Ms.).

keep these rebel Poligars in check and also watch over the movements of the British at Madura and, if possible thwart them in co-operation with the *Jamadars* of Madura and the Poligars of the Tinnevely region. The *Foujdar* of Dindigul must be a strong resourceful person. Haidar was selected for the post. An ambitious man thus got his first independent command.

CHAPTER III

From Prominence To Power, 1755-1760

The first task of the new *Foujdar* of Dindigul was the subjugation of the rebellious Poligars led by Amminayaka and Appinayaka, the Poligars of Palni and Virupakshi.¹ As he approached their territory on his way to Dindigul, he offered his help to secure a remission of their tribute. Thus posing as a friend he obtained a safe passage and, on reaching Dindigul, organised his attack. There were 26 *palayams* or feudal estates under his jurisdiction.² If all the Poligars had united they could have put into the field 30,000 troops and easily overwhelmed Haidar. But these contumacious Poligars remained disunited and were brought to their knees with extraordinary rapidity. Kannivadi is 10 miles due west of Dindigul. It is close under the Palni hills. If harried on the plains, the Poligars at Kannivadi would retire to the hills above. Haidar took two months to clear away the jungles and obstacles which surrounded the Kannivadi fort.

¹ *Haidarnama*.

² W. Francis, *Gazetteer of the Madura District*, Vol. I, p. 183.

The Poligar was reduced to such a plight that he promised to pay 3 lakhs of *chakrans* and paid at once 70,000;³ but as he was unable to find the remainder, Haidar Ali sequestered his state, arrested him and sent him to Bangalore. At Palni, Haidar plundered everything valuable and compelled the Poligar, who had fled, to pay a fine of 1,75,000 *chakrans*. Virupakshi, 13 miles east of Palni, was also a very difficult country. But its Poligar had no heart to resist. When Haidar Ali entered the country only two of the Poligar states were under resumption. He resumed all others, except five.⁴

At Dindigul, Haidar was also busy increasing his army and accumulating wealth. Wilks says on the strength of the evidence of eye witnesses that Haidar was an adept in fraudulent musters. On one occasion only 67 persons were wounded, but he secured allowance for 700 and cleverly hoodwinked a commissioner sent from Seringapatam. Exaggerated reports of disturbances were sent and Haidar was permitted to increase his troops and by means of a circular muster ten thousand men were passed off as 18,000.⁵ It has been asserted, certainly with some exaggeration, that he amassed wealth to the extent of 20 lakhs, as a result of his operations against the Poligars.⁶ He was not content with

3 *Madura Gazetteer*, Vol. I, p. 239. A *Chakran* = $1\frac{1}{4}$ Rupees.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 69. 5 Wilks, pp. 353-54. 6 *Haidarnama*.

merely playing the part of a pike in a pond. He is said to have obtained skilful French engineers to organise his regular artillery, arsenal and laboratory. All this kept him occupied during the years 1755 and 1756.

The *Jamadars* of Madura headed by Barkatullah and the Poligars of Tinnevely, who were resisting the attempts of the British and Muhammad Ali to conquer Madura, wrote to Haidar for assistance. They even offered to give up the district of Sholavandam, comprising a strong pass and the only road between Madura and Tinnevely, but Haidar, recalled temporarily to Mysore in 1757, was not at that time in a position to accept the offer. Madura surrendered to the British in 1757. Haidar came back to Dindigul in November, took the fort of Sholavandam without resistance and entered the district of Madura. He approached the walls of the city but found them much stronger than he had expected. He plundered the country and sent off the cattle and other booty to Dindigul. Muhammad Yusuf, the general of Muhammad Ali, described as the ablest of the Indian soldiers who fought in the Carnatic Wars, now advanced upon him. Haidar "took post with a part of his army near the issue of the pass of Nattam in order to intercept the march."⁷ This pass, between the Alagarmalais and the eastern spurs of the Sirumalais, was, accord-

ing to Orme, one of the most difficult and dangerous defiles in the peninsula. Muhammad Yusuf attacked and his better disciplined army and his powerful guns worked havoc amongst Haidar's men. Haidar was defeated and withdrew. Collecting his detachments he returned to Dindigul.

While Haidar was consolidating his position in Dindigul, affairs at Mysore had taken a turn which provided him with further opportunities. Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao first invaded Mysore in 1753. He had to be bought off from attacking Seringapatam by the payment of 30 lakhs and promises of greater regularity in future. He was accompanied by his cousin Sadasiva Chimnaji in this expedition.

At the beginning of 1755, Salabat Jang and Bussy came to Mysore. The march of the Mughal army was proverbially slow. If his brother from Trichinopoly could come in time, Devraj thought that he would be able to take the enemy in the flank. But Salabat and Bussy marched very fast; indeed, the celerity of Bussy's movements struck terror. Kungul, the only fort that resisted, was taken by storm. Devraj was compelled to agree to pay 56 lakhs of rupees. The plates and jewels of the Hindu temples, as also the personal ornaments of the Raja and his family which were sold, only realized $1/3$ of the sum. For the rest Devraj gave bankers' securities. But as no payment could be made the usurpers' Government lost all credit with the bankers. The

Peshwa, whose army was operating about the Dharwar-Hubli-Kundgol region, was persuaded by Bussy not to make demands on Mysore. He therefore devoted his attention to settling Maratha claims on Bidnur, Basavapatna and Chittaldurg. He also captured various places in the Mysore territory to the north-west of that state.⁸

The disgraceful failure of Nanjaraj at Trichi, the inability of the usurpers to resist the encroachments of the Nizam and the Peshwa, and the collapse of their credit perhaps emboldened the King (who was smarting under their yoke) to conspire against them. The Raja, his mother and the *Pradhani Pandit* Venkatapati Ayyan, who was at one time himself the *Sarbadhikari*, resolved to seize and imprison Nanjaraj and their plan was to restore Venkatapati Ayyan to his former position. Nanjaraj collected 4,000 troops and decided on attacking the palace. But Devraj pacified him and Nanjaraj contented himself with placing guards on the palace. The house of Venkatapati Ayyan was, however, plundered and Venkatapati and his wife were imprisoned at Manvallidurg, his son and son-in-law in Kabaldurg. Thus was the conspiracy nipped in the bud.⁹ This happened in October and November, 1755. The Raja was, however, im-

8 S.P.D., Vol. 28, letters no. 111, 112, 113, 114. Papers for the years 1754-56 are not forthcoming because the Peshwa was himself on the spot.

9 *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, Vol IX, pp. 369, 370, 398.

patient to get rid of the usurpers. Several months after this they heard that he was approaching Shahbaz (brother of Haidar) and Khande Rao (Haidar's *Mutsaddi*¹⁰). On hearing this Nanjaraj and Devraj ordered the fort gates to be closed. They prepared to kill the Raja the next morning. But the Raja with his immediate retainers (1,000 in all) sallied forth with drawn swords, killed a large number of Nanjaraj's troops, and dispersed the rest. The Raja having gone back to the palace, Nanjaraj fired all the guns that he had mounted on the walls, and slew men, women and domestic servants of the King, numbering 100. Nanjaraj and Devraj then entered the palace and seized all the Raja's people. "They also resolved to kill the raja but Krishnaraja Udaiyar's wife who had brought him up clung to him and vowed that they should kill her first. After much talk they decided to imprison the raja and his family." Balaji Baji Rao's *vakil* protested against this treatment of the King, who is said to have sent a letter to the Peshwa by camel messengers.¹¹ This happened in August, 1756. Balaji however could not come to Mysore before April, 1757.

Thus it appears that Devraj and Nanjaraj were both in favour of removing the Raja by violence. The statement of Wilks that Devraj opposed the violent proceedings of Nanjaraj is not borne out by

10 *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, Vol. X, p. 181.

11 *Ibid.*, Vol. X, p. 181.

the above entry in the Dairy of Ananda Ranga Pillai, which on this point was based on the information supplied by the Mysore *vakil*. But the brothers had their differences. These two masterful personalities were bound to part sooner or later. Devraj, grown old, resented the hustling tactics of Nanjaraj.¹² The differences that commenced with the Trichinopoly expedition became very acute in the beginning of 1757. Devraj thought it better to withdraw altogether and with his family, his personal adherents, 1,000 horse and 2,000 peons, he withdrew to Satyamangala in February, 1757. From Satyamangala he is said to have issued his orders to the *amil*s of several districts assigned to Haidar to make their payments to him. This led to the coming of Haidar from Dindigul early in 1757.

In February, 1757, Nanjaraj was the undisputed master of the Mysore kingdom. The King, he was sure, was now absolutely incapable of any attempt to wriggle out and Devraj, the senior usurper, was eliminated. Nanjaraj now required only a respite from foreign invasions to consolidate his authority. But this respite he could not get. The Marathas entered Mysore in March, 1757, and besieged Nanjaraj at Seringapatam. A battery of 30 guns was opened by Sadasiva Rao Bhau. One of the shots is said to have struck the top of the

¹² Misunderstanding in connection with the treasury was the cause of their quarrel according to *Haidarnama*.

temple of Rangaswami and a gun in the battery burst killing several besiegers. Both parties feared divine wrath and decided to come to terms, Nanjaraj agreeing to pay 32 lakhs. Sadasiva Rao raised the siege but the usurper of Mysore could only pay 6 lakhs in cash. 13 *taluks* were handed over as security for the payment of the remaining amount.¹³

After the departure of the Marathas, Haider arrived at Seringapatam from Dindigul. He advised his chief to expel the Maratha agents as also the Maratha troops occupying these districts on the approach of the rains. The rivers would then swell and the Marathas would not be able to cross the Krishna and the Tungabhadra until the water level subsided. He would then have time to come with reinforcements from Dindigul.¹⁴

Before his departure from Dindigul for Seringapatam, Haider had received from the chief of Palghat on the eastern frontier of Malabar an appeal for help, that chief being at war with the Zamorin of Calicut. Haider sent Makhdum Ali, his brother-in-law, with 5,000 infantry, 2,000 horse and 5 guns. Makhdum advanced up to the sea coast. The Zamorin of Calicut agreed to pay a military contribution of 12 lakhs by instalments. Makhdum

13 According to *Haidarnama*, these were Nagmangala, Kadaba, Banavara, Chenraypatnal, Kikkeri, Haranahalli, Kadur, Turkere, Belur, Chicknayakanahalli, Honnavali, Halliyurdurg, Kandikire.

14 Wilks, Vol. I, pp. 359-60.

left an army of occupation. The Malabar chiefs, to get rid of this, offered through their agents to pay their dues to Devraj. Haidar in his turn waited on Devraj who was persuaded to surrender the districts of Haidar that he was enjoying and agreed to pay him 3 lakhs for the expenses of the Malabar expedition. Haidar surrendered his claims to the military contribution from Malabar and Devraj sent Hari Singh to realize the amount.¹⁵ But this Malabar episode made Haidar realize how easy it was to conquer divided and distracted Malabar from the landside. Of this knowledge acquired by the reconnitting expedition of Makhdum Ali, he made excellent use later.

The Government of Mysore was bankrupt. The pay of the soldiers was for several months in arrears, and there was a mutiny, which took a form peculiarly Indian. The soldiers sat in '*Dharna*,' preventing water and provisions being carried into the apartments of Nanjaraj. This information reached Haidar at Dindigul, who thereupon went in person to Devraj at Satyamangala, entreated him to be reconciled to his brother, arguing with every plausible reason that otherwise the Government would be entirely dissolved. Devraj was very ill, suffering from dropsy. There was a public reconciliation with his brother but shortly after he died. On his insistence Nanjaraj had made his submission

and apologies to the Raja for the former outrage. The soldiers were demanding their pay. Nanjaraj asked Haidar and his assistant Khande Rao to make an adjustment. Haidar, "with constant demonstrations of deference to the Raja's order, distributed in lieu of money all public property that could be so applied down to the elephants and horses of the Raja's retinue." He compelled the accountants to produce true accounts and thus succeeded in discharging most of the soldiers. Then he seized the ringleaders and plundered them of all their property.¹⁶ In all these transactions Haidar was all things to all men. Nanjaraj was grateful to him for his reconciliation with his brother before his death. The King looked upon him as his sole protector against Nanjaraj, whose violence he could not possibly forget. The troops thought that they owed their payment entirely to his exertions. Haidar was conscious of the strength of his position but perhaps he felt that he was not strong enough to attempt to oust Nanjaraj at this stage. He must not be precipitate.

Hari Singh was the one man in Mysore who was thought to be a better soldier than Haidar. A man of implacable revenge, Haidar could never

¹⁶ This episode is narrated in a very confused manner by Kirmāni. *Haidarnama* does not give a sufficiently detailed account. The *Ms. Or.* 1865 gives a narrative that is palpably false. Parkinson trips over this pitfall. I had thus to depend on Wilks alone.

forgive or forget personal insults, injuries and rivalries. Hari Singh had always expressed openly his contempt for him as a soldier. His patron Devraj was now dead. He could not under the present circumstances think of continuing in Mysore service. Haidar sent Makhdum Saheb with 1,000 horse and 2,000 infantry ostensibly to Dindigul but really to surprise and cut down Hari Singh. Having failed to realize the military contribution from Malabar he had withdrawn to Coimbatore, where he was refreshing his troops. He was cut down with most of his men in a surprise attack. Wilks says, "300 horses, one thousand muskets, 3 guns were brought in triumph to the capital.....3 guns and 15 beautiful horses were presented in form to the Raja. The remainder were appropriated by Haidar."¹⁷

Devaraj had promised to pay Haidar 3 lakhs for his expenses in Malabar. Nanjaraj recognised this claim. He was given an assignment on the revenues of Coimbatore. For his services in the recent disturbances and as a recognition of his fidelity and zeal he was given the fort and district of Bangalore as a jagir.¹⁸

¹⁷ Vol. I, p. 369. Kirmani's account is very confused. But he admits that the sleeping party was attacked and put to the sword and Haidar appropriated most of their arms, baggage, money, utensils, horses and other articles.

¹⁸ Wilks, Vol. I, p. 369. The Bishop of Halicarnassus says that Bangalore was conferred on Haidar immediately before the siege of Mysore to quicken his zeal against Nanjaraj.

But Haidar must now reckon with the Marathas. In pursuance of his advice, Maratha agents had been expelled from the ceded districts. Murar Rao of Gooty, dissatisfied with the part assigned to him in the scheme of Maratha expansion in the South, had become lukewarm to his master and even sympathised with a league against the Peshwa, composed of the chiefs of Cuddapah, Savanur and others. Balwant Rao Mehendele, entrusted by the Poona Government with the realization of dues from Mysore, was engaged in fighting against this hostile combination. He succeeded in defeating Nawab Abdul Hamid Khan of Cuddapah on the 25th September, 1757.¹⁹ But his cousin and heir, Abdul Nabi, still continued the fight and occupied the Marathas for a longer time than they could spare. In the meantime, an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded with Murar Rao Ghorpade on the 11th May, 1757.²⁰ All these disturbances over, Balawant Rao Mehendele would naturally turn against Mysore. The Peshwa informed Balawant Rao that Gopal Rao Patwardhan and Malhar Rao Raste had been instructed to advance and give him support against Mysore.²¹ But Balawant Rao was detained in the district of Cuddapah until February, 1758. The troops under Gopal Rao were employed near the Godavari under

19 S.P.D., Vol. 28, letter no. 146.

20 *Ibid.*, letter no. 185.

21 *Ibid.*, letter no. 205.

the Peshwa's son, Viswas Rao. The Peshwa's plan is quoted by Grant Duff from an original letter from the Peshwa to Balawant Rao in which the latter was advised "to march to that place (Bidnur) as soon as possible.....the whole would fall into his hands before the arrival of Gopal Rao when they must conjointly attack Chittaldrug".²² Grant Duff comments that if this scheme had been practicable it would in all probability have prevented the rise of Haidar Ali. But Balawant Rao, after being detained in fighting against the Poligars until February, had to go northward on account of complications in Hyderabad. The Mysoreans had a welcome respite of which Haidar took the fullest advantage; he consolidated his hold, secured Bangalore, cut down Hari Singh and got the upperhand in all the affairs of Mysore.

Towards the close of 1758, the Marathas came again to Mysore under Gopal Rao Patwardhan and Ananda Rao Raste. Payments were demanded of the Mysore Raja towards the end of 1758. The name of Haidar is now pretty frequently mentioned in the Maratha news letters. Every letter comments on the wavering attitude of the Raja of Mysore. The Marathas, however, adopted vigorous measures. An ultimatum was sent to the Raja of Mysore that in the case of noncompliance with the request for the payment of arrears, they would invade Mysore

territory within 36 hours.²³ Everyone knew that Haidar counselled non-compliance. The Maratha chiefs wrote, "We shall let Haidar enter Bangalore and then raise our batteries and see how he forces them"²⁴ They commenced their march upon Bangalore in September, 1758, and invested it, occupying the districts of Bangalore, Kolar, Deonhalli and Hoskote. Even Chenapatna, about 40 miles from Seringapatam, was taken. At Bangalore Srinivas Rao Barakki was besieged by them and soon the garrison there found itself faced with starvation. Srinivas Rao appealed to his father Barakki Venkata Rao at Seringapatam for help. Haidar relieved Bangalore by retaking Chenapatna.

Some arrears were still due to the troops in service. Most of the senior generals of Mysore were unwilling to advance against the Marathas unless these arrears were paid. Haidar offered to take personal responsibility for arrears due to the men which were not heavy, and he was placed in charge of the field army to the disgust of the older chiefs who resigned. He placed respectable detachments at Maddur and Malavilly which guarded the approaches to the capital. The commandant at Maddur, Latif Ali Beg, succeeded in recapturing Chenapatna by escalade.²⁵ Haidar concentrated his force. Gopal Rao had to raise the siege of Bangalore²⁶ and marched

23 S.P.D., Vol. 28, letter no. 226.

24 *Ibid.*, letter no. 229.

25 *Ibid.*, letter no. 242.

26 *Ibid.*, letter no. 256.

against Haider who fortified his camp. Haider occupied a difficult mountain terrain where horsemen could not penetrate. He never ventured out at daytime and contented himself with making night attacks in which he was incessantly active.²⁷ This continued for more than two months. Haider could not expect to defeat the Marathas in the open. But if he just succeeded in remaining on the defensive it might wear them out and induce them to withdraw. There is nothing to show that Haider was victorious in the open field. In a letter dated August 19, 1758,²⁸ we find Gopal Rao and Malhar Rao writing to their agent at Seringapatam that they had received a despatch from the Peshwa intimating that he was not inclined to exchange the ceded territory for money to be paid by the Mysore Raja. But, they added, as they had given their word they would abide by it if the Raja accepted their proposal. But what Haider really did, was to agree to these terms after months of campaigning. That does not point to victory but rather to a desire to get the State embroiled more and more so that he could catch the reins of government that were slipping from the hands of Nanjaraj. The Marathas gave up their claims to ceded districts and received 32 lakhs of rupees in liquidation of all claims past and present. Sixteen lakhs were paid in cash by realising a forced contribution from all individuals.

27 S.P.D., Vol. 28, letter no. 254.

28 *Ibid.*, letter no. 225.

For the rest Haidar gave his personal security and such was his credit that the bankers in the Maratha camp agreed to make the advance on his assurance.²⁹ Haidar took the 13 ceded districts under his own direct management so that from their revenues he could liquidate his debt to the bankers.

"Haidar Naik has made you lose your reputation", so said the Peshwa to Gopal Rao.³⁰ But Gopal Rao would not agree. He asserted that Haidar Ali was not the man to pay this huge amount without being put to very serious difficulty. This statement seems to be justified. But the relief of Bangalore and the escalade of Chenapatna were exploited by Haidar, who was welcomed as a victor who brought peace with honour.

The large assignments made to Haidar and the heavy payments made to the Marathas left the State unable to defray even the ordinary expenses. Arrears to troops began to accumulate. Haidar had become practically the commander-in-chief. The King could not forget the insults and injuries he had suffered from Nanjaraj and the old dowager of the late Dud Deo Raj conspired through Khande Rao with Haidar. Once again the old weapon of 'Dharna' came handy.

The plot, as it has been described by Wilks,

29 *Kaifiyat* of Haidar—the Mackenzie Ms., p. 33, says that Khande Rao, his *Mutsaddi*, and Viranna Chetti, a great banker, were his hostages.

30 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 24.

was a very simple one. Khande Rao instructed some of the leaders of the army who wanted payment of the arrears to approach Haider. He protested that he was only responsible for the payment of the troops in his charge and they were regularly paid. The troops then requested him to use his good offices to secure payment from Nanjaraj. They repeated their request day after day and ultimately demanded insistently that he should go at their head to sit '*Dharna*' at the gate of Nanjaraj. Haider complied with the demand, seemingly with great reluctance. Nanjaraj could see through the whole episode and perceived the full extent of the plot as soon as he saw Haider at his gate. He had a talk with Haider in which the details of his life in retirement were perhaps settled. Then he told the soldiery that in view of the misfortunes of his administration, he had decided to retire and resign office. They should better go to the King. Haider then led them to the palace. The King, who was in the know, agreed to meet the demands of his troops provided Haider renounced his relations with Nanjaraj, Haider again agreeing with seeming reluctance. In order to enable him to pay the arrears and provide for regular payments to the troops, additional assignments were made to Haider who thus had in his direct possession more than half of the kingdom. Nanjaraj was given a jagir yielding 3 lakhs of pagodas and he was to maintain 1,000 horse and 3,000 infantry. But on his way towards

his jagir, he halted at Mysore whence he would not withdraw. His residence so near the capital was inconvenient. It was therefore decided by the King in council (the Raja in consultation with Haidar and Khande Rao) that he would not be required to maintain any detachment of troops and his jagir should be reduced to 1 lakh of pagodas and he must be compelled to leave Mysore. This Nanjaraj refused to do and Haidar was ordered to besiege Mysore. Wilks refers to an underplot of protracting the siege in order to make it the ground of future encroachment. He says that otherwise it did not seem that Haidar had profited much by his prolonged stay at Trichinopoly. There may be some truth in the statement. But Wilks makes no allowance for the fact that a man can do wonders when he has the energy of despair. Nanjaraj, a bungling aggressor at Trichinopoly, was defending his last ditch against an ungrateful man who owed every step in his rise to his personal favour. A Portuguese writer refers to the incredible valour of Nanjaraj and the ability of his white troops. Haidar's success would have been doubtful if Bento de Campos, the Portuguese officer commanding Nanjaraj's white troops, had not violated the oath which he had taken over an image of the virgin.³¹

31 S. N. Sen, *A Portuguese Account of Haidar Ali*, *Calcutta Review*, December, 1937. Pissurlencar's document, II. Peixoto says, "With the second king were 2 European chiefs, one Manuel Alvoes, who had about 600 men with hats, 150 of which were

He deserted to Haidar, compelling Nanjaraj to capitulate. But this was only to be expected. These European adventurers, who fill so important a place in the history of India in the 18th century, made treachery a part of their profession. Whoever built his plan of defence on the support of these 'hatmen' built upon a foundation of sand. After his capitulation Nanjaraj was permitted to withdraw to Coonoor. To Haidar the districts taken from Nanjaraj had already been assigned, but not content with these he demanded that in view of the expenses of the siege of Mysore and the needs of defence he must have a further assignment. This is said to have been opposed by Khande Rao but there was no stopping Haidar and four more districts were added to his block of territory. This episode is said to have brought about an estrangement between Haidar and his erstwhile supporter Khande Rao.

Khande Rao began his career as Haidar's accountant. To him Haidar largely owed the perfection of the Bedar peon organisation that made his part in military expeditions so profitable to him. While Haidar was at Dindigul, Khande Rao re-

Europeans, all Portuguese. The other chief was named Bento Dos Campos, who had also 400 of the same kind."

Haidar desired Peixoto to seduce the two European chiefs. But Manuel Alvoes, unlike Bento de Campos, could not come away and remained with the 'second king' till the fort was unavoidably given up when it was found undermined.

presented him at Seringapatam and his zeal in his master's cause was unsurpassed. He became the link between Haidar and the royal family and his machinations developed into that successful scheme which led to the retirement of Nanjaraj and the installation of Haidar in his place. He was rewarded by being appointed as the *Pradhan* or *Dewan* for that portion of the kingdom not yet assigned to Haidar, but he also remained Haidar's *Dewan* for the assigned portion. In his dual capacity he could control the entire revenue administration. The mounting demands of Haidar are, however, said to have created a feeling of disgust in the mind of Khande Rao. The dowager queen as also the puppet King could see that they had only exchanged King Log for King Stork. Haidar, master of the army and of more than half the kingdom, kept the King as a part of a pageant as Nanjaraj had done.

As we study the history of the rise of Haidar Ali, he does not appear to have possessed the daring and generous spirit of hero, who courts danger and fame, disdains artifice and boldly challenges the allegiance of others. He is more conspicuous for the steady pursuit of his aims, the flexibility of his means and the ability to submit his passions to the interest of his ambition. His career was marked by implacable vindictiveness and gross ingratitude, for revenge was profitable and gratitude expensive. Pride and virtue may recoil from many of his manoeuvres but one cannot but admire his power of

assigning to objectives their true priorities which, combined with his brilliant opportunism, led him from success to success. Grote refers to the machinery of fraud and the machinery of force used by the usurpers of ancient Greece. Haidar was not less adroit than they in the use of fraud and force, first to establish and then to consolidate his authority.

CHAPTER IV

Reverses and Recovery, 1760-1761

Haidar's usurpation was complete. It was therefore natural that the court party would make an attempt to bring about his overthrow. Khande Rao as Haidar's *Dewan* was expected by him to guard against such a contingency. Therefore they first of all won Khande Rao over. The prominent members of the court party were *Pradhan Venkatapataiya*, *Venkatapataiya* of the treasury, *Viranna Chetty* and *Anniah Sastri*.¹ Their plan, formed in consultation with the King and the dowager, widow of *Dud Deo Kissen*, was the expulsion and destruction of Haidar. Khande Rao was persuaded to turn his back on his patron and take an active part in his expulsion. *Kirmani's* interesting comment on Khande Rao's desertion is that "the water of a little pool soon becomes offensive." The conspirators also came to an understanding with the Maratha chief *Visaji Pandit*² and a concerted attack was

¹ *Haidarnama*.

² S.P.D., Vol. 28, letter no. 266. *Visaji Krishna* wrote to *Balkoba Taty*, "The ruler of Mysore has agreed to pay tributes of 2 years according to an agreement with *Gopal Rao* and besides this

arranged. Most of the troops of Haidar had gone with Makhdum Ali to aid the French. Even Ismail Saheb and Peixoto had gone with another detachment to Anekal preparing to march towards Arcot. He was left with only $2/3$ risalas of regular infantry (consisting of about 1,500 men), 400 horse of his own stable and 1,000 foot without arms.³ The date fixed for the ruin of Haidar was 12th August, 1760. On the appointed day at dawn, a cannonade opened from the ramparts on Haidar, who occupied a position near the modern *Daria Daulat Bag*. Haidar was taken by surprise. A detachment sent by Khande Rao cut down Haidar's infantry and cavalry on the northern bank. The Marathas did not arrive in proper time. Khande Rao decided to wait for them before launching his final attack. Visaji was coming with 10,000 troops and 10 guns. Haidar and Khande Rao are said to have exchanged messages, perhaps to amuse each other. Haidar temporized till the night came and then sped up. He had seized all the boatmen of the river side with their baskets. He ran away leaving all his family, taking with him only $2/300$ well-mounted horses and bags of gold and jewels. He was fortunate to find the landing place on the northern bank unguarded. The only explanation possible is that

to pay 3 lakhs for forage, and has also returned the posts he took and has come over to *Sarkar's* side (*i.e.*, side of the Poona Government)."

3 Portuguese document, no. III.

Khande Rao did not really want to kill him and was willing to facilitate his escape. Wilks says, this remnant of virtuous feeling was politically imprudent.⁴ Manuel Alvoes in Haidar's service was killed and the other European joined the Brahmin.⁵ Haidar knew Khande Rao sufficiently well to count upon his treating his family with kindness.

Haidar went first to Anekal, where Ismail Saheb was posted with a cavalry detachment. Ismail was at once despatched to Bangalore to ascertain the fidelity of the commandant Kabir Beg, an old comrade. On receiving assurance from Ismail, Haidar made a dash to Bangalore at the head of the detachment at Anekal and reached there on the evening of the 13th. It was this indomitable spirit and this promptness that saved Haidar. But with the exception of Bangalore, Anekal, Dindigul and Baramahal, nothing now remained to him. He must begin his career anew. Visaji Pandit had joined Khande Rao with his troops. Haidar could at best only hope to stand on the defensive at Bangalore until Makhdum Ali with his detachment succeeded in rejoining him. By persuasion and cajolery, Haidar succeeded in getting from the merchants at Bangalore a loan of 4 lakhs of rupees. It must be added here that Haidar later repaid this amount.⁶ He always wanted to keep on good terms with the bankers. This was the one trade guild with which

4 Wilks, Vol. I., p. 418.

5 Peixoto, Book I.

6 Orme Ms., Vol. 33—a letter from John Strachey.

every ambitious politician, even in those unsettled times, had to keep faith. Otherwise, he would find it very difficult to tide over crises.

When Haidar entered into an alliance with the French in order to expel the British, a treaty was concluded on the 4th June, 1760.⁷ In order to clear the way he took possession of the district of Baramahall, belonging to the Nawab of Cuddapah. He also seized Anekal from the Poligar of that place. The fort of Tiagar was yielded by the French as a post of deposit and communication. When Makhdum marched back post haste on receiving instruction from Haidar, his route was Tiagar, Krishnagiri, Rayakottai and Anekal.⁸ But in the last place he found himself completely surrounded by the Marathas and the King's force. Kirmani says that although the Marathas were camel-hearted they were as numerous as the locusts and they buzzed round Makhdum like flies.⁹ He had to withdraw to Anchetty instead of advancing to Bangalore. To enable him to break through the cordon Haidar sent from Bangalore as many troops as he could spare without facing a collapse of the Bangalore defence. Haidar's relieving force numbered 1,400 foot, 330 horse and 250 coolies with powder and ball, 12

7 *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, vol. XII Orme, Vol. II, p. 642. The treaty was signed on the 27th.

8 Makhdum started from Tiagar on the 16th September, 1760. (Orme, Vol. II, p. 686).

9 *Nishan-i-Haidari*, Miles, p. 82.

camels with money, 400 men with provisions and 500 workmen to level roads.¹⁰ It was commanded by Mir Faizulla, who was a son-in-law of Dilwar Khan, the late Nawab of Sera, and who had joined him in the days of his adversity at Bangalore. Faizulla's relieving force passed through the middle of the Maratha troops under a brisk fire. This relieving force reached Kellamangal but Makhdum, who had the day before narrowly escaped being routed by the Marathas, was at Anchetty. In a fight in the open which was forced by the Marathas, Faizulla's detachment lost 900 foot and 130 horse in killed, wounded and prisoners. But division of plunder led to quarrel among the Marathas. Some of the prisoners succeeded in escaping in the midst of the disorder and in joining the main army. Makhdum was perhaps justified in saying, "The Marathas are more thieves than soldiers."¹¹

Still Haidar was now absolutely helpless. The relieving force was completely defeated and Makhdum was surrounded. Haidar's career seemed again approaching its close. Negotiations for peace with the Marathas had for a long time been afoot. The Marathas suddenly appeared to be very amenable and they now agreed to withdraw on his paying 5 lakhs and ceding Baramahal. This sudden turn in the wheel of fortune was a mystery to Haidar at that time, though he availed himself

10 Peixoto, Book I.

11 *Ibid.*

of the opportunity with alacrity. The Nawab of Arcot also paid a very considerable sum of money to the Marathas. Though Visaji thus sold himself to Haidar Ali and Muhammad Ali, his withdrawal was really due to the very difficult position of Maratha affairs in Northern India, which later led to the disastrous defeat at Panipat on the 14th January, 1761. Visaji had to make the best terms he could in the existing circumstances. Pondicherry surrendered to Coote on the 14th January, 1761. Three hundred French troops under Alain and Hugel took service with Haidar Ali.¹² When Haidar became aware of the Maratha defeat at Panipat he refrained from handing over the Baramahahal districts. The *Faujdar* of Krishnagiri, when approached for the surrender of the fort, said that he could not think of giving up forts and territory on a single order. When the Marathas insisted on an authentic repetition, Haidar plainly told them that no order or signature could be repeated.¹³

With the junction of the detachments commanded by Makhdum Ali, Haidar became numerically superior to Khande Rao. But he sent a considerable number of troops towards Salem and Coimbatore in order to recover that country from the agents of Khande Rao. In the contest which was inevitable, he was to depend on his

¹² Military Consultations, Vol. 14A, 1761, p. 15.

¹³ *Nishan-i-Haidari*, Miles, p. 89.

resources in that region. It became necessary to cover the operations of this detachment and for this purpose he crossed the Cauvery at Sossila. Khande Rao was there with his army, but Haidar, trusting too much to his superior ability, had again become numerically inferior. Khande Rao "compelled Haidar's infantry to change its front and charged it when in the act of performing that evolution. On this occasion, his success was considerable and Haidar was defeated with very heavy loss but retired in tolerably good order."¹⁴ Haidar now suddenly appeared in all humility before Nanjaraj at Coonoor. He must have had a very poor opinion of the intelligence of Nanjaraj to think that such stage acting would be effective. But so it was. Haidar appeared so repentant for his past misdeeds and ascribed all his misfortunes so readily to base ingratitude that Nanjaraj, always proud of the fact that it was he who had picked up Haidar, was completely deceived. It was given out that he would henceforth exercise the functions of *Sarvadhikari*

¹⁴ Wilks, Vol. I, p. 426. I do not find this victory of Khande Rao at Nanjengad mentioned in any Maratha news letter or in the contemporary Portuguese accounts of Peixoto or Noronah or even in contemporary English records. The Persian Chronicles are not in the habit of mentioning Haidar's smaller defeats and they even pass off defeats as victories. But a defeat in the open field, as mentioned by Wilks, seems very probable. Otherwise we cannot explain the sudden appearance of Haidar as a suppliant before Nanjaraj at Coonoor.

with Haidar as his *Dulwai*. He lent Haidar Ali his own household troops numbering 1,500 and 3 guns.¹⁵ What was more, he gave Haidar Ali the advantage of his name and influence. Nanjaraj's name worked wonders. The British records mention this strange combination—"A similarity of circumstances has produced a very extraordinary coalition in the Kingdom of Mysore. Nanjaraj was sometime ago obliged to fly from Seringapatam through the intrigues of Haidarnaik. The present Prime Minister lately supplanted Haidarnaik. Now both Nanjaraj and Haidarnaik have united their interest in order to oblige the King to sacrifice Khande Rao to their resentment."¹⁶ Haidar's troops and the household troops of Nanjaraj united at Kutte Malwaddy. The royal army advanced under the command of Khande Rao. It consisted of 4,000 Siphais, armed with European guns, 3,000 horsemen, 50 Europeans, 6 pieces of field artillery, necessary provisions and 200 topasses. Haidar's defeat was this time a certainty if in battle the greater number could be relied on to defeat the lesser. But Haidar now took recourse to a stratagem and the astute Khande Rao was so easily duped that this requires an explanation. In war the influence of moral causes is to that of physical as three to one, so said the greatest master of the art of war. A large part of the army

15 Portuguese document, no. III—Noronah's account.

16 Military Consultations, Vol. 14A, 1761, p. 17.

held together by Khande Rao was composed of deserters. He could not therefore be very sure of the constancy of their devotion to his cause. This alone explains the success of so simple a stratagem. But Haidar could count unhesitatingly on the support of his soldiery who had flocked under his banner in the days of his adversity. He took advantage of Khande Rao's distrust of some of his officers to write some letters in the form of replies in which he promised them big rewards if they would slay their commander Khande Rao on that night. The messenger fell purposely into the hands of the guards of the camp and was taken to Khande Rao, who, suspecting a treacherous correspondence between his officers and Haidar, abandoned his army and rode away secretly to Seringapatam.¹⁷ The whole army, rank and file, was in a state of dismay when the soldiers came to hear of this sudden flight of their leader. A disorderly flight now began. Haidar, who was informed of everything, arranged a concerted attack in the front and rear and it was so successful that by seven o'clock in the morning he was the master of the whole army, its guns, stores and baggage, only a few swift horsemen escaping. Haidar consolidated his success by incorporating most of the soldiers in his army. A contemporary Portuguese document puts this episode in a slightly different way: "As the majority of

17 Portuguese document, no. III—Noronah's account.

the Cabos (petty officers) in the army were Muslims, the astute and cunning rebel easily corrupted them with presents and promises, so that they fled precipitately leaving arms, artillery and all their retinue behind and victory declared for the fraudulent and rebellious Muslim."¹⁸ Haidar halted for 4 or 5 days. Khande Rao was drawing his troops together at Seringapatam, where many of the fugitives had gathered near the Mysore gate. Four platoons of Haidar made a surprise night attack on these disorganised bands. After doing as much injury as they could they fell back. Haidar was not in a position to undertake a prolonged siege. He thought it better to leave Seringapatam alone for the time being and recapture those places in the South which were still in the hands of Khande Rao's men—Satgud, Erode, Sankaridrug, Palni and Dhara-pur. After this he marched back to Seringapatam. On his way he entered Mysore and left Nanjaraj there. But he resumed his march and made his approaches for the siege. "But it would have been impossible for him to effect anything since neither his army nor his implements of war were sufficient for the siege of such a place."¹⁹ A few days after the preparations had commenced the King offered terms of accommodation. Khande Rao's influence was undermined by his misfortunes. The foreign officers as well as other agents at Seringapatam, the parti-

¹⁸ Portuguese document, no. II.

¹⁹ Peixoto, Book I.

sans of Haidar and Nanjaraj, were very solicitous to promote Haidar's reconciliation with the King and to sacrifice Khande Rao.²⁰ Haidar's biographer says that he fired a few shots at the palace of the Raja to frighten the women. As soon as these shots struck the zenana, a mighty cry arose from them and all the women making great noise and clamour went to the King. Frightened out of his senses at the tumult and the wailing of the women he sent a messenger to Haidar.²¹ Haidar's terms meant absolute surrender. The King was to hand over Khande Rao. Territory worth 3 lakhs only was assigned to the King and 1 lakh to Nanjaraj. Haidar was to assume the management of the remaining territory. One of the terms of the King's surrender was that Haidar was not to let Nanjaraj take upon himself the functions of *Dulwai* and Haidar, ever true to his promise if it suited his interest, kept Nanjaraj in Mysore, the ex-usurper thus fading into complete obscurity. Haidar was requested not to molest Khande Rao²² and he said with condescension that he would cherish him like a pet bird of the harem. As it has been said, even the oracle of Delphi was not perhaps more adept in making ambiguous pronouncements. Peixoto says, "Then commenced a great examination in

20 It is not without significance that as a reward for negotiating the King's terms of surrender, *Pradban Venkatapatiya* was rewarded with *Kungal taluk* (*Haidarnama*).

21 *Nisban-i-Haidari*, Ms., f. 23, 23a.

22 *Ibid.*, f. 24.

which all those who had done anything against him did not escape condemnation. At all these enquiries Khande Rao assisted under the care of a guard and promoted all Haidar Ali's objects as the desires of one upon whom his life depended. When all the business was over, he was put into a cage and sent to Bangalore, where he was kept for more than one year until his death."²³

Haidar was ruthless, relentless and remorseless. Khande Rao had brought him very near to ruin. That he succeeded in emerging victorious out of this conflict was largely due to his pluck and his luck, his undaunted spirit and his utter unscrupulousness. But it is amusing to find his biographer indignantly recording the 'villainy and ingratitude' of this Brahmin, who according to him, deservedly died the 'death of an inauspicious crow', while Haidar himself is described as the true avenger of ingratitude. In this connection we would do well to mention a remark made by Yasin Khan, a privileged companion of Haidar in his convivial hours. Once Haidar was pronouncing a philippic against *nemuc haramme* and looked at Yasin Khan. "Why look at me," said he, "you had better consult Nanjaraj on this subject."²⁴ Khande Rao's ingratitude was only comparable to that of Haidar, the only defence being that Khande Rao failed while Haidar succeeded. Now at last after the defeat of Khande

Rao Haidar could feel that he was safely established in supreme authority of the *Khodadad* (the state of Mysore as described by him).

Khande Rao's fate arouses our pity. He was no doubt a man of considerable ability. A very capable administrator, an able financier, he also developed, without any military training, a flair for military affairs. But he lacked what his adversary had in abundance, robustness, unperturbable solidity and obstinate determination. It can be said of his successful antagonist that he was at his best and easiest when he had to ride a storm.

CHAPTER V

Conquests, 1761-1763

The Nizam Salabat Jang was an imbecile. His brother Basalat Jang was for sometime his *Dewan*. But another brother, Nizam Ali, a successful intriguer, ousted him and Basalat retired from Hyderabad to his seat of Government at Adoni. Salabat Jang became a puppet in the hands of Nizam Ali, who imprisoned him in July, 1761, and 15 months later usurped the throne by murdering him. Basalat Jang at Adoni had naturally very ambitious views of independent sovereignty in the South. A belt of Maratha territory in the south and south-east prevented the realisation of his views of expansion. But in 1760-1761, he had a more open field. The Udgir and Panipat campaigns had directed Maratha attention to other regions and Maratha detachments that might have gone to the South were sent to the North or kept at hand to face the contingency of an Afghan push southwards. Basalat "began to draw within the circle of his own possessions the most convenient and accessible fragments of the shattered states around him."¹

He decided to attempt to annex Sera with its dependencies and Hoskote and other forts which were occupied by the Marathas. But Basalat Jang's ability and resources were not equal to his ambition. He found Sera too strong for him, passed it by and laid siege to Hoskote, which he thought he would be able to take. Hoskote was then garrisoned by seven hundred peons under Mukunda Sripat.² It stood a siege of two months and there was still no likelihood of its early surrender. Basalat was at the end of his resources. Hoskote was only 18 miles from Bangalore. Haidar was watching this situation and he knew well how miserable was the plight of Basalat. He sent Faizulla to the camp of Basalat, offering to pay 3 lakhs provided he was invested with the office of the Nawab of Sera, a post which he hoped to be able to conquer from the Marathas.³ Haidar did not bother himself with the question whether Basalat Jang had the right to make even a paper grant of Sera and its dependencies. The *sanads* were made out and Haidar Ali Khan Bahadur became the Nawab of Sera. De La Tour tells us that it was arranged with Basalat Jang before the siege of Sera

² *Nishan-i-Haidari*. Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

³ Noronah says that Haidar negotiated through Mir Muhammadi Khan, father of Mir Faizulla Khan, a favourite of the aforesaid prince, to obtain the administration of Sera for 5 lakhs which he promised to pay at once and a continued annual tribute of 2 lakhs of rupees.

that all the artillery, ammunition and everything that could be carried away should be the share of Basalat Jang and Haidar should only take possession of the place itself.⁴

In October, 1761, Haidar came to Hoskote with his army and paid his respects to Basalat Jang. The fort was soon taken. Haidar next marched to Dod Balapur, which was a dependency of Sera and where resided Abbas Quli Khan, who had inhumanly persecuted Haidar's family in its misfortune 32 years ago.⁵ "Haidar sought his revenge with the virulence belonging to the memory of a recent injury." But Abbas Quli apprehending this had fled with his women and indispensable baggage to Arcot. The combined army of Basalat and Haidar then advanced to the siege of Sera. With his fine park of artillery, manned by Europeans, Haidar had very little difficulty in taking Sera. By successful undermining he is said to have blown up two bastions and compelled the besieged to surrender.⁶ Sera was the Maratha depot of provisions and military stores for the Carnatic expeditions. "All this was seized by him and applied to his own use and without any delay or the knowledge of anyone, he buried underground all the heavy artillery and such stores as he wished to reserve for himself and throwing out 4 or 5 pieces of artillery

4 De La Tour, p. 51.

5 See Chapter I.

6 The siege lasted one month. (*Nishan-i-Haidari*).

damaged and split at the muzzles with a parcel of old and useless stores, he sent a letter with congratulations on the capture of the place to Basalat Jang."⁷ Thus befooled, Basalat withdrew to Adoni at the beginning of 1762.

Haidar, now master of Sera, began to conquer its dependencies one by one. But the task was not so easy. The Poligar of Chik Balapur, 14 miles to the east of Dod Balapur, put up a stubborn resistance. In course of 3 months Haidar had a thousand people killed.⁸ Murar Rao of Gooty, whose territory lay to the north-east of Haidar's new acquisition, tried to create a diversion in favour of the besieged Poligar. Haidar had sufficient troops to carry on the siege of Chik Balapur and at the same time to defeat Murar Rao in the field. Murar Rao sent Shiv Rao Ghorpade and Khande Rao Ghorpade with 2,500 troops. Four miles from Chik Balapur they were met by a Mysore detachment of 3,000 foot and 1,200 cavalry and, after suffering a defeat, had to fall back.⁹ Another attempt at diversion was made but this also failed. The troops of Murar Rao were again defeated. But Haidar became convinced that the conquest would cost him dear if he persisted and he decided to make peace with the Poligar for 7 lakhs of rupees to be paid in 3 instal-

7 *Nishan-i-Haidari*, Ms., f. 26-27.

8 Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

9 Orme Ms., Vol. 72. S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 7.

ments.¹⁰ The first instalment was paid. Ha'idar therefore withdrew to Deonhalli. The Poligar now put 500 Marathas of Murar Rao within the fort and himself withdrew to Nandidurg, an almost impregnable fort at a distance of 3 miles. Thus duped, Haidar became furious. He made a forced march from Deonhalli and by a supreme effort took Chik Balapur after ten days. He made no direct attack on Nandidurg but arranged that the garrisons of Chik Balapur, Deonhalli and Bangalore should devastate the country and cut off supplies. In order to prevent Murar Rao from furnishing supplies, Haidar took the offensive against him. Kirmani says, "The troops of the Rao were scattered like grain shaken out of a slit bag and they did not drink water until they arrived at the walls of Gooty."¹¹ Haidar also came up with the Marathas at Penukonda inflicting a crushing defeat on them. Some of the principal officers of Murar Rao were taken prisoner, among them Khande Rao Ghorpade. Haidar took Penukonda as also Madaksira.¹² "Haidar conquered that part of Murar Rao's dominions most convenient for his new acquisition of Sera amounting to 3 lakhs of pagodas yearly."¹³ The Chik Balapur Poligar at Nandidurg was practically starved into surrender. Haidar's treatment of the

10 *Nisban-i-Haidari*. Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

11 *Nisban-i-Haidari*, Ms., f. 27, 27a.

12 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 20. Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

13 Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

Poligar was the severest imaginable. The Poligar had not only stubbornly resisted him but had at one time successfully made him the victim of stratagem. So Haidar singled him out as an object of almost personal revenge and meted out to him an exemplary punishment. He was despatched as a prisoner to Bangalore and his two sons were converted to Islam.¹⁴

The Raidurg Poligar submitted willingly, for which he was ever afterwards marked out as the special favourite of Haidar. This generous treatment of those who willingly submitted was not without its effect. We are told that at the time of his Malabar expedition, the generous treatment of the Poligar of Raidurg induced the Zamorin to surrender. The Harpanhalli chief surrendered on being summoned to do so. The Chittaldrug Poligar was less prompt and attempted evasions. His country was therefore overrun by Haidar's cavalry. He had to agree to pay a fine of 3 lakhs of rupees besides the usual tribute. Kirmani says, "The Poligar of Chittaldrug took the head of submission out of the veil of rebellion and entered the circle of obedience, paid 2 lakhs in lieu of *peshcush* and 1 lakh as a present."

The greatest opportunity of his career now came to Haidar. The Chittaldrug Poligar introduced to him a youngman who told him that he was

Chen Basaviyya, the adopted son of Baswappa Nayak, the Bidnur Chief who had died in 1755. He was only 9 years old at that time and was therefore placed under the guardianship of the widow of the deceased monarch. But his friends were obliged to remove him out of the queen's power because she had designs against his life and wanted her brother to become the ruler in his place.¹⁵ For his safety he was sent to Chittaldrug. Haidar was requested to take up his cause and he readily agreed. It was stipulated for his services Haidar would get 40 lakhs. Haidar had of course other views, but those were kept carefully concealed at that time. At each stage Haidar issued proclamations in the name of Chen Basaviyya. The people flocked with great joy to receive him. It was more or less like a triumphal march. The army advanced via Santa Bidnur, Shimoga, Kumsi

15 Orme Ms., Vol. 72. Peixoto says, "Chen Busveia was sent away to be put to death. These had compassion upon the young prince and instead of taking away his life left him in the woods. He came to Chittaldrug." Wilks writes as follows: The queen had formed a connection of shameless publicity with a person named Nimbeia. The youngman protested. The lovers employed a Jetti while shampooing in the bath to dislocate his neck and destroy him and they selected an adopted infant in his place. Chen Busveia announced that he was concealed in the house of his preserver for 5 years. My account is based on *Orme Ms.*, Vol. 72. The story of Wilks has the smell of bazar gossip, though a *Mackenzie Ms.* (Local Records, Vol. XXIV) supports it.

and Anantapur. At Kumsi Haidar is said to have found Lingana, the prime minister of the late Raja, who had been imprisoned there and he offered to guide Haidar through a secret path by which the defensive outworks could be evaded. At each halt the Rani is said to have increased her offer to buy off Haidar. She went so far as to promise 18 lakhs of pagodas to Haidar. As the army reached Bidnur, the queen with her brother fled to Bellalraydrug, 70 miles southward. The defensive works were, however, sufficiently strong. Haidar, guided perhaps by Lingana, left some troops to confront them, and most of the men were sent to the rear by the brink of a river which ran across the town. There were not enough Bidnur troops to oppose them on that side. Everyone ran away. It is said that under instruction from the queen, fire had been set to the palace but Haidar had it extinguished. On the approach of Haidar many people of Bidnur had fled below the ghats. The loot which Haidar got at Bidnur is said to have been immense though it must be admitted that the description of Bidnur as the most opulent commercial town of the East is an exaggeration. Haidar garrisoned Bidnur and all the strong places with Mysore troops. Chen Basaviyya had up to now been treated with all marks of royalty and undoubtedly his presence undermined the opposition of the queen's partisans. The Poligar of Chittaldrug, who accompanied Haidar, was Chen Basaviyya's most ardent supporter. As

Peixoto says, "The country people, the merchants visited him as one whom they regarded as their king. But the Nawab had small thoughts of giving up what he wanted for himself, especially as he said that this place alone would serve him for a safe refuge if the wheel of fortune should turn about."¹⁶ Haider occupied one after another Basavarajdrug, Honaver, Mangalore and also Bellalraydrug where the queen had sought shelter. The conquest of Bellalraydrug shows Haider's art at its best. Haider sent messages to the garrison, telling them that their master was there. Why should they stand against him? The people thereupon gave up the queen and her brother.¹⁷ Peixoto is surprised at the ease with which Bidnur was conquered. He says, "If the place had been in the hands of one who knows how to defend it, four such armies as these could not have taken it."¹⁸

When the conquest of Bidnur was complete Haider thought that he could now safely reject the claims of Chen Basaviyya, declare him an imposter and assert his own authority. All the important places were in the hands of his own troops. Whatever popular feeling there might be in support of Chen Basaviyya could be easily suppressed. In this connection Michaud tells us a story which is also mentioned in outline by Parkinson. This young-

16 Peixoto, Book II.

17 Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

18 Peixoto, Book II.

man, who was sixteen years of age and had been haunted by all the illusions of youth, had known love in the valley where they had hidden him during his childhood. This sentiment followed him from the heart of his solitude to the pomp and noise of his new court and the woman who was the object of his sentiment accompanied him to Bidnur. Haidar saw her and became the rival of the prince who owed to him his kingdom. He wanted her as the price of his conquest. The young Raja, who was still in an age when one prefers the heart of a woman to a kingdom, ventured by his refusal to expose himself again to the risk of losing his crown. Haidar, irritated, used violence and took away by force the young favourite of the Raja. This first injustice was soon followed by another. Haidar wanted to remain the master of his kingdom. The Raja was removed by force from his palace to Madgiri.¹⁹ Haidar was no doubt a man of strong impulse. This rivalry in love with Chen Basaviyya was perhaps true. But it is too much to assume that Haidar would otherwise have handed over Bidnur to the helpless prince and contented himself with the loot acquired. It might be said of

¹⁹ Michaud, Chap. II, pp. 41-42.

Parkinson's account—"He was very fond of a favourite woman. Haidar sent some of his people for her, which being communicated to the raja, they were dismissed with great contempt. Haidar pretending to take offence ordered the raja to be made a prisoner."

Kanara, 'the land of gold' as the Portuguese called this granary of theirs, that once Haidar had seen it, he was not certainly going to give it up. Generosity was a virtue to which Haidar was, like most politicians, a stranger. Chen Basaviyya, the dowagar queen and her brother, the rival boy King, were sent to Madgiri and Haidar, gorged with spoil, proclaimed his authority in a manner he had not done in any part of his dominions. Everywhere else he ruled in the name of the Mysore King; Bidnur he regarded as his *swarajya*. Bidnur was named Haidarnagar and was proclaimed as his capital. Here for the first time he asserted the right of striking coins and issued his earliest coin, the so-called Bahaduri pagoda. He was extremely cautious, exhibited only the initial letter of his name, and associating his coinage with Hindu deities he undoubtedly showed very remarkable toleration on the part of a Muhammadan.²⁰ But the exclusion of Chen Basaviyya and the circumstances connected with it must have been very disagreeable to a large number of people who felt that they had been duped. A number of conspiracies were organised for which Haidar put upwards of a thousand people to death.²¹ Bidnur was henceforth the most tranquil possession. But as it was exposed to the attack of the

20 Obverse: Haidar's initial on a granulated field.


Reverse: Siva seated with Parvati on his left knee; in one of the god's right hands a *Trisul* and in one of the left a deer.

21 Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

Marathas—the first expedition of Madhava Rao in 1764 showed how vulnerable it was—Haider did not make Haidarnagar his capital, and the state of Bidnur remained an outlying but very important part of his extensive dominion. Venkatapiya was left as the governor of this province, with its mint town at Haidarnagar. This province extended in the east up to Holulkera within 20 miles of Chittaldrug and below the Sahyadris on the seacoast it extended from Mirjan to Mangalore. The conquest of Sunda next year extended the jurisdiction of this province up to a small fortified promontary 24 miles south of Goa.

It has been said that Haider regarded the Bidnur windfall as the foundation of his future greatness. The loot of Bidnur alone is said to have brought Haider 12 million sterling, according to the estimate of Wilks. The Marquis of Alorna, in his instructions in 1748, referred to the immense hoarded wealth of Bidnur. He wrote, "The rice trade that supports the whole of Malabar and some parts of Muscat, richly contributes to the vast wealth of the country which the king hoards and is thereby made the richest of his class. This wealth does not serve any other purpose than that of hoarding."²² De La Tour has a very fertile imagination. But even when due allowance is made for his tendency

²² S. N. Sen, *Studies in Indian History*. (Marquis of Alorna's Instructions.)



CHAPTER VI

*Relations with the Marathas,**

1764-1765.

The third battle of Panipat is regarded as the beginning of the end of Maratha ascendancy. But we are too much accustomed to think of the effects of this battle in terms of North Indian politics. It must not be forgotten that the echo of this battle resounded far and wide and Maratha affairs in the South were materially influenced to the detriment of the Maratha cause.

The disaster of Panipat diverted Maratha pressure from territories lying south of the Tungabhadra, leaving Haidar absolutely free to pursue his plan of advance. It was not until 1764 that the Marathas once again marched in this direction. But in the meantime Haidar had not only consolidated his position in the Mysore State but had also conquered Bidnur, Sunda and Sera with its dependencies. He tried to bring Savanur, Kurnul and Kurpa within the orbit of his influence and form what has been described as a 'defensive cordon.'

* Read before the Indian Historical Records Commission (Calcutta, 1939) and published in the *Proceedings*.

Not content with the Tungabhadra frontier, he advanced to the north-west of that river. Taking advantage of this temporary Maratha eclipse, he also took Dharwar and Bankapur. In diplomacy too he was successful, for the Nizam had been conciliated.¹

Fortunately for the Maratha cause, there was one chieftain on the other side of the Tungabhadra, Murar Rao of Gooty, who proved to be a thorn by the side of Haidar and maintained an unequal fight against him. He was practically fighting single-handed. We read in the *Bakhar* by Sathe that later in the course of his first expedition Madhava Rao recognised the services of Murar Rao and on receiving a representation from him, invested him with the title of *Senapati*.²

The ruler of Savanur, a dependent Maratha ally, had been recently overpowered by Haidar. He took the earliest opportunity of joining the Peshwa as soon as he crossed the Krishna. We read in a Marathi letter dated the 17th April, 1764:—
 “Our troops making halts came here. Savanurkar has been saved. Otherwise Mir Faizulla with 10,000 troops would have marched on Hangal. He had an intention of finishing Savanurkar. But the Peshwa reached quickly.”³

1 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 23.

2 Rajwade, Vol. IV.

3 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 30. According to Kirmani, the ruler of Savanur had helped the Rani of Bidnur.

Madhava Rao, the greatest of the Peshwas, must be regarded as the most formidable antagonist whom Haidar had to meet on the battle field. Haidar was no doubt defeated by Smith as also by Sir Eyre Coote, but he could keep the influence of these defeats confined within a narrow sphere. But Madhava Rao inflicted on him defeats in the field and followed up each blow by the recovery of valuable territory. In his wars with the British Haidar had the initiative in his hands throughout, but in his clashes with Madhava Rao the initiative always rested with the latter. Haidar's offensive against Madhava Rao led to disaster and the failure of his defensive was not less complete. Peixoto writes that the Marathas were well-directed and their perseverance was great. The Maratha military system was shaken by very serious defeats, but this young Peshwa, resolute, courageous and dignified, always prompt and active, had the capacity of crushing the enemy by paralysing his will power. In war so much depends on the quality of the commander that the Marathas under his leadership worked wonders. Wherever he was personally present, success always greeted the Marathas. He was invariably on the offensive but his progress was always marked by prudence and method. The Maratha plan "to deceive, to surprise and to overwhelm" was at its best under Madhava Rao. Haidar found himself unable to stem the ceaseless tide of Maratha advance. It was only the early

death of this formidable antagonist that saved Haidar and weakened the Marathas in the Carnatic.

Madhava Rao reached Savanur, where the Pathan Chief met with 1,000/2,000 cavalry and 1,000 infantry. After this he marched from Savanur to the banks of the Tungabhadra. Meanwhile Haidar reached Harihar with 35,000 troops, infantry, artillery and cavalry. There was an engagement at Ratehalli, 36 miles south of Savanur and 70 miles south-east of Dharwar. Gopal Rao and Vithal Shivdev came out one morning.⁴ Haidar, seeing that their troops were small in number, marched against them and advanced 5 miles, hoping to overwhelm them. The Maratha troops retreating before him did not number more than 4,000. Haidar moved slowly, threw rockets and pursued them as they retired. They kept on retiring and he continued to pursue them until there appeared suddenly before him a Maratha army of about 50,000(?). Haidar instantly sent a message to Faizulla Khan to advance from the camp with heavy artillery. He halted on the banks of a rivulet which was dry. The Maratha artillery fight continued for 4½ hours. Haidar had 40 guns but most of them were 3 or 4 pounders. The Marathas had practically surrounded the Mysore camp. Faizulla Khan succeeded in penetrating

4 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 32 (2nd day of the Sudha Baisakh).

their lines with only 3,000 troops and joined Haidar. He suffered terribly and managed to ward off the attack a little before sunset, only after the Marathas had withdrawn their artillery. On the Mysore side the dead were upwards of a thousand and the wounded were about the same number. The date of the action as given by Peixoto is 3rd May, 1764.⁵

Haidar raised batteries around his camp, waited for the Marathas and engaged them twice without much advantage to either side. Madhava Rao decided on an attempt to destroy the Mysore camp. He wrote to Haidar "that he had heard his name at Poona, where many of his heroic actions were related, and that he had come to seek him and fight him, for his father had advised him to cultivate friendship with all good soldiers and that was his own wish. But as he did not know whether all that was said was true, he had come himself to try him and he would expect that the Nabob would quit his entrenchments to-morrow, come to his camp, where he would find him ready. If, on the contrary, this was not done, he would perceive that Haidar was no soldier and what was said of him was more than truth. He would visit his camp and batteries the next day and tell him of the delight with which he left Poona to come and engage with him."⁶ Haidar laughed, but when he heard from

5 Peixoto, II.

6 Peixoto, II, paragraph 100.

his spies in the Maratha camp that Madhava Rao was in earnest and had ordered all his chiefs to take betel in ratification of their oath, he marched after midnight to the entrenched fort at Anawatty where he arrived about 7a.m. that day. As the fort had several hills around and as Haidar had posted his men to guard the roads between the hills, the Marathas could not penetrate. Haidar could now see that the Marathas would not be able to do him great harm for want of time, as the rains were at hand. In view of the approach of the rainy season, Madhava Rao left his camp divided among Savanur and other forts under the care of Gopal Rao and Sayaji Pant. Haidar also made barracks for the infantry, big enough to enable the infantry to form in them and to fire, if necessary, without marching out or wetting their arms. He also took other precautions.⁷

Immediately after the beginning of the campaigning season, Haidar marched from Anawatty, descended on Bankapur, planned an attack on the isolated force of Gopal Rao and threatened Savanur. Peixoto says that Haidar in course of this march sent some of his horsemen to show themselves to the Marathas and to withdraw before them towards places of ambushade. But this attempt to steal a march over the Marathas and use their own tactics against them failed entirely. Says Peixoto: "We

7 Peixoto, II, paragraph 101.

remained there from 7 o'clock in the morning until three in the afternoon, but the Marathas could not be enticed."⁸ Haidar withdrew again to Anawatty. The Peshwa was then free to invest first Mudhol and then Dharwar. In Dharwar there was a garrison of Haidar, commanded by Mir Faizulla's brother. Faizulla himself with about 9,000 troops and 7 guns came within fifteen *kos* of that fort. Between the fort and his army there was the Maratha army under Gopal Rao and Raste. Ultimately, however, he thought it prudent to withdraw and the fort was taken at the beginning of November.⁹

Madhava Rao now advanced to attack Anawatty and encamped near it on the 16th November, 1764. Haidar assigned to every chief his position in the camp and told everyone that he would not receive any succour although in the greatest distress. Nobody was to quit his position under pain of death or the ruin of his house and his family. No one was to leave his position to bring succour to another. "None of these precautions was sufficient, for the perseverance of the Marathas was great."

Haidar had erected a very strong battery away

8 Peixoto, III, paragraph 2.

Aitibasiḱ Lekha Samgraha, II: Haidar started with 15,000 *gardis*, 6,000 cavalry, came to Hangal, suddenly marched to Bankapur, took 4½ hours' rest there, arrived at dawn at a brook between Savanur and Bankapur, hid there and made a few troops stand out. But Gopal Rao Patwardhan would not come out.

9 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 51.

from the lines of encampment, mounted with 8 twenty-four and eighteen pounders. Mir Faizulla Khan, who was in charge of it, had 3,000 men to defend it and along with him was the Portuguese commandant Joseph Menzes. The Maratha camp was at a distance of about six miles. Every morning the Marathas would come out, skirmish in detached platoons and then press Haidar's army heavily on one wing. Haidar used to march out for 6/7 days and then would not march out at all. The Marathas now came nearer and nearer until, on the 1st December, there took place a severe fight in which Haidar suffered a heavy defeat. The Nawab was on this day the dupe of an artifice which an experienced commander like him ought to have seen through. The Marathas came out early in the morning with their horse artillery numbering 54 pieces. Eight guns were placed on a small hill close to the Mysore outpost at the end of a wood. This was seemingly a very exposed position for the Marathas, as Maratha horsemen could not enter the wood except in small numbers. As these 8 guns caused great loss, Haidar ordered an attack there and these guns were taken with great ease by Ismail Khan. Haidar then ordered Haji Muhammad Khan to take the hill upon which the guns stood and to defend it against the Maratha soldiers who would certainly try to regain not only the lost guns but also the position from which they had been dislodged. But now the troops who had taken the

Maratha guns were overpowered by the Maratha horse and compelled to retire, whereupon the Nawab sent a reinforcement of 2,000 to their support. But Ismail Khan and most of his troops were cut to pieces. "Four field pieces were lost, the Nabob also was wounded in two places but not dangerously. In order that he might escape being taken or known, he took off all his clothes and a topas and a caffree brought him safe to the camp."¹⁰ The Maratha estimate was that between 1,000—1,500 *gardi* troops were killed and 6 cannon were taken. It was a great victory. The fight lasted from midday until 2 o'clock.¹¹

Soon after this battle Raghunath Rao joined the Maratha camp. The Peshwa, his nephew, had himself sent Chinto Ananta to invite him to come. immediately after this peace negotiations were started but these proved abortive. On the 26th December an attempt was made by Haider on the Maratha position which was defended by a river. He only succeeded in making them withdraw from the banks. For sometime the war continued faintly on both sides. On the 11th February, the Marathas broke up their camp and began their march in the direction of Bidnur. Haider at once retraced his steps towards Bidnur as quickly as he could. His first halt was at Shikarpur, where he had some encounters with the Marathas. He was obliged to

¹⁰ Peixoto, III, paragraph 21.

¹¹ S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 55.

retreat further and further to Anantapur and thence to Bidnur. The Peshwa had in the meantime succeeded in taking Honnali without firing a shot and Kumsi was annexed after a siege lasting 3 days. Faizulla Khan, however, offered resistance at Anantapur. But on the 27th February, 1765, he fell back from Anantapur to Morangary outside the gate of Bidnur where breastworks and entrenchments were made.¹² Haidar was now anxious to conclude a treaty and considering the plight in which he was placed, the terms that were granted were very lenient. Madhava Rao wrote to Nana Fadnis, "After taking 2/4 places in Bidnur territory, I raised batteries at Anantapur. After taking Anantapur, I intended to advance and conquer Bidnur. Haidar sent his *vakil* and with great eagerness began his negotiations. In the opinion of Raghunath Rao negotiations must not be protracted. So I have concluded the treaty."¹³

The terms of the treaty were as follows :—

- (1) Haidar was to pay 28 lakhs as tribute.
- (2) He had to give up the *talukhs* of Bankapur, Harihar and Basavapatna and release the brother of Gopal Rao.
- (3) He had to give back the territory of Murar Rao and of the ruler of Savanur.¹⁴

¹² Peixoto, III, paragraph 43.

¹³ S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 63, dated the 30th March, 1765.

¹⁴ S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter nos. 60, 61, 62, dated the 12th and 13th March, 1765.

These extremely moderate terms, it has been suggested, were due to the desire on the part of Raghunath Rao to enlist the support of Haidar Ali for the furtherance of his personal ambition. When we take into consideration the later career of Raghunath Rao, the suggestion does not seem to be unwarranted. Madhava Rao was in a position to demand that Haidar must also give up Sera, Chittaldurg, Raidurg and Harpanhalli. If he had advanced further he might even have taken Bidnur. Though he did not insist on a further restriction of Haidar's sphere of influence, he succeeded in driving Haidar from the region between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra. With Murar Rao and the ruler of Savanur restored to their old position and power, Maratha offensive could at any time be resumed south of the Tungabhadra.

CHAPTER VII

Relations with the Marathas, 1766-1767

In March, 1765, Madhava Rao agreed to negotiate a treaty with Haidar and conclude his first campaign against him. In course of the negotiations Madhava Rao demanded that Harihar and Basavapatna should be included in the list of territories ceded by Haidar. The desire to retain these two outposts on the other side of the Tungabhadra seemed to be a part of a plan to occupy Bidnur, of which Basavapatna was the key. Haidar, therefore, got a clear indication that the Peshwa wanted to resume the offensive against him at the earliest opportunity. But he had won over Raghunath Rao and the Peshwa was prevailed upon to remain satisfied with the cession of Bankapur and the restoration of the possessions of the chieftains of Gooty and Savanur along with the payment of twenty-eight lakhs as tribute.¹ But Haidar knew quite well that the Maratha menace would reappear very soon and he knew how formidable his Maratha opponent was.

Haidar might have turned to the Nizam or the British against the Marathas. But his policy,

¹ S.P.D., Vol. 37, letters no. 60, 61, 62.

as has been said by Khare, was like that of Sivaji in relation to Bijapur, Golconda and the Mughals.² He had an eye on the territory of all and he did not find it to his interest to enter into a scheme of alliance with any of them, least of all with the British. As the Madras Governor wrote to Verelst, "We must fix Haidar as a friend or overthrow him as an enemy; the former notwithstanding all our advances we have hitherto found impracticable."³ The Peshwa had in the meantime succeeded in persuading the Nizam to join in a scheme of offensive alliance against Haidar. Nizam Ali was at first induced to join hands with the Peshwa against Janoji Bhonsla who was compelled to cede a large portion of the territory he had secured earlier by means of his double treachery at Rakshasabhuvan. The Nizam got a tract of territory giving an annual revenue of about 15 lakhs ('ceded for the firm establishment of peace and friendship' as a prelude to conjoint operations against Haidar).⁴

Haidar was in the meantime plotting with the malcontent Marathas to create sufficient difficulties for the Peshwa in his own home territory. He

2 *Lekha Samgraha*, Vol. III, Introduction.

3 Select Committee Proceedings, 16th January, 1767, p. 78.

4 Khare, *Aitihāsik Lekha Samgraha*, Vol. III, letter no. 602 L, dated 20th September, tells us that earlier there was an understanding between the Peshwa and the Nizam that whatever big expeditions were to be undertaken would be done after informing each other.

walked in the footsteps of Asaf Jah Nizam-ul-Mulk who had adopted a similar policy against Baji Rao. The Peshwa's excellent espionage system brought to his notice the fact that Babuji Naik was in correspondence with Haidar Ali and gave him presents. The Naik was asked to surrender the forts in his charge. He shut himself up in Sholapur but was compelled to submit and surrender his possessions, contenting himself with a personal allowance of one lakh.⁵ Anticipating a quick Maratha advance, Haidar demanded contributions from the chiefs of Bellary, Chittaldrug, Raydrug, Harpanhalli and other places.⁶

Before the start of the expedition against Haidar in November, 1766, Nizam Ali concluded an alliance with the British. The East India Company engaged "a body of their troops ready to settle the affairs of His Highness's government in everything that is right and proper whenever required."⁷ Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty the British representative was informed that the Nizam required the assistance of the British troops against Haidar Ali, and that as he would take the field in less than a month, he expected the British troops to join him by the end of December. He was assured that the British would use all the despatch in their power.⁸

5 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letters no. 99, 117.

6 *Ibid.*

7 Select Committee Proceedings, 16th January, 1767, p. 58.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 77.

What were the motives of the Nizam in thus securing the assistance of the British in a war against Haidar in which the Marathas were already his ally? It has been suggested in another connection, "The Nizam would never break his relations with any. To continue negotiations with all the Powers is his policy. But in the end whatever comes in practice depends upon Providence. He never tries to break off negotiations from whatever side they might come."⁹ But such a facile explanation of his motives would be inadequate in this case. Grant Duff himself suggests that without British aid the Marathas would have dictated in any scheme of the partition of Haidar's territory. But now Nizam Ali could legitimately expect that with British aid he would be in a position to dictate his own terms. Madhava Rao however could not be so easily overreached.¹⁰

Without waiting for his ally, Madhava Rao crossed the Krishna in January, 1766. His first campaign had convinced Haidar that it would be improper to fight pitched battles with the Maratha chief. He fortified Bangalore, Bidnur and Sera, remaining at Seringapatam with his troops. Along the route of the march of the Marathas, the supply of water was poisoned and corn was either burnt or buried. Wilks writes, "However efficacious against

9 S.P.D., Vol. 38, letter no. 135.

10 Grant Duff, *History of the Marathas*.

a regular army, the project is mere theory against the overwhelming mass of genuine Maratha invasion which covers the whole face of the country and almost divests of poetic fiction the Muhammadan illustration which compares them to a cloud of locusts. Such a plan may distress but cannot stop such an army." Madhava Rao came to Raidrug in February and "pushed on through the imperfect desert to Sera."¹¹ The Marathas had a front of 25 miles, marching in parallel lines. They would take fodder from house-tops, leaves and roots and provide themselves with water by digging the dry beds of rivers. Within the space of a month the Peshwa realized from Kanchangutta, Godwal, Bellary, Sidnur, Adoni, Kurnool, Kanakagiri, Chittaldrug, Devdurg and Raidrug about 25 lakhs of rupees in *hundi*, besides clerkship charges that were paid separately in cash.¹²

Haidar's brother-in-law Mir Reza, who was in Sera, came out of the fort and took his stand with a view to fighting a pitched battle. He was defeated and forced to take shelter inside the walls. Two hundred horses of Mir Reza were taken by the Marathas, about 300 of his men were wounded and 40/50 were killed. The Marathas also seized five of the seven guns he had brought out. Sera was well-stocked with provisions and garrisoned with select troops numbering about 12,000. But as the batteries of the Peshwa advanced, Mir Saheb thought

¹¹ Wilks, *History of Mysore*, Vol. I, p. 302.

¹² Khare, *Lekha Samgraha*, Vol. II, Introduction.

discretion to be the better part of valour and offered to desert to the Marathas, Gopal Rao Patwardhan being the mediator and guarantor for the Peshwa. Mir Saheb was given Gurumkunda, his old paternal possession, on condition that he should keep 2,000 men for Maratha service. This was in February, 1767.¹³ Early in March the Peshwa took Madgiri, a mountain fort very difficult to assault. Although Haidar was confident that it would hold out, on the the second day of the attack the wall was demolished and men in the fort came down for negotiations. The King and the dowager queen of Bidnur were found imprisoned in the fort.¹⁴ The Peshwa released and honoured them.¹⁵ He continued his onward march and succeeded in taking Chenraidurg, Madaksira, Dod Balapur, Chik Balapur, Deonhalli, Hoskote and Kolar.

These repeated blows, and the news of the approach of Nizam Ali, made Haidar sue for peace. The Peshwa was eager to conclude a treaty before Nizam Ali could intervene. It is said that the Peshwa asked the Nizam to send Rukn-ud-daula and Sher Jang ahead and insisted upon the settlement of some preliminaries, demanding that a distance of 40 miles must be maintained between the two camps.¹⁶

¹³ S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 141. *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 678.

¹⁴ See p. 67.

¹⁵ S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 147; *Bombay Diaries*, p. 132.

¹⁶ *Lekha Samgraha*, Vol. III, letter no. 706. The treaty

Haidar was sufficiently intimidated at the prospect of the combination and at the news that messengers were coming and going between the two camps. With characteristic diplomatic ability he proposed to the Peshwa through Gopal Rao a joint march against Muhammad Ali and the English. Madhava Rao saw through the game and said that the Nizam, and through him the English, were his friends. He himself would march to Bangalore and the Nizam would take Seringapatam.¹⁷

Haidar had no alternative but submission. He had to agree to pay a tribute of 33 lakhs of rupees. Sera, Chik Balapur and Kolar were to be given back to him but Madgiri, Chenraidurg, Dod Balapur, Hoskote and two *parganas* were kept by the Marathas. Haidar also got back Ganeshgad, Nandagundi, Gudibanda, Kotikonda and Namgandlu.¹⁸

Nizam Ali was thus deservedly outwitted. Peixoto writes, "Nizam Ali much disliked the peace just concluded and asked Madu Rao what had obliged him to agree to it and to retire. He replied that he had received his tribute and made his agreement and it was already late to retire to Poona. Therefore he had determined to depart, for the Nabob was resolved to make the island of

should be concluded before the arrival of the Nizam, so said the Peshwa.

¹⁷ *Lekha Samgraha*, Vol. III, letter no. 701.

¹⁸ S.P.D., Vo. 37. *Lekha Samgraha*, Vol. III, letter no. 721, 718.

Seringapatam the seat of war and the affairs would not so soon have ended as Nizam Ali might think. Besides it was not his custom to make war with those who paid tribute."¹⁹ Nizam Ali had expected success as a gleaner but was completely out-manoeuvred.

In connection with this second expedition of Madhava Rao several facts deserve notice. Mir Reza deserted to the Marathas, most probably because he feared that his brother-in-law would degrade and dishonour him for failure against them. Madhava Rao did all that could be done to placate him. But an incident happened near Chenraidurg that explains how ill at ease Mir Reza was in the Maratha Camp. At Chenraidurg, one night, his camp was looted by the hooligans, the looters penetrating even into his zenana. Some *gardis* and *Pin-daries*, who were dissatisfied with Mir Reza, went to the camp of Murar Rao, and in conjunction with some people there, made this loot. The Maratha newsletters report that when the Peshwa heard about it, he looked like god Siva when angry. Forty or fifty of these looters had their hands chopped off. The Peshwa in person went to the camp of Mir Reza, sent him dresses, utensils, sweets, horses, camp equipage, even cash and jewellery. Mir Reza was on bad terms with Murar Rao and it was his suspicion that Murar Rao was personally responsible

¹⁹ Peixoto, V, paragraph 16.

for this incident. But investigations proved that neither the troops of the government nor those of any prominent Sardar had anything to do with this unfortunate episode. He was paid about a lakh of rupees as compensation by the Peshwa.²⁰ But in view of the bitter relations subsisting between Mir Reza and Murar Rao the Peshwa could not perhaps remove altogether the suspicions of the former.

What were the motives of Madhava Rao I in undertaking this expedition and how far was Haidar successful in thwarting him? Wilks says that the Marathas were always guided by two objects: anticipating others in plunder during the confederacy and exclusive conquest after its close. The Maratha chiefs "professed nothing short of the entire subversion of Haidar's usurped authority."²¹ Thus in his view the Peshwa succeeded only as a true Maratha in anticipating his ally in plunder and in nothing else. To this extent Haidar must then be considered successful. But there is no evidence to prove that Madhava Rao actually contemplated the entire subversion of Haidar's authority. Such an attitude was at the root of his third expedition, not of the second, in which it appears that he was still feeling his way. With the undependable Nizam as his ally, no such plan could possibly have been contem-

²⁰ *Lekha Samgraha*, Vol. III, letter no. 692, dated 8th March.

²¹ Wilks, *History of Mysore*, Vol. I, pp. 300, 301.

plated by him. Letter after letter written from the Maratha camp emphasises the Peshwa's desire only to realise tribute from Haidar. Haidar's ambassador Karim Khan offered 12 lakhs only in December and January and later raised the offer to 21 lakhs. The Peshwa's demand was at first 70 lakhs. In March it came down to 40 lakhs. The Peshwa's plan originally was that Haidar should give back all the territory of the Maratha *Raj* and its dependants as also the state of Sunda. Besides this he expected a tribute of 75 lakhs.²² A modification of his war aims was inevitable in view of the change of the foreign policy of the Nizam.

22 *Lekha Samgraha*, Vol. III, letter no. 658.

CHAPTER VIII

*Relations with the British, 1760-1767**

At the beginning of 1760, Haidar Ali was the absolute master of Mysore. The Seven Years' War between France and England which was raging in Europe had its repercussion in India. Lally, hard pressed at Pondicherry, was using every means to avert an imminent catastrophe. He approached Haidar who agreed to lend him the services of 4,000 Mysorean horse, who were expected to bring provisions to the beleaguered city. The main body of the Mysore army remained at Tiagar, collecting provisions, and a party got into Pondicherry, but on the 18th July, 1760, the main body with the convoy reached Pondicherry, after inflicting a severe defeat on Major More. In this encounter the British loss was 35 Europeans killed and wounded.¹ Haidar's attachment to the French was founded on the principle of self-interest, for they supported him in his

* Read at the meeting of the Indian Historical Records Commission, Baroda Session, 1940, and published in the *Proceedings*.

1 Despatches to England, 31st July, 1760, Paras 14, 15, 30.

usurpation.² In the event of a favourable termination of the Anglo-French War, he could expect to secure Trichinopoly, Madura, Tinnevely and some other places in the Carnatic. Though the outlook for the French was gloomy Haider agreed to support them, and he might have given the Anglo-French War a very different turn if in the meantime the monarchical party in Mysore headed by Khande Rao, till then a staunch supporter of Haider, had not planned to drive him from power. They got the aid of a Maratha army under Visaji Pandit and on the 12th August, 1760, Khande Rao made a sudden attack, which compelled Haider to fly to Bangalore.³ He could not overwhelm the field force of Khande Rao and recover his position until May, 1761.⁴ Meanwhile the British had easily disposed of the French.

To prevent Haider from giving effective aid to the French, Yusuf Khan from Tanjore was directed to make incursions into that part of Mysore which lay nearest to him, and Captain Richard Smith with a part of the Trichinopoly garrison attacked and took Karur, a Mysore possession.⁵ The British even thought of enlisting a body of Maratha horse to enter the Mysore country and compel Haider to recall his forces from Pondicherry. It was only for

2 Military Consultations, Vol. 13B, 1760, p. 1127.

3 *Ibid.*, Vol. 13A, 1760, p. 778.

4 See pp. 53-55.

5 Despatches to England, 3rd November, 1760, para 13.

want of money that this could not be done.⁶ At this stage occurred the internecine struggle in which Khande Rao had temporary advantages over Haidar. Khande Rao wrote friendly letters to the President of Madras and the Nawab of Arcot, informing them that Haidar was a rebel and it was he who had sent the troops under Makhdum Ali to assist the French.⁷ In these circumstances, Haidar had to recall Makhdum's detachment. The King of Mysore intimated to Richard Smith at Trichinopoly that he was willing to enter into an alliance with the English. Captain Smith was authorized by his Government to open negotiations to this effect but, as the motive was only to gain time until the French were crushed, he was to make proposals "either to the King of Mysore or to Haidar as from circumstances shall appear to him best calculated to serve the present purpose without concluding any definite treaty which is always to be referred to our approval and determination."⁸

Haidar was pressed so heavily by the Marathas and Khande Rao that his ruin seemed imminent when most unexpectedly the Marathas agreed to depart on Haidar's ceding Baramahal and paying 3 lakhs in cash. The Marathas were also in a position to aid the French at Pondicherry and the French

6 Despatches to England, 31st July, 1760, para 15.

7 *Ibid.*, 3rd November, 1760, para 14.

8 Military Consultations, Vol. 13B, 18th December, 1760, p. 1132.

even offered 20 lakhs, 5 immediately, and Jinji was to be delivered up. The Nawab of Arcot settled with the Marathas for 10 lakhs, 5 to be paid in twenty days and the remainder in three months." Pondicherry surrendered to Coote on the 16th January, 1761. Three hundred French troops under Alain and Hugel took service with Haidar Ali.¹⁰

With the loss of Maratha aid, the King of Mysore became anxious to secure British support. In view of the growing power of Haidar and his coalition with Nanjaraj, Khande Rao was naturally earnest in his desire for British friendship. At one stage the British had even contemplated restoration of Karur in return for one lakh of pagodas,¹¹ but now they were conscious of the strength of their position and were not in a mood to entertain such a proposal. The King of Mysore's *Bakshi* (who was near the British frontier) told Richard Smith that Haidar was the enemy of the British as well as his master's and that "the King was very desirous of British friendship and he expected every hour to be invested with full authority to conclude a treaty of alliance." Smith wrote, "He has received orders to join me should I call upon him to oppose Haidar Naik. This he assured me of and

9 Military Consultations, Vol. 14A, 1761, p. 32.

10 Despatches to England, 4th February, 1761, para 25, Military Consultations, Vol. 14A, 1761, p. 15.

11 Military Consultations, Vol. 14A, 1761, p. 25.

his intentions to comply." Smith further informed the President and Council, "The King is a weak man. Assurance of British friendship might engage him to continue firm in his position to Haidar Naik."¹² The Nawab of Arcot also proposed that a body of troops be sent to enable the King of Mysore to reduce Haidar.¹³ But the Board resolved that "the recent proofs of the loss which the French Company sustained by their troops in the Deccan notwithstanding the immense revenues assigned for their support is a warning to us not to plunge the Company into the same difficulties by sending their troops into parts so distant from their capital."¹⁴

After the triumph of Haidar over Khande Rao, the King of Mysore was entirely divested of the management of his country and Khande Rao became a close prisoner. The whole affair left a trace of bitterness behind. Though the British had negotiated with the King of Mysore with the object of temporising at the end, yet Haidar could not altogether forget that at the most critical stage of his affairs the British were about to join his mortal enemies just as he had joined theirs. Letters in general terms written to him during this period remained unanswered.¹⁵

¹² Military Consultations, Vol. 14A, 1761, p. 102.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 15, p. 451.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 14A, p. 102.

In these circumstances it is no wonder that French influence in Haidar's camp continued to increase. Seven or eight French officials under the command of Chevalier Du Muy Colonel, and Mons De La Tour, styled commandant, came to Mangalore with the intention of joining Haidar.¹⁶ Haidar had the reputation of being closely united to the French and he is said to have given protection to and gathered together the scattered remnants of the French nation in India. General Lawrence's minute dated 10th July, 1762, which was a plea for sending a respectable force, laid the greatest emphasis on this danger from this professed enemy of the British, who was also closely united to the French. The Nawab of Arcot began to express his apprehension at a report of Haidar's intentions to enter his province. But he continued to repeat his warnings so often¹⁷ that this had no effect on the mind of the President and Council, who learned to laugh at his scare which they thought it was the Nawab's interest to create.

While the Madras Government and the Mysore chieftain were eyeing each other with suspicion, the Bombay people, perhaps more intent on trade, obtained from Haidar an exclusive right to purchase pepper in preference to all others and they even suggested to the Madras people that as some dispute

¹⁶ Military Consultations, Vol. 16, 1762, p. 1.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3; *Ibid.*, Vol. 18A, p. 74; *Ibid.*, Vol. 18B, p. 334.

subsisted between Haidar and the Nawab of Arcot, the President and Council should try to settle it.¹⁸ They were so very friendly to Haidar that they even supplied him some cannon, gunpowder and firearms when he pressed urgently for aid in men and stores at the time of Madhava Rao's expedition (1764-1765), and this at the risk of antagonising the great Peshwa. Their argument was that they could not afford him to lose Bidnur and Sunda countries in which he had given them valuable privileges.¹⁹

A noticeable feature of South Indian history during these years was the enmity between Haidar Ali and Muhammad Ali. Apart from their mutual personal dislike, which must have been very intense, there were many other points at issue. The territorial dispute concerned the districts of Dindigul, Karur, Kodumudi, Uttamapalaiyam, Palni, Virupakshi and Pallapatti. When Chanda Saheb was taken prisoner and put to death, there was a *Foujdar* under him at Dindigul who agreed with the Mysoreans to deliver these places for a considerable sum of money and other presents. But between 1682 and 1730 these districts were dependent on Trichinopoly. Towards the end of the reign of Queen Minakshi of Trichinopoly, Karur and Kodumudy had been seized by the Mysoreans. They were retaken by Chanda Saheb. Muhammad Ali therefore thought

¹⁸ Military Consultations, Vol. 18B, p. 568, 14th August, 1763.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

that he had every right to these places and the Mysoreans ought to surrender them.²⁰ In 1760, when Haidar helped the French, Smith took Karur which was to be handed over to Muhammad Ali. Haidar agreed to deliver up Malpaddy which he had taken and wanted Karur back, but he met with a rebuff. He was told, "Caroor was taken by us at a time when he had joined the French and made himself a party in the national war and the supplies he sent to Pondicherry enabled them to hold out longer than they could otherwise have done. It was but reasonable that we should keep Caroor as a conquest made from them or their allies who had without any reason taken up arms against us. As the treaty of peace only obliged us to restore to the French their ancient factories, we are left in possession of everything else as a reward for success and the immense expense we had been at in obtaining it. Agreeing at part of this expense being charged to the Nabob it was but just that he should share in the advantages our arms had gained and therefore Caroor was delivered up to him. The Nabob might indeed claim it by another title."²¹ The Nawab of Arcot also advanced some claims to the Cuddapah country which Haidar was absorbing into his own dominions.

Besides these territorial disputes there were

20 Military Consultations, Vol. 23A, p. 714.

21 *Ibid.*, Vol. 24, p. 74.

other causes of friction. British troops were cantoned at Vellore to the grave irritation of Haidar, who naturally regarded this with apprehension.²² Haidar entertained in his service Raja Saheb, the son of Chanda Saheb, Muhammad Ali's mortal enemy. He also gave shelter to Mahphuz Khan, the elder brother, and as such a potential enemy, of Muhammad Ali. All this, however, might not have led to war but for bungling British diplomacy. Haidar himself explained that the situation was not irretrievable. He wrote, "What reason has the Governor to be displeased at Mahphuz Khan's coming? If a firm friendship is established between the Governor and me, I know how to give him a proper answer."²³

The President and Council of Bombay informed the Government of Fort St. George on the 4th April, 1766, that in his last invasion of the Malabar country Haidar had attacked some of the powers with whom the Bombay Government were in alliance. They judged from some circumstances in his conduct that they might be under the necessity of coming into a rupture with him. They made a request that in such a case the Madras Government should be ready to assist them in their operations against Mysore.²⁴ Madras in reply advised them to accommodate with Haidar because they were en-

22 Military Consultations, Vol. 24, p. 10.

23 *Ibid.*, Vol. 25, 1766, p. 384.

24 *Ibid.*, Vol. 24, 1766, p. 213.

deavouring to avail themselves "of the grant of the circars contrary to the inclinations of the soubah who had earnestly desired assistance from Haidar Ali to dispossess us." Therefore, in case hostilities were started against Haidar, he was sure to join Nizam Ali and this would prevent their bringing the Nizam to terms.²⁵ This was in May, 1766. In July Haidar made an offer through his *vakil*. He expressed his desire to live on the most friendly terms with the English. He made his offer in the following words, "I have got a large force. The English have the same. If both be united, the Mogullians and the Marathas can do nothing. If there be an occasion on that side my troops will go to their assistance and if on my side their troops will come to my assistance. Mention this to the Governor and if he is of the same opinion and if the gentlemen of the Council agree thereto, the settling it cannot be managed by a correspondence of letters for which reason you should bring a proper Gentleman and a letter under the seal of the 7 Councillors."²⁶ The Madras Government decided to send Bouchier, a member of the Madras Council, along with Muhammad Ali Khan. A letter from the Nawab to Haidar Ali was thus drafted, "It is desirable that between the governor of the Payenghat and the governor of Balaghat, a sincere

25 Despatches to England, 22nd February, 1767, para 70.

26 Military Consultations, Vol. 24, 1766, p. 213.

friendship and alliance should be established.”²⁷ Bouchier was also instructed to get the earliest information of Haidar’s intentions, the number of troops assembled and the details of preparations. It was patent that the British did not believe in the reality of the proposed offer. About defensive alliance Bouchier was told, “Nothing more particular should be engaged than in these general terms that their friends and enemies shall be the same.....we shall be ready to give him assistance provided the peace of this country will admit of it.”²⁸

But Haidar was also negotiating with Nizam Ali and Bouchier could receive no certain intelligence of the place and time of interview. He had to return to Madras without even interviewing Haidar. The President and Council of Madras apprehended that Haidar and Nizam Ali had entered into an alliance to invade the Carnatic. This open rebuff, Haidar’s return to Coimbatore without so much as sending an answer to their letters, made the people at Madras more forward in their overtures to the Nizam.²⁹ They hoped to steal a march over Haidar. The British envoy received his rebuff early in August and Calliaud’s treaty with the Nizam was signed on the 12th November. Wilson draws our attention to the military advantage resulting from this treaty. “Madras alliance with the Nizam in 1766

27 Military Consultations, Vol. 24, 1766, p. 406.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 436. Instructions for James Bouchier, para 9.

29 Despatches to England, 22nd February, 1766, para 74.

against Haidar has been generally condemned but the movement had an indirect advantage of great military importance. Till then the various battalions of the army had not been brigaded, indeed they had not always been kept together as battalions but had been often dispersed by wings and companies. Under Colonel Smith, who accompanied the Nizam with the English detachment, they were drawn together by battalions, brigaded and placed under picked officers, European and native. The force was thus formed and kept together for a considerable period, as a camp of exercise, of which the good effect was soon apparent."³⁰ On the 18th November the President and the Council of Madras wrote letters to Bombay and Tellicherry to the following effect, "We may be prevailed to assist (the Nizam) in reducing the Mysore Government within its ancient and proper bounds and which we cannot but look upon as favourable opportunity of checking the ambitious designs of a man from whose violence, immense conquests, riches and power the peace of the Nabob's dominions is liable to be disturbed, and indeed his refusing to admit Mr. Bouchier who set out to negotiate with him sufficiently evinces how little desirous he was of our friendship and alliance and that nothing but proceeding to extremities can bring him to reason."³¹

³⁰ *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. I, p. 11.

³¹ *Military Consultations*, Vol. 24, p. 615.

Apprehending a concerted attack as a consequence of the treaty between the British and the Nizam, Haidar sent back his *vakil* with a letter expressing his concern at his not having been able to see Mr. Bouchier and desiring that he might return to settle the terms of friendship and alliance, but the Madras Government now decided to conceal their real intention as much as possible. The President informed the *vakil* that it was the constant care of the British Government to live on terms of friendship with every Government but that they could not but be alarmed at his master's dubious conduct which had put them to a considerable expense in drawing their troops from different parts but they were well pleased to find him inclinable to adopt peaceable measures."³²

It is interesting to note that a treaty of peace and friendship between the East India Company and Haidar Ali was actually proposed by the Bombay Government on the 11th July, 1766. By it they were to enjoy all grants and privileges they had enjoyed under the former chiefs from "Cape Ramos to Penny South" and they were not to suffer any impediment or molestation in any other settlements in this region. In all matters of trade and business the English were to have preference. Clause 12 of the proposed treaty provided that Haidar was not to enter into any alliance prejudicial to the in-

³² Military Consultations, Vol. 24, p. 649.

terest of the Company, nor must he attack any other country, and more particularly the Nawab of Arcot and the Raja of Travancore. Haidar evaded this clause and himself put forward his demand in the following words, "Whenever the Honourable Company may be in want of troops I will furnish them with 10/15,000 men from the Sarcar and on the contrary should the Sarcar be in such necessity, the Honourable Company are to supply me in like manner as is consistent with our firm friendship and is also the cause of dread to our enemies."³³ Here we have the same proposal of a defensive alliance.

This Bombay project failed on account of the same reasons that prevented a rapprochement between Madras and Mysore, British policy taking a definitely anti-Haidar tone. The Madras Government objected to the proposed treaty as inconsistent with the treaty they had made with the Nizam. The curious part of the whole business was the foolish British belief which finds expression in the letter from Madras to Bombay, "We flatter ourselves that he will look upon our alliance with the Soubah in the same light as he did formerly that of the French who frequently attended the Soubah in his expeditions to Mysore, yet Haidar Ali continued in friendship with Pondicherry."³⁴

33 Military Consultations, Vol. 26A, pp. 16-26.

34 *Ibid.*

The Nizam advanced with his British auxiliaries into the Mysore country. Madhava Rao, his ally, was already plundering other parts of Mysore. But Haidar did not give up his attempt to win the Nizam over. Mahphuz Khan was sent with 50,000 pagodas and some elephants as a present to the Nizam. Sonapat Rao, who had been the *Dewan* of Anwar-ud-din, was also with the Nizam. Among the influential courtiers Sher Jang showed his decided dislike of the English treaty.³⁵ The flattering offers of Haidar Ali, and the influence of these three friends of Haidar, converted the vacillating Nizam from an anti-Mysore to a pro-Mysore attitude. With a weak resolution, so fettered by a thousand considerations that it had hardly any existence, the reconversion of the Nizam was not difficult.

The British now found themselves in a morass from which they found it impossible to extricate themselves. The difficulties of the situation were reflected in a letter written to Smith who was commanding the English detachment accompanying the Nizam. The President and Council of Madras wrote, "If all the arguments and any other you can suggest prove fruitless and the Soubah seems determined to return to Hyderabad, you must then hint (provided you can learn beforehand that the Marathas will readily embrace the proposal) that you

hope His Highness, though it is not convenient for him to remain with his whole army, will leave a part to act in conjunction with us and in that case we shall endeavour by means of the Marathas to accomplish the end proposed by the expedition. In case he cannot leave any troops that you hope he will have no objection to our entering into an agreement with Madhava Rao to assist each other against Haidar Ali. This however must be touched on in a light manner and if you perceive it raises jealousies or distrust of your intention you are to endeavour to remove them by the strongest assurances that we never mean to lose sight of our connection with the Soubah."³⁶

The utter failure of the diplomacy of the Madras Government became more visible when Lt. Tod, sent to the camp of Madhava Rao, submitted his report. He wrote, "I blush when I think the degree of contempt I was treated with considering my station and those I represented. Nevertheless I kept my temper, showed as little sign of disgust as possible."³⁷ Madhava Rao concluded a separate treaty with Haidar and went away. The Madras Government antagonised Haidar and then, deserted by the Nizam and insulted by the Marathas, they found themselves completely isolated and confronted with the Nizam-Haidar alliance. The back-

36 Military Consultations, Vol. 26A, p. 243, para 5.

37 *Ibid.*, p. 381.

ground of diplomacy that explains this situation is a story of incredible bungling. They had flattered themselves with the hope that they would "reduce the Mysore Government within its ancient and proper bounds as well as check the designs of a man dangerous to the peace and tranquillity of the Carnatic."³⁸ But now they found that before any defensive plan had matured and arrangements had been made for adequate provisions they had to face the Nizam-Haidar combination. Their hollow alliances and diplomatic counterplots were foiled completely by Haidar who made them look ridiculous. In this connection the following remarks of the Court of Directors³⁹ deserve notice :

"After having for successive years given it as our opinion, confirmed by your approbation, the maintaining an army for the support of the Suba of the Deccan was endangering the Carnatic and would tend to involve us in war and distant and expensive operations and the grant of the Circars was not to be accepted on those terms, you at once engage in that support and send an army superior to that which in the year 1764 you determined would endanger your own safety. You justify this measure by the advice from the committee of Bengal, which never countenanced so great a division of our force, and on


³⁸ Despatches to England, 22nd February, 1767, para 75.

³⁹ Company's General Letter to Fort St. George, 13th May, 1768.

the principle of checking the Maratha power which all your measures seem to counteract.

In the year 1766, in your letter to Bombay, dated 24th June, you express yourself averse to a rupture with Haidar Ali, whose power you deemed a restriction on the Marathas. Before the year is closed, the power of Haidar is assigned as a motive for a union with the Suba and the reducing it becomes the principal object of your policy.

Much has been written of the necessity of checking the Marathas which may in some degree be proper but it is not for the English East India Company to play the part of empire in Hindustan. If it had not been for the imprudent measures you have taken, the country powers would have formed a balance of power amongst themselves and their quarrels would have left you at peace."



Smith hoped to be joined by Wood's division which was expected to come from Trichinopoly. The army under Smith was very small in number, the whole English force being 600 Europeans and 6 battalions of sepoys. Haidar's army numbered 210 Europeans, 800 excellent Mughal horse, 12,000 other cavalry, 5,000 grenadier sepoys, 8,000 sepoys with European muskets, 1,000 topasses with muskets and 4,000 matchlocks. Of these 18,000 infantry of his, 12,000 were really good. He had 49 cannon of all sorts. The Nizam had 25-30,000 horse, 10,000 foot and 60 pieces of cannon.¹ On August 30 Smith marched to Singarpettah. The whole way was covered with woods and bad for the movement of cannon. He passed the Pennar (Ponnaiyar) twice in course of this march. Haidar's horse followed, but kept out of sight. On August 31, about 6 in the morning, Smith marched through the Singarpettah pass. Haidar's horse attacked the party but after a brisk fire made by the British they retired. The comment of a British soldier is significant. He writes, "I should hardly have been brought to believe that any horse in the world would have attacked infantry in so thick a wood, which in many places only admitted of our marching by files but that was not all for many of them scrambled over a steep rugged hill. Their notions of war are so different from ours."²

1 Orme Ms., Vol. 215.

2 *Ibid.*

Haidar's plan was to cut the small British army to pieces near Changama. Colonel Smith was marching in the following order: Major Bonjour with Captain Calvert's battalion led the van. The Nawab's horse, about 1,000 in number, marched in the rear. The baggage was immediately after them. On the right of the baggage, Cooke's battalion was marching by files, on the left Cosby's in the same order. The rear face of the baggage was open, but close up marched the head of the line, and the rear of the whole was closed by Major Thomas Fitzgerald and his grenadiers. Haidar had sent Raja Ramchandra Rao of the Nizam's army with 5,000 horse and some infantry to take possession of a village and hill directly on the road the British were to pass. Haidar's plan was to check them in front while he would attack the rear with the main body. A smart fire was kept up from their musketry and rockets and his cavalry was also put in motion. But Captain Cosby's battalion attacked the village with fixed bayonets and dispersed the Nizam's troops. As a large body of Haidar's sepoys and horse were pushing up the right of the British line, a British battalion was posted there. The hill was attacked to the south by Haidar's best sepoys. Haidar, sensible of the advantage secured by the British in having the hill, made several attempts to regain it. In one of these attempts Haidar led his sepoys himself and received a contusion on his leg. At one stage of the fight Haidar's troops had possess-

ed themselves of the village and were driven out by Captain Baillie's grenadier sepoy. Haidar found it impossible to break in. The British lost 125 sepoy killed and wounded and 6 Europeans. Haidar and the Nizam are said to have lost 2,500 in killed and wounded. The fight took place on the 2nd September and it lasted from 1 o'clock in the afternoon till dark.³ This battle produced on Haidar's mind a very high opinion of the commander which was of service to the British afterwards.

Pursuit in the absence of cavalry was impossible. The British army next morning continued to march, Haidar's troops plundering the baggages from distance. As Major Bonjour moved on with his detachment and baggage, he was followed by a large body of Haidar's horse. On his route there was a river which had little water at this time. Its banks were steep and bushy and the ground was very uneven. Haidar's horsemen got in, plundered heavily and even cut the bullocks carrying tumbrils. These tumbrils were later recovered. The advance guard of the British army reached about noon on the 4th and the rear guard reached about the evening—"a march of 27 hours without the least refreshment for men or beasts who were never unloaded."⁴

The *battle of Changama* was a very indecisive fight. The British commander-in-chief was cons-

3 Orme Ms., Vols. 33, 215.

4 Select Committee Proceedings, 13th October, 1767.

trained to admit, "The enemy's horse got into the Carnatic by various passes before me. I found large bodies of them near Trinomali." One curious feature of the events of these days was the desertion of Lt. Hitchcock, "an example, considering all circumstances, unexampled."⁵

On the 5th September, Haidar advanced and encamped about six miles from the British, the Nizam's whole force joining Haidar's. The confederates used to alarm the British by throwing rockets. On the 8th Colonel Wood's detachments from the south joined Smith's. Haidar ought to have attempted to prevent this junction but Wood was absolutely unmolested and had not even a sight of Haidar's army. The British army now marched 8 miles northward to Kalaspakkam. The Mysore army contented itself with exchanging some shots with the flanking parties. On the 14th of September Smith with his army returned to the high ground near Trinomali and on the 16th the British army again retired to Kalaspakkam, being in the greatest want of provisions. Some grain was found by them

5 But Wilson in his *History of the Madras Army* tells us that this was not unexampled. "The persons who were in those days willing to come to India in the Company's service were, for the most part, reckless adventurers and their position exposed them to many temptations. So late as 1761, a Captain Coulson, commanding at Chittapet, marched out of that place and with his garrison and guard joined Haidar Ali."—Copy of a letter from Smith to the Secret Dept. at Fort St. George—Select Committee Proceedings, 13th October, 1767.

buried in the village. On the 21st a large body of Haider's cavalry appeared in front of the British army. The grenadiers under Major Fitzgerald were ordered to move towards them. They were driven away with the help of field pieces. This body subsequently went to St. Thomas's mount and threw the inhabitants of Madras into the greatest consternation. "The Governor, Muhammad Ali and his son together with Colonel Call and almost all the council very narrowly escaped, being taken in the country house in the Company's garden. Happily for them a small vessel that by accident was opposite the garden, furnished them with the means of escaping."⁶

On the 24th the British army again marched towards high ground. These marches and counter-marches of the British army were undertaken with a view to draw the confederates into the open field and to bring them to action, but as yet they were of no avail. On the 25th September, the British marched by the left about two miles which brought them nearer their encampment and directly to it, on which the Mysore army immediately struck their tents. The British army found the ground very unfavourable for attack. The Mysore army marched 3 miles southward among high hills and threw up several

6 *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. II, p. 596. The news of this raid was magnified into a story of the capture of Madras. The price of the Company's stock fell from 275 to 222. Select Committee Proceedings, 27th October, 1767, p. 327.

strong redoubts. They thus strengthened their encampment as a precaution against night attacks.

Battle of Trinomali—On the 26th September, to the surprise and satisfaction of the British, the confederate army advanced with 16 pieces of 18 and 24 pounders towards the British camp, keeping a swamp between the two armies. As a smart cannonade was soon begun by the Mysore army, the British naturally thought that the confederate army wanted to drive them out of their encampment without coming to close action. Colonel Smith's guns being inferior in weight, he did not find it possible to reply to the brisk Mysorean cannonade. But he gave orders to his men to move off by the right, making a circuit round a high hill that lay between. Captain Cook was ordered to take possession of the hill. The Mysoreans thought that the British were retreating and moved by the left round the opposite side of the same hill. They were surprised to find the British advancing, the British movement being screened from their view by the hill. A group of their topasses and sepoys had taken possession of some straggling rocks in front of them. Another body tried to get up the hill from which they were driven away. The rocks were attacked by the British in front and the Mysorean troops were driven back, but they kept up a smart musketry fire. The main body of the English army advanced into the plain further right. The confederate infantry in this part of the field kept aloof, and immense bodies of

cavalry formed a kind of semi-circle around the British, waiting apparently for an opportunity of cutting in. But, curiously enough, they appeared to be quite at a loss until put to flight by the British field pieces. Very late in the afternoon a body of horse attempted the right flank of the British army but Major Fitzgerald in the rear wheeled round and warmly received them and they rode off. It was quite dark when Colonel Smith took possession of the field of battle. The confederate army retired to their fortified camp. Haidar placed his best troops in the redoubt where he himself remained in command. The Nizam moved off immediately. All night the confederates engaged themselves in removing their baggages. The British, a mile off, could observe this with the help of their lights. Colonel Smith wanted to swoop upon the opposing camp. "But he found himself in a swamp and a rascally spy informed him that it was impossible to get to their camp without going a great way about. This information was next morning found to be false but it robbed Colonel of a great deal of glory." Colonel Smith had to content himself with 41 cannon which the confederates could not carry off. Haidar's practice after a defeat in the field was to bring up the rear himself attended by the pick of his cavalry. Colonel Smith regretted : "2,000 good horses would have put us in possession of both the enemies'

armies.'"⁸ The Nizam left Haïdar at midnight after the battle and reached Singerpettah before he halted. Major Fitzgerald and Colonel Tod were sent to intercept Tipu in course of his return from the mount, but he was much too quick for interception.

The monsoon now began in all its violence. The English army now entered into cantonments at Trichinopoly, Conjeeveram and Trinomali. The confederates quarrelled and then separated. The Bengal Government, always bolder than Madras, now advised the Madras Council that this blow should be followed up by further blows against the Nizam and concessions must not be made too early. "Something similar to the Government established in these provinces might we think be set up to advantage on the coast without extending the company's influence quite far or reducing that of the Suba too muchThe expedition to Hyderabad may still be pushed with vigour.....if it should be necessary to bring about a change of persons in the Subaship we shall exert our influence with the King to have the appointment sanctioned by the royal

8 Select Committee Proceedings, 27th October, 1767, p. 330. According to De La Tour, Haïdar withdrew his army into the camp without leaving the English any mark of victory except one of the three pounders they themselves had lost before. The English made no prisoners except a Portuguese officer. The number of killed in the army did not exceed 400. (Pp. 316-17).

sanad.”⁹ The Madras Government was not altogether averse to the idea of having a puppet Nizam but wanted to know “if the king might be inclined to send any of his sons or any of the royal race and if he can supply money or give any security of reimbursing the expense we may be at to support any appointment he might make of a Suba to the Deccan.” British Indian imperialism, born on the battlefield of Plassey, had got a firm hold on the mind of the British statesmen in Bengal who wrote, “The grand power we ought to aim at is to have the Carnatic, Mysore country and the Deccan under the influence of British power and form an effectual barrier against the Maratha encroachments.”¹⁰ Shah Alam went to the extent of issuing a blank royal *farman* for any appointment to the Subaship of the Deccan that might appear as most favourable to the interests of the East India Company.

But in Mysore the British had to reckon with an enemy very different from the easy-going type with which they were familiar in the East. Even during the monsoon Haidar set about assembling his troops under the walls of Kaveripatnam. “Not less than 600 carriages daily passed to and from Bangalore and Kaveripatnam.”¹¹

9 Select Committee Proceedings, 27th October, 1767, pp.332-334.

10 *Ibid.*, 20th December, 1767, p. 458.

11 Orme Ms., Vol. 33.

Haidar began his march early in November, 1767. He very easily took Tirupattur and Veniyambadi. The garrison of Veniyambadi consisted of companies of sepoy and Lt. Robinson and Lt. Davis, who were all taken prisoners. Smith wrote to Orme, "Haidar treated them handsomely, received their paroles and set them at liberty. The sepoy there he confined except those who took his service. Others were carried upcountry to discipline his troops."¹² After this Haidar laid siege to Ambur which held out. Although Haidar brought 27 pieces of heavy cannon and raised 9 batteries, Ambur offered stubborn resistance. Haidar made two breaches in the wall but found it impossible to approach them. He could ascend only by two roads which again were so hard of access that troops without arms could with great difficulty crawl up. No wonder that Calvert, who led the defence, found it easy to fill up the breaches. Haidar wanted to finish his business before the approach of the main body of the English army. Failing to stagger people by the briskness of his fire as he had hoped, he wrote threatening letters and is said to have offered to make Calvert the commander-in-chief of his own forces. But in the meantime provisions within Ambur ran short and the men became fatigued. Smith wrote to Orme, "The Europeans, to their utter disgrace and shame as Englishmen,

¹² Orme Ms., Vol. 33.

came in a body, begged for heaven's sake he could give up the place. I believe it is the first instance known throughout our history of European forces to surrender a town to blacks. Calvert was mildly telling them the bad consequences it must produce among the sepoys. They at length grew ashamed of their dastardly conduct."¹³

For all these reasons the English army could not wait longer. Though miserably equipped it marched from Vellore on the 2nd and 3rd December and only seven days' rice, carried on 600 bullocks, was all that Smith was able to obtain in all the Carnatic, "a pretty prospect again." Ambur was relieved on the 7th, Haidar trotting off to Veniyambadi.

*Affair of Veniyambadi*¹⁴—The British army moved at 3 in the morning next day. At about 9 A. M. Major Fitzgerald sent news that he perceived the enemy. Haidar was in a very advantageous position. His army was encamped at the back of the fort on an island but the river was not very deep. In front of him lay the bank which was very steep. His rear was covered by the fort, his left by the village and *pettah* of Veniyambadi. To his right was a ridge of mountains. He had to run up a redoubt on the high road but had to withdraw it again. The British army had a deep water course and a paddy field to its left and a wooded, bushy, country

¹³ Orme Ms., Vol. 33.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 215, Vol. 33, pp. 25-58, 63-105.

to its right intersected by large gullies. Therefore the British army had to push straight forward. Haidar had some guns on the opposite bank, but the inexperienced gunners could do the British very little harm. The guns that flanked the British towards the left were attacked by a British battalion, but Haidar drove them off. As the British gained the opposite bank, the Mysore army retired to the fort and *pettah*. There was the greatest confusion in the British army on account of the ugly descent. Had Haidar's cavalry done their duty, the British would have had to suffer terrible losses. From the fort and village Haidar's men fired, and though very soon driven off, the entire army of Haidar got off with amazing quickness. Smith wrote, "They have a knack of retreating with so great celerity, (neither mountains, nor anything else can stop them) that we could not get one piece of cannon from them. The moment they find themselves inclined to run for it, Haidar orders 10,000 horse in the rear to keep you in check. No troops dare break or pursue in disorder with such a body of cavalry ready."¹⁵ During the action Monsr. D'Aumont with 50 French hussars came over from Haidar to Smith. Haidar's army withdrew to Kaveripatnam. After taking Tirupattur the British marched upon Kaveripatnam. Colonel Wood's division joined Smith on 20th December, 1767. The army now consisted of

1,500 European infantry, 9 battalions of sepoy, 30 guns and 2,000 Indian horsemen. Smith found Haidar very strongly posted. His redoubts were too strong to be attacked. Smith wrote, "Our sepoy on a plain would overturn the enemy from their wonted success; but this I full well knew that Haidar's sepoy, secured with a strong parapet, a ditch and thorny bushes around a redoubt, would then make a good fight and give much trouble to drive them out, as they had heavy cannon and light ones in each of these redoubts. The fort and *pettah* and three strong hills within shot of the town all commanded each other and formed a chain of strength sufficient to stop our career."¹⁶ Still he remained before Kaveripatnam because he knew that some of the officers of Haidar were discontented and some had even applied for service with the British. He wanted to see whether an opportunity would offer. There was also hope of a convoy coming to help him for which he had to wait. On the 26th December, Haidar attempted to cut it off. He moved so rapidly sword in hand through Wood's part of the camp that Wood could not even get into his track. Haidar took with him 4,000 horse, 1,000 sepoy and 2 small field guns, in order to intercept Major Fitzgerald who had been sent with 2 companies of grenadiers, a battalion of sepoy and 2 guns to reinforce the convoy. Fitzgerald received timely

¹⁶ Orme Ms., Vol. 215.

information and put all the grain and all the bullocks it could hold into an old mud fort. With this fort securing his rear, he drew up his men on two faces of the mud fort and took care to secure his angles. Haidar's field guns were ill-pointed. He therefore tried to confuse Fitzgerald's men with rockets. Mysore cavalry approached in three bodies, but steady fire compelled them to gallop off. Haidar rallied them and himself charged at their head. The Mysore horsemen now advanced briskly with horrible screamings. Haidar's horse was shot under him and his turban was beaten off with a ball. But he had to retire and as usual he covered his own retreat successfully.¹⁷ Forty-eight hours before the convoy arrived at Kaveripatnam nobody in the British camp had grain. Even then the supply brought by Fitzgerald was sufficient for four days only. But Haidar had marched away to Bangalore with the greater part of his force. The British were now free to move as they liked.

By the end of the year, the Nizam made his approaches for peace and wanted to manoeuvre the British into the position of a power suing for terms. But the Madras Government demanded that he must either quit Haidar Ali and throw himself into the hands of Colonel Smith or retire immediately to Hyderabad. When Smith was at Kaveripatnam many messages passed between him and the Nizam.

¹⁷ Orme Ms., Vol. 215.

Haïdar, who knew of this correspondence, coaxed, flattered, promised and threatened. As a preliminary to negotiations Smith insisted upon the Nizam's quitting Haïdar, which he did. The Hyderabad-Mysore alliance was from the beginning very unreal and it could not stand the strain of defeats. Lt.-Col. Hart took possession of Khammamet which has been described as the key to the Deccan. Though he expressed a desire for a reconciliation, he remained encamped opposite the Damalcherry pass, waiting to see what Haïdar alone could do. But the Nizam now heard with dismay that an army was getting ready for the reduction of Hyderabad. He sent Rukn-ud-daula and Raja Ramchandra to negotiate with the British. It is the characteristic of the tortuous diplomacy of the Nizam's *darbar* that a messenger was at the same time despatched to Haïdar Ali to reassure him that the negotiations would be spun out till he got the assistance of 10,000 more horse.¹⁸ The British, however, kept themselves in readiness to march through the Damalcherry pass. There was not much difficulty in making the Nizam agree to British terms as Rukn-ud-daula was sensible of the British power to remove his master. Moreover, Colonel Peach had already made himself master of Warangal and was encamped 5 kos from thence on the road to Hyderabad. A

¹⁸ Select Committee Proceedings, 18th March, 1768, pp. 145-146.

treaty was concluded between the Madras Government and the Nizam on 22nd March, 1768. The 9th article of the treaty runs as follows: "Asaf Jah recognises Haidar Naik as a rebel and usurper and as such divests him of and revokes from him all sanads, power and distinctions conferred by him or any other suba of the Deccan."¹⁹

The English army in two divisions was engaged in driving out garrisons of Haidar Ali from the many different strong places in which they were entrenched. Having reached Bangalore, Haidar set off for Mangalore, leaving Makhdum Sahib with about 3,000 horse and some irregulars to hover about the division commanded by Smith. There remained yet another force to harass Wood's division. Wood went with his detachment to Trinomali and Smith left for Tirupattur. Colonel Smith sent his heavy artillery to Colonel Wood who reduced Singerpettah and Dharampuri. Smith turned to Kaveripatnam, which he took on February 23rd. Colonel Wood was directed to proceed south on the fall of Dharampuri. Smith blockaded Krishnagiri on the 24th January, being informed that it had only a month's provision. The English daily expected that the place would be given up. People who were intercepted informed Smith that the place could not hold out long. It has been suggested with reason that this was nothing more than a finesse

19 Select Committee Proceedings, 27th April, 1768, p. 217.

of Haidar to encourage the British to wait and thus keep them inactive and prevent their pushing to Bangalore, in which case he would have been compelled to return from Mangalore. Krishnagiri was not "a very important place but after having waited so long, prestige demanded that it should be taken. It did not surrender until 2nd May, thus serving the purpose for which the defence was intended. Even then the *Killadar* was allowed to march off—this being one of the conditions of surrender—with troops, arms, colours etc. and one field piece, "the first demand of the kind made by an Indian officer which we must attribute to that military spirit which Haidar took every opportunity of instilling into his troops, expressed by rewards to the deserving and severe punishment upon the coward or traitor." Smith explains this stubborn resistance in words that do not disprove the fact that the defence of Krishnagiri was intended as a decoy to enable Haidar to finish the Mangalore operations. Smith says, "The *Killadar* seems modest in his replies and says how can he betray a trust committed to his charge by the best of masters and at whose hands he had received many favours. The truth is Haidar secures the families of all those men he gives command to, and if they behave ill, he destroys the remainder. No wonder then these fellows are desperate."²⁰

With a view to assisting the operations against

Haidar Ali the Bombay Government had sent a force for the reduction of his possessions on the Malabar coast. They sent an army of 400 Europeans and 800 sepoys under the command of Major Gavin by land and Mr. Watson by sea and they possessed themselves of Mangalore and the largest portion of Haidar Ali's fleet. Thereupon Tipu advanced with 1,000 horse and 3,000 foot. Major Gavin went out to meet him and a skirmish took place. Gavin's next plan was to march upon Bidnur. Haidar was equal to the occasion. A Mysore army commanded by Tipu got possession of the Mangalore bazar on the 2nd May but was repulsed from the fort. On the 9th May the British army near Mangalore heard that Tipu was joined by a reinforcement of 4,000 foot and 2,000 horse with a train of artillery and that Haidar himself had come down to join them. In consequence the British detachments embarked on the night of the 11th May and went to Tellicherry. The retreat itself was so panicky and precipitate that they left all their sick in the hospital, all the field pieces and practically everything except 250/300 muskets. The sick in the hospital included 80 of the European infantry and 170/180 of the Bombay sepoys and they fell into the hands of Haidar Ali, who thus succeeded in completely crushing the rebellion on the Malabar coast and driving the English into the sea.²¹ The success at Mangalore gave Haidar

²¹ Select Committee Proceedings, 20th July, 1768, pp. 291-93.

stores, guns and money, and to his people boldness. He also got a fine train of field artillery at Mangalore.

After taking Dharampuri Wood marched against Salem and Atur. Wood took Namakkal on the 25th May, Erode on the south side of the Kaveri on the 8th June. Wood then captured Satyaman-galam and marched towards Gazalhatty pass. Having got possession of it he marched towards Coimbatore which surrendered without much opposition. This was on July 5. Dindigul surrendered on the 4th August. Thus was completed the subjugation of the southern countries. The plan was to cut off the supplies of Haidar from the south as a preparation for the siege of Bangalore.

In the meantime Colonel Campbell at the head of a detachment of troops succeeded in seizing Venkatagiri on the 16th June and Mulbagal on the 23rd. The fort of Mulbagal was surprised by a stratagem. Jaffar Hussain, Haidar's recruiting officer, who was then at Mulbagal, was won over and admitted some British troops, dressed as his recruits. Mulbagal was of great consequence, as it lay on the direct road to Bangalore and secured communications with Venkatagiri and Kolar. It surrendered to Campbell on the 28th June.²²

The division under Smith marched from Krishnagiri on the 20th June. On the 31st May it had been

22 Orme Ms., Vol. 215.

decided that the army should enter the Mysore country. On the 1st June Muhammad Ali, the Nawab of Arcot, arrived in the British camp along with two field deputies, Messrs Call and Mackay. It was hoped that the Nawab's authority over the *amildars* would ensure plenty of supplies in the bazar of the British army. Colonel Smith differed from the Madras Government regarding the method of conducting the war. The field deputies were therefore appointed in order that those who had been responsible for planning the expedition might give their advice and influence in the prosecution of the war. Messrs Call and Mackay, together with the Commander-in-Chief, formed a council of war in which the majority would decide, the Colonel agreeing to this arrangement because it took away from him a portion of his responsibility and rendered frequent references to Madras unnecessary.

The British plan of war was to invade the Mysore country and besiege Bangalore. After completing the subjugation of the southern countries Wood would join Smith, and of the two divisions one would besiege Bangalore and the other would watch Haidar, who, however, came back to Bangalore from Mangalore on the 28th July. The main British army under Smith marched from Krishnagiri on the 20th June and reached Budicote on the 4th July. Hosur was besieged and on the 11th captured, Smith attacking it from the north and Colonel Campbell from the east. On the 12th July Anekal

surrendered. The British advanced with the intention of taking post near Hoskote and there they wanted to wait for cavalry and stores from Madras, intended for the siege of Bangalore. Colonel Wood, who had already secured Dindigul, was ordered to join the main army as soon as possible. On the 24th July the British army advanced 5 miles south of Hoskote on a fine high ground and there they intended to remain for sometime. Murar Rao of Gooty came with 3,000 horse, 2,000 sepoy and some pieces of cannon and joined the British army on the 3rd August. On the same day the British also received definite information of Haidar Ali's coming to Bangalore.

On the 22nd August, about midnight, Haidar with 6,000 horse and one battalion of sepoy made an attempt on Murar Rao's camp which was half a mile on the right of the British encampment. He broke through the entrenchments with elephants and entered it, but the Maratha chieftain forbade his people to mount, got Haidar's horse entangled in the tent and obliged his men to retire, leaving 150 killed and wounded and several elephants.²³ They had very nearly carried him off, having penetrated to the door of his own tent and wounded him, his son and some of his generals.

On the 4th September the British army moved from the ground at Hoskote to follow Haidar who

had gone from Bangalore with a considerable force to intercept Wood arriving at Budicote from the south to join the main army. Smith fell back to Malur and there left all the baggage and camp followers and even the tents. Haidar had counted on meeting only Wood's division and Wood would have beyond doubt been surprised and defeated.²⁴ But on the 6th, when Smith met Wood on the march, an unlucky salute from Wood in compliment to Smith gave the alarm to Haidar's camp and he was immediately in motion. It was, however, impossible for the British to intercept him, for his excellent bullocks marched at the rate of 2 feet to one of the British. But the English, whose determination was unshaken, dragged on their artillery. This alarmed him so much that he could not make a stand, and put up a fight. Colonel Wood's pursuit was too precipitate for the rear to keep up. He lost 2 pieces of artillery which were, however, later retaken. Haidar's horse fell on his rear, attacked the Poligar troops who had loitered behind a tank and, but for the assistance of Colonel Lang, would have cut them off. The pursuit failed as it was bound to fail. Haidar went towards Gurumkonda, a detachment under Lang being sent after him; the remainder of the

²⁴ Wood had got through the pass and had been a very short time on the ground when Haidar appeared. Wood's troops were worn out by their long marches and Haidar should have attacked at once. Next morning Smith's division joined Wood's on the march.

British army marched to cut off, if possible, his return to Bangalore. Most probably Haidar's principal design in this manoeuvre was to recruit his army and overawe his vassals who had been emboldened by his ill success. The British army gathered at Kolar, ready to commence the siege of Bangalore, but Smith and the field deputies were of the opinion that "so long as Haidar remained in the field with so numerous an army, the attack on Bangalore would be too arduous an attempt and that he must be first defeated before it could be undertaken with a prospect of success." Bangalore fort was also very admirably constructed, fitted with all the necessaries of war and provisions for 12 months. The walls were of stone. The well built bastions were turfed, the ramparts wide, the ditch deep, the glacis and esplanade excellent. There were batteries on the salient angles and redoubts without; 3,000 of Haidar's best sepoys were within the walls and more than 7,000 other troops. Haidar himself, with 10,000 sepoys, 7,000 horse and 20,000 Poligar troops, was outside, ready to come to its relief. "All this could not have been vanquished by the threats of a half starved, ill-recruited, ill supplied, ill paid, harassed army."²⁵

An excellent opportunity of concluding the war was missed by the Madras Government owing to excessive greed. Haidar made offers of accommodation to Colonel Smith when he was being pur-

sued towards Gurumkonda. Colonel Lang, who was in charge of Wood's division on account of Wood's illness, was obliged to halt at Punganuru for want of provisions. He was reinforced by Smith and his mission now was to prevent Haidar from running into the Carnatic. At this stage came the peace offer. Haidar's *vakil* arrived in the camp on the 23rd September. On October 3, finding that nothing could be done, he left. The Madras Government demanded a reimbursement of all their expenses, calculated on an extravagant scale, and wanted that a barrier should be set to the Carnatic consisting of some forts; and they also wanted territorial cession worth six lakhs of annual revenue to defray the cost of garrisoning the places. The Madras Government only thought that they were going to restore territory worth 30 lakhs of annual revenue and calling upon him to cede territory worth not more than six lakhs of annual revenue. Fallen though his fortunes were, Haidar thought he could not accept such terms. Malleison comments, "Rarely have rapacity and extortion met with a prompter punishment. Driven to bay, the wild and untutored genius asserted itself. From the recovery of Mulbagal began the series of successes ending in the triumph of Haidar Ali."²⁶

Finding himself only pursued by a detachment of the army, Haidar returned to Mulbagal which he

²⁶ *The Decisive Battles of India*, p. 221.

succeeded in taking by surprise through either the neglect or the treachery of the garrison consisting of the troops of the Nawab of Arcot. Mr. Call, the field deputy, had, without Smith's knowledge, withdrawn the British sergeant and his sepoy and replaced him by an officer of the Nawab. On receipt of this information Haidar surprised the garrison and took the fort without resistance.

On hearing this Wood, who had resumed the command of his detachment, marched towards Mulbagal to retake it. He attempted to take it by escalade but was unsuccessful and was repulsed with some loss. The next day, the 4th October, on Haidar advancing with an army to throw up a fresh supply of provisions, an action took place between him and Colonel Wood.

*Battle of Mulbagal*²⁷—Haidar first took two guns which had been advanced with a picket and he obliged the picket to retreat. Wood was with the picket but he did not know that Haidar's army was so near. He thought that this was only a detachment and that the main army of Haidar would not be able to come up. Haidar pressed the picket very hard but Colonel Lang brought the British line up. Then the action began. Encouraged by their success, Haidar's army became exceedingly bold. Wood formed his line behind some rocks. Haidar made some furious charges

and once even cut through several battalions of sepoy of Captain Mathews. The face of the battle was changed by a providential accident. Captain Brooke, who had been left with some companies of sepoy to guard the baggage, shouted the name of Smith, the British Commander-in-chief, from which an impression was aroused that he had come to assist the army. This threw the Mysorean army into confusion and enabled Wood to draw his men together. About 250 were killed or wounded on the British side. Haidar is said to have lost about 1,000 men. But more such victories as that of Mulbagal would place him in a position to dictate his terms.

Next morning Smith joined Wood. A few days after the army returned to Kolar. Colonel Smith left the army on the 19th November in obedience to orders from the Presidency dated the 2nd November. In Smith's opinion, the real motive which induced the Madras Government to recall him to Madras was to let Colonel Wood take command, for they had a better notion of his generalship. Colonel Wood was now left in sole command, the field deputies, as also Muhammad Ali, having also gone to Madras.

As soon as Smith was gone Haidar, who had no reason to think highly of Wood, became more confident and more daring. His plan was to destroy by perpetual harassment rather than hazard a pitched battle. Under Wood's command the ope-

rations of the British army consisted in little more than marching and counter-marching, without any possibility of an action. On the 19th November the British, after leaving two 18 pounders and all heavy baggage, came to Hosur, where Haidar moved round to the rear, around the British, with his cavalry, while his infantry and guns pushed towards Bangalore, where he attacked the *pettah*, took the two 18 pounders and a great quantity of baggage, made the English draw back and was off as usual. On November 22, Haidar took Wood completely by surprise at Arlier. Wood had just time to strike tents and make disposition of his forces. A warm cannonade began which lasted from noon till evening when Haidar drew off quite unmolested. The English lost about 20 Europeans and 200 sepoys in killed and wounded. As Wood began to march next morning, he was followed close by Haidar's troops. The British army was obliged to halt and form. Another cannonade began which lasted till 11 a.m., when they drew off hearing of the approach of Fitzgerald who now commanded Smith's division. The British failed to bring Haidar to an engagement at Bagalur, withdrew to Hoskote and thence to Kolar. The Presidency, disappointed in Wood, recalled him and gave the command to Lang, whose first step was to move the troops towards Venkata-giri, leaving Haidar free to enter the southern districts. Haidar went southward, retook Dharampuri and marched towards the Coimbatore country, so

recently conquered by Wood. Major Fitzgerald was sent with a detachment in pursuit of Haidar. It was impossible for Fitzgerald to get up with Haidar, who kept several days' march ahead of him. Haidar retook every fort on his way—Salem, Atur, Namakkal, Erode, Dindigul, "in short all Wood's late conquests with the addition of Karur." Such an easy reconquest has been explained by the fact that these places had been put under the management of the Nawab of Arcot and every place was left practically without provisions and the troops had not received any part of their salary, which had been lying so long in arrears. But this cannot explain why Captain Orton surrendered at Erode even though he had 200 Europeans and 2 battalions of sepoys under him.

Haidar now advanced into the Carnatic and stationed himself near Arialur. He sent parties of his horse to plunder the Carnatic. While Major Fitzgerald with his detachment was watching Haidar's motions at a distance, Colonel Lang was withdrawing his stores from Kolar to Vellore, a distance of about 100 miles.²⁸

Colonel Smith, having received orders to take the command of the army again, arrived at Chetput on the 28th January, 1769.²⁹ Haidar being then at

28 Select Committee Proceedings, 1st March, 1769, p. 101.

29 Early in 1769, Haidar offered to come to terms, but Bouchier vacillated and while affecting to treat, directed Smith to

Trinomali, Smith marched in that direction. On arriving at Trinomali he heard that Haidar had marched to Tricalore. Hearing that Haidar had marched eastward, the British returned towards Chetput. Determined to bring Haidar to a decisive action, Smith divested himself of every useless encumbrance. As Haidar had the advantage in point of heels, the British found themselves terribly handicapped. A body of 3,000 horsemen of Haidar harassed the British rear, supplied Haidar with information and kept all information from the British. On the 19th the British army, in its vain pursuit of Haidar, arrived at Chetput. At this stage there was a cessation of arms for 7 days. But the negotiations continued up to the 12th March, when Haidar's *vakil* was finally withdrawn. The Madras Government proposed a truce for 40 days and wanted that during the negotiations Haidar's army would be at Atur and the British at Jagadurgaon. Haidar proposed that his army should be at Wandiwash, the British at Conjeeveram, and hostilities would cease for 7 days. But that would place him in the heart of the country whence with his swift cavalry he could be near Arcot or Cuddalore before the British. The negotiations for truce having failed, the armies were constantly in motion, without the British being able to approach nearer than a day's march and Haidar making from place to place.

threaten the enemy's force. Haidar lured Smith to the southward. (*Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. II, p. 597).

On the 14th March Colonel Smith received intelligence that Haidar was making a push to pass the British army on the Mysore road. Colonel Smith, moving in hot pursuit, cut across and advanced towards Wandiwash. The plan of pushing forward to Madras was frustrated. Not receiving certain intelligence Colonel Smith marched further northwards, reaching Chingleput on the 16th. Some of Haidar's cavalry in the flank deceived Smith, who thought that the main body was in front, which however was not the case. Colonel Smith marched to Conjeeveram where he found Colonel Lang with his division. Not knowing anything about Haidar's movements Colonel Smith arranged that he would move to Wandiwash and Colonel Lang would march farther to the westward, hoping that one or the other party would catch the Mysorean or get him between the two. Smith reached Wandiwash on the 23rd March. On the 27th March Smith heard that Haidar, having sent all his baggage and guns to Atur, had with his cavalry and light infantry passed the right flank of the British and got between them and Madras. On hearing this Smith marched as fast as he could. On the 29th Smith reached Karanguli, on the 30th he reached Chingleput; on the 31st Smith came to Vandalur, where he was ordered by the Madras Government to halt,³⁰ Haidar having compelled

them to open negotiations for peace and Mr. Dupre having been sent to his camp for that purpose. But it is only proper to note that from the military point of view the situation of Haidar was very difficult. There were then in Madras 2,000 sepoy, 400 Europeans, a light train of artillery, with Colonel Campbell, Major Bonjour and a number of old officers. Colonel Lang with his force was on the Arcot road, Colonel Smith's force close on the heels of Haidar's cavalry which was exhausted with fatigue. Whatever might be the mistake from the military point of view, the political calculation proved to be correct.³¹ He twisted himself skilfully into a peace through the characteristic weakness of his enemy on the field and in the cabinet.

A treaty was concluded on the 4th April, 1769. The treaty provided for the mutual restitution of conquests, except the fort of Karur and its districts which would be held by Haidar. Haidar could argue that this was also restitution of conquests as Karur had been formerly cut off from the dominions of the Mysorean. It also provided that in case of either of the parties being attacked, they would mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out. Some difficulty was caused in the wording of the treaty as neither the Nawab of Arcot nor Haidar Ali

³¹ We must not, however, omit to mention that "there was but provision for only 15 days in the Black town when the peace was concluded."—Dupre to Orme—Select Committee Proceedings, 21st April, 1769, p. 207.

would give to the other his proper titles. The difficulty was obviated by the Nawab agreeing to give to the British power to settle for the Carnatic Payenghat in general terms. Bombay was included within the terms of the treaty and in lieu of the ships of Haidar taken on that coast the Madras Government surrendered the stores at Kolar.³²

The Anglo-Mysore War of 1767-69 is interesting as it was the first war in which the British Government finished by suing an Indian power for peace. Haidar is said to have ordered a caricature to be made, representing the Governor and his Council kneeling before him. Haidar was shown holding Dupre by the nose, depicted as an elephant's trunk, pouring guineas and pagodas. Colonel Smith also was in this picture, holding the treaty in his hand and breaking the sword in two.

The overwhelming superiority of the European soldier over his Asiatic rival, of which the Europeans got a clear impression in the battle of St. Thome, had been confirmed by the issue of the engagements at Arni, Kaveripak, Plassey, Kondur, Machhlipatnam, Biderra, Uduanala and Buxar. The failure of the British in this campaign, therefore, requires some explanation. The Indian armies, inspite of great numerical superiority, were no match for the European whose spirit, temper, discipline, fire control,

³² Select Committee Proceedings, 21st April, 1769, pp. 222-228.

swiftness and superior technique took the former by surprise. Against this mere personal bravery was helpless. But the element of surprise was by now over. The other Indian powers saw that the Indian sepoy trained by the Europeans were gaining resounding victories for their masters. Naturally, chieftains like Haidar Ali started employing Europeans to train their armies. Captain Mathews writes about the battle of Mulbagal, "I never saw black troops behave so bravely as Haidar's, all his foot were led on by Europeans." Haidar himself, though no match for Captain Smith, was as a general far superior to commanders like Wood and Lang. Moreover, he had so much advantage over the British in cavalry that he could make ravages, cut off the convoys, paralyse the British intelligence service, secure his own retreat after defeat, and prevent Colonel Smith from taking advantage of his victories. "Next to beating the enemy the pursuit is the most important thing in war" and in pursuit, the British army was literally paralysed. Haidar told Srinivas Rao, the *vakil* of Sir Eyre Coote, in 1782, "You will march four coss in a day, more you cannot for your lives and so keep trotting after me all round the country. My business in the meantime I shall take care to despatch." This lack of mobility was a factor that contributed to British failure in 1769. Smith was so weak in cavalry that he had to reduce the theatre of operations as much as possible to the mountainous country. De La Tour

writes, "The excellence of the English cavalry is acknowledged in Europe and its advantages consist less in the goodness of the horse than in the choice of the horsemen. The officers who were first entrusted with the formation of a body of cavalry in India, thought to establish and preserve the same discipline among them without attending to the great difference of time, place and persons. The recruits sent from England to India were in general libertines and people of bad character, and as the company will not dismiss a soldier, all the punishment inflicted on a horseman is to reduce him to serve in the infantry so that a man is no sonner put among the cavalry than he is sent back again to his former station." Haidar's army, so superior in cavalry, had much greater mobility and was more daring than the British. Haidar made full use of this superiority especially in the later stage of the war; marching, fatigue and exertion were his special weapons.³³

33 Wilson, *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. I, p. 280. The measures undertaken by the Government at the repeated request of Colonel Smith were the following:—The Nawab was requested to place 2,000 of his cavalry under the British officers of the Madras Government. This was done in December, 1767; but the whole of this body returned to Arcot early in 1768, being in distress for want of pay. A body of horsemen under Ibrahim Beg, a soldier of fortune who had joined the British in 1766, after the acquisition of the Northern Circars, was placed under Colonel Wood. They left the camp and joined the Nizam. Then the Government decided to raise the number of British horsemen to 100 and to increase the foreign hussars

But what hampered and weakened the British army most seriously in the conduct of the war was the constant interference of the Council of Madras. The point where civilian control of military operations becomes presumptuous may be easily defined. Arnold, in his *Lectures on Modern History*, says, "There must be a point up to which an unprofessional judgment on a professional subject may not only be competent but of high authority, although beyond that point, it cannot venture without presumption and folly. The distinction seems to be originally in the difference between the power of doing a thing and that of perceiving whether it is well done or not. What we understand least in the profession of another is the detail of the practice." The appointment of field deputies was an example of interference in detail. As the writer of the *Orme Ms.*, Vol. No. 71, puts it, "The Madras Government is a set of licensed plunderers, who scarce equal to the honest arts of commerce, grasped in idea, imaginary sceptres and disposed of kingdoms not their own." Smith complained that Chevalier de St. Lubin, the French adventurer, gained the confidence of the Council and suggested the plan for the conquest of the Mysore country and Colonel Smith had to conform to the direction of field deputies who were dictated by the Chevalier. Colonel Smith protested from 60 to 100 and 500 good horses were obtained from the Nawab and mounted by selected sepoys. This was all the exertion made.

against these measures, sensible of his shameful and ridiculous part. This was responsible for his recall and the appointment of Wood, whom they regarded as an officer of vigour and resolution and whose achievements in the south they contrasted with Smith's failures. They were so obstinate in this belief that after the Mulbagal action in which Wood was really worsted by Haidar, they resolved, "We cannot sufficiently admire the bravery and resolution of our troops under the disadvantage of ground which they laboured under and persevered at the same time with Haidar's whole force".³⁴ What crowned all these disabilities was the dishonesty of this remarkably inefficient yet meddlesome Council. They supplied the army through contractors with whom they were in league to plunder. Oxen were taken by force from people on hire at 1 pagoda per month and after the expiry of a month or so, they would be informing the owner that the beast was dead and then it would be passed to the account of the Company as purchased at full value.³⁵ As a consequence of all this, Colonel Smith found it very difficult to secure oxen for the conveyance of artillery, ammunition and baggage.

The Madras Government attributed their defeat to the want of a carefully laid up reserve of funds, 'the rock upon which the French were

34 Orme Ms., 41—Sketch of Col. Wood's conduct—extracted from Madras Records.

35 De La Tour, p. 267.

wrecked in the last war.' It was asserted that they could not assemble a sufficient body of cavalry because they apprehended that their means would be exhausted before those troops could be brought to act. "Had the Nabob of Arcot before it was too late exerted his utmost powers, it might have been effected and this amongst others, is a striking proof of the dangers of a divided power." It was verily a coalition of cripples, called upon to war with a man who, in the words of Colonel Smith, "possessed immense treasure, force and every article he wishes for, sole master of his actions without control, a man of fire and soul."³⁶

The Court of Directors' comment on the war is significant. They wrote, "The several powers of India, whose dread of our name and arm had contributed, in a great measure, to our prosperity and security, have seen terms of peace dictated to our Governor of Fort St. George, by a country power, at the gates of Madras. The Company's interest and influence in India have suffered such diminution and discredit that the most consummate abilities, persevering assiduity, unshaken fidelity and intrepid courage in our future servants, may perhaps be proved insufficient in many years to restore the English East India Company to a proper degree of credit and dignity in the eyes of the nations and inhabitants of Indostan. It is our opi-

nion that you have so untruly made us principals in the quarrel with Haidar, the said war has been very improperly conducted and most disadvantageously concluded."

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX

*Peshwa Madhava Rao I and the First Anglo-Mysore War.**

When war began between the British and the Haidar-Nizam coalition (25th August, 1767), the contestants did not know the attitude of the Peshwa, Madhava Rao I. He was courted by the Nizam and Haidar Ali as also by Muhammad Ali and the British. Mostyn came to Poona from Bombay, Nagoji Rao came from Madras, Sher Jang came as the *vakil* of Nizam Ali and Chanda Saheb's son as the agent of Haidar Ali.

In the instructions of the President and Council to Mostyn we find a record of the motives of the British. But Mostyn did not think it prudent to place all his cards on the table. The British at Bombay expected Madhava Rao to take part against Haidar, especially if they invaded Haidar's possessions on the western coast. They wanted to hold before the Peshwa the bait of Bidnur and Sunda, expecting in return Salsette, Bassein and the

* Published in *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Calcutta Session, 1939.

Maratha share of the revenues of Surat. If the Peshwa declined to make this exchange, the British would try to put someone else in possession of Bidnur and Sunda, guaranteeing the annual *chauth* to the Marathas. The British envoy was also asked to ascertain, if he found the Peshwa willing to conclude an alliance against Haidar, whether some Maratha cavalry could be had to make up for the deficiency of cavalry on the eastern front.¹ Charles Broome accompanied Mostyn as his assistant to attend to any representation Raghoba might make; in other words, to foment domestic dissensions.² The memorandum for Nagoji contained terms almost identical and also included the following instruction: "In case Madhava Rao makes difficulties and listens to the proposals of Haidar Ali Khan and the Nizam, he may be given to understand that the Raja of Berar has been soliciting the friendship of the English at Bengal and of this Court and that

¹ Forrest, *Selections from the State papers preserved in the Bombay Secretariat, Maratha Series*, English Embassy to the Marathas in 1767.

² Raghoba told Broome that he had applied to the President "that a gentleman might be sent him, with whom he would concert measures for revenging his cause, hoping for assistance from the English, but as he had waited in expectation without receiving any favourable answer he was obliged to accommodate matters in the best manner he could—he hoped to engage the English on his side and receive help from them when he might take up arms, which after the rains he was fully resolved on."

they will doubtless give him their friendship if Madhava Rao does not engage it."³

A few days after the arrival of Mostyn, Madhava Rao sent Gopal Rao, Anand Rao Raste, Bapuji Naik, Visaji Pant and Naru Rao Ghorpade to Miraj to collect an army of 24,000 horse and then go to Sera and Madgiri and there await instructions. Apparently the Maratha *Darbar* was for watching events before coming to any resolution. When Mostyn made an enquiry why so large a force was sent under Gopal Rao to the Carnatic, he was told that it was sent only to collect the revenues which could not be done without a force. The British ambassador was, however, clearly told that the Maratha *Darbar* could not say what part they should act until they had heard what the different agents had to say.

It is interesting to note that there were rumours even in Northern India that Madhava Rao was sending an army of 20,000 horse to the assistance of the confederacy with Gopal Rao as the commandant. Richard Smith stationed at Allahabad even proposed to seize those Maratha chiefs who had come to bathe at the confluence of the Ganges and the Jumna to keep them as hostages until they could discover the truth about Gopal Rao's destination.⁴

But Haidar Ali was the professed enemy of the Marathas and would, whenever free from diffi-

³ Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*.

⁴ Select Committee Proceedings, 10th February, 1768.

culties, give them trouble. Therefore, unless he would 'make it very materially their interest to support him,' it was not likely that they would lend their assistance to him. Moreover, Haidar's affairs were in a bad way. He was himself defeated at Changama and Trinomali. The Nizam, always a lukewarm ally, was separated from him. Finally, the Peshwa had his own domestic difficulties. Mostyn perceived this. He wrote, "I am well assured that it is not in Madhava Rao's power to take the field this year, first on account of his apprehension and engagements to Raghoba and the low state of his finances to recruit."⁵ With the Nizam eliminated from the hostile coalition,⁶ and the Peshwa preoccupied with the opposition of his uncle, the Bombay Government felt themselves in a position to send an expedition for the reduction of the possessions of Haidar on the Malabar coast, even without referring the matter to the Peshwa's *Darbar*. Madhava Rao's differences with his uncle became more and more acute, culminating in an open fight in June, 1768, in which Raghunath Rao was taken prisoner. The Peshwa was now free from his domestic preoccupations to take advantage of the Anglo-Mysore conflict. In the meanwhile the attempt of the Bombay Government to conquer Haidar's possessions on the Malabar coast had

5 Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*.

6 A treaty was concluded between the Madras Government and the Nizam on the 2nd March, 1768.

failed, Haidar and Tipu succeeding in driving the British to the sea.

With the Maratha attitude still uncertain the campaigning season opened again in September, 1768. This time Charles Broome was sent from Bombay to reside at Poona to procure intelligence and report any occurrence worthy of notice. Madhava Rao must be given his due share of credit for hoodwinking the British for a very considerable time as to his real intentions. From Madras it was proposed that Madhava Rao should be offered assistance in reducing Bidnur "if no other means can prevent him assisting Haidar, for however averse we may be to add to the power of the Marathas, which is already too great, yet we would not hesitate when the two evils threaten, the one present, the other distant, which to prefer."

Broome reported that Haidar offered to Madhava Rao, on his consenting to assist him, the tribute due for the last two years, i.e., 30 lakhs, 17 to be paid to the army on their journey and 13 on their joining Haidar. His *vakil* also proposed that for the maintenance of the army half a rupee per horse for each day would be paid. Madhava Rao did not give his final reply and said that he would await the arrival of the English envoy. But he took the field about a *kos* distant from Poona. The ambassador reported, "I think the *Darbar* are on the very brink of breaking with us."

7 Select Committee Proceedings, 13th December, 1768.

The Company's General Letter to Fort St. George⁸ recommended an immediate conclusion of a treaty, offensive and defensive, with Janoji Bhonsle on his ceding the province of Orissa to the East India Company, as the most effectual support that could be given to the Madras people. The Governor and the Select Committee of the Presidency of Fort William wrote, "Our principal object of bringing about a treaty with Janoji was to divert Madhava Rao from entering the Carnatic to the assistance of Haidar Ali."⁹ But the British negotiations with Janoji failed. Madhava Rao had to some extent misled the British as to the aim of his preparations and had even sent his fleet to cruise off the Bombay harbour, though he was really concerting with the Nizam a plan for marching against Janoji. By that time Haidar had brought the war to a close.

We must not think that British diplomacy twice succeeded in bringing about a diversion of the Maratha power. We shall not be certainly justified in accepting the proposition that Madhava Rao really intended to help Haidar against the British.¹⁰

Copy of a letter from Mr. Broome to Messrs Smith, Call and MacKay.

⁸ Select Committee Proceedings, 13th May, 1768, p. 681.

⁹ Select Committee Proceedings, 13th December, 1768.

¹⁰ This was the assumption of the Bombay Government. Thomas Hodges from Bombay wrote to Richard Bouchier in Madras on the 30th September, 1767, "We shall immediately pursue such measures as may appear to us most eligible for

From Haidar's side no such offer was made that might induce Madhava Rao to join hands with him, especially after the defection of the Nizam. Madhava Rao certainly wanted to strengthen his home front before he would think of embarking on such ambitious schemes of foreign conquest. Raghunath Rao and Janoji were the two domestic enemies whom he must first dispose of. Madhava Rao must not be taken to be a man of confused thinking to whom first things did not come first. It is significant that only after Janoji had been effectively checked did Maratha policy adopt a more decisive and vigorous tone both in the North and in the South. Haidar had encroached on the Maratha sphere of influence and hoped in future to encroach more and more. There was a much greater clash of interests with the Marathas than with the British, though Haidar was actually at war with the latter. The fact that the ministerialist party at Poona later enlisted his support against the British during the First Anglo-Maratha War, must not make us think in the same strain about the years 1767-1769. By 1779, Haidar's greed for territory at the expense of the Marathas had been satisfied, partly by his own

answering your intentions in respect to the Marathas, which we shall be the better enabled to do from a difference which is likely to arise between Madhava Rao and his uncle Raghoba, which we shall do our utmost to foment and embrace any other opportunity which may offer for drawing off the attention from the Carnatic."

—Gense and Banaji, *Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. I.

conquests and partly by the readiness of the Poona *Darbar* to meet his wishes. Haidar could not expect an alliance with the Marathas in 1767-1769.

Neither of the contestants expected Madhava Rao to be an ally, but both were apprehensive that he might throw his weight on the other side. His neutrality was what each really could hope for at the utmost and that policy was forced on Madhava Rao by Raghunath Rao and Janoji. Otherwise, it was not unlikely that Madhava Rao would have taken advantage of this war to attempt to crush Haidar completely, a policy which he tried to pursue in his third expedition undertaken towards the close of 1769.

CHAPTER X

Relations with the Marathas, 1769-1770

In the proceedings of the Select Committee of the 10th March, 1771, we read: "From the present conduct of the Marathas both in the North and in the South and from the genius, spirit and ambition of Madhava Rao, we are inclined to suspect that their designs are not confined to the mere collection of chauth but extend to the subjection of the whole Peninsula." This suspicion had a basis of truth.

Krishna Rao Ballal informed Nana Fadnavis that the third expedition of the Peshwa against Haidar was undertaken to humble Haidar completely with the assistance of some of the Poligars in the South as also the chief of Chittaldrug and Murar Rao of Gooty.¹ The Peshwa himself wrote that he intended bringing together all the Poligars, including the chiefs of Cuddapah and Kurnul, to defeat Haidar and to reconquer territory worth 2/3 crores of rupees, which Haidar had seized by force and cunning.²

Haidar gave Madhava Rao grave offence. He attempted to stir up the Peshwa's domestic enemies

¹ S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 194.

² *Ibid.*, letter no. 198.

against him. He maintained secret communications with Raghunath Rao and even after Janoji Bhonsle's complete reconciliation with the Peshwa in 1769, he tried to stir him up against the Peshwa.³ But these were small matters compared with the systematic encroachment of Haidar on the Maratha sphere of influence. Two years' tribute had also remained unpaid. Haidar felt strengthened by the defensive alliance he had concluded with the British. Mir Reza, his brother-in-law, who had three years before deserted to the Marathas, now returned to his former allegiance.

Mir Reza and Haidar together attacked Mahimaji Sindhia, the *Faujdar* of Chik Balapur, who had a garrison of about 850 men. The strength of the Mysore army was about 10,000. Mahimaji retreated first to Cuddapah, thence to Gooty, but could not get help anywhere. He returned to Anantapur. In the meantime Talpul held by Rakhmaji Bhonsle was seized treacherously by Haidar. He called Rakhmaji for negotiations but seized him and put many of his men to death. Haidar next advanced to Anantapur. Mahimaji withdrew to Harihar. Gopal Rao Patwardhan protested against this aggression of Haidar and tried to dissuade him from doing mischief in the *taluka* of Chik Balapur. Haidar replied: "It was agreed between us that within 4 months Sera, Hoskote and

3 S.P.D., Vol. 29, letter no. 236; Vol. 38, letters no. 151, 198.

Balapur *taluka* would be returned to me, but even after the lapse of two years with a man of your worth as the go-between this has not been done. Please request the Peshwa to right this wrong. The *Killadar* of Balapur, Mahimaji Sindhia, was taking into his service some of our dissatisfied men and was fomenting trouble in our own territory. Hence I drove him out."⁴

Haidar then went to the territory of Murar Rao of Gooty. Murar Rao thought it proper under the circumstances to placate Haidar by seeing him. Haidar gave him presents and induced him to make an agreement promising to pay 50,000 rupees every year.⁵ He took tribute by force from Chittaldurg, Harpanhalli and other places and proceeded upto Harihar. Lakshman Hari, the Maratha *Mamlatdar* of Harihar, thought it prudent to see Haidar and placate him. Haidar then advanced to Savanur and the Marathas heard that the ruler of Savanur had paid 40,000 *huns* secretly to him and thus bought him off.⁶

Madhava Rao proceeded systematically. There was nothing inadequate or haphazard about his arrangements. With an army numbering approximately 75,000 the Peshwa was in a position to spare a considerable number of troops to occupy the conquered territory. Of the conquered forts those

4 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 172.

5 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 827.

6 *Ibid.*, letters no. 833, 834.

which were easily defensible were garrisoned by the Marathas. Unimportant forts were systematically dismantled so that Haidar might not seize and utilize them as points of vantage. Peixoto notes with some surprise that the Peshwa did not pillage or cause any damage. Therefore many forts surrendered voluntarily.⁷

On the approach of the Peshwa, Haidar withdrew to Anawatty and the forest of Udagani with his infantry and guns. He kept about 25,000 troops with Mir Reza, Tipu Sultan, Venkat Rao Barakki and Makhdum Ali; 20,000 were scattered in different forts and nearly 30/35,000 were always with him.⁸ The Peshwa kept a small force of about 10,000 to watch Haidar's movements. He himself encamped 20 *kos* in advance of Haidar towards Seringapatam. If Haidar came out the Peshwa intended to advance towards Seringapatam and conquer his forts on the way.⁹ Gopal Rao remained encamped near Savanur and the Peshwa near Seringapatam. Haidar had become wiser after his two encounters with Madhava Rao. He did not intend to fight a pitched battle. He commissioned Tipu to collect all the straw and wood that he could, burn all that could not be removed, to fill up the wells and ponds and to give notice to the people to retire from the villages into the larger fortified

7 Peixoto, VI, 45.

8 *Lekha Samgraha*, IV, intro.

9 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 184.

places. Having executed as far as possible the orders of his father, Tipu fell back to Seringapatam.¹⁰

In January, 1770, the Peshwa captured Budhehal, Kandikire and Chiknaikhalli. The Peshwa's itinerary reports that by the 13th of February he reached Nagmangal *via* Turuvekire, the ruler of Chittaldrug and Murar Rao of Gooty accompanying the Peshwa's army. The Peshwa pulled down some forts to the ground and garrisoned some others. Even then in some of the conquered forts he had to keep the men of Chittaldrug and in some the old guard of Haidar with a small number of Maratha troops. Nagmangal was razed to the ground but Belure was garrisoned.¹¹ Haidar had fortified Bangalore and Seringapatam where he hoped to be able to hold out for 4/6 months until the advent of the rainy season. Without wasting his time in besieging Bangalore and Seringapatam, the Peshwa marched towards Chik Balapur and Kolar. After taking Deonhalli he demolished it as also Magadi. Then he proceeded to Chik Balapur which surrendered after four days' siege. Nandidurg had also to be besieged and when its *Foujdar* agreed to surrender the place 400 Maratha troops were placed there. Kolar was taken and razed to the ground. At Mulbagal 30/32 men, who were taken prisoner, were killed because they had looted the *mela* of

¹⁰ Peixoto, V, 163.

¹¹ *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 973.

Venkatagiri. About the 10th of April the Peshwa retraced his steps to Devraidurg without attempting to capture Bangalore or Seringapatam. In course of his return journey he stormed the hill fort of Nijgal, directing the attack himself. The fort held out for 8 days and the Peshwa's brother Narayan Rao received a bullet wound in the wrist.¹² Peixoto who was in Haidar's camp records, "We had frequent news of the Marathas and there were some days in which they took 2/3 forts which might have held out for some months."¹³

Haidar was in the eastern part of his dominions at Udagani. Thence he went to Turuvekere. Gopal Rao came from Savanur to Harihar, 30 *kos* from Turuvekere. Haidar succeeded in sending detachments that surprised the Maratha garrison at Chiknaikhalli. There were 1,100 men of whom only 125/150 were Maratha troops, 400 belonging to the Poligar of Chittaldurg, and as the rest were Haidar's old garrison, he had no difficulty in smuggling 300 of his own men. The Marathas were caught and their noses and ears were cut off. The Maratha garrison from Kandikire and neighbouring places took fright and fled away. The Peshwa on hearing this sent 3,000 cavalry with Narasing Rao Dhaigude, Shahji Bhonsle of Akalkote and Mahimaji Sindhia towards Chinaikhalli. He also directed Gopal Rao to go from Harihar to Mattode, so that their men

¹² S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 206.

¹³ Peixoto, V.

might not take fright and fly away, and he might be in a position to watch Haidar. Mir Reza had been commissioned by Haidar to divert the energies of the Marathas and to prevent them from getting their forage. He was a constant source of trouble to the Maratha garrisons and the Peshwa's attempts to catch him failed.¹⁴

Haidar, however, had his own difficulties. If he tried to recapture any place, he might be crushed between Gopal Rao and the Peshwa, who would come up by quick marches. If he sent small batches against Gopal Rao, the latter would run away and would at a favourable opportunity turn back to attack him. Haidar therefore decided to make a night attack.¹⁵ But Gopal Rao was very alert. He himself, Nilkantha Rao and Parasuram Bhau watched at night by turns. But Haidar was a man of many wiles. His excellent news service circulated the rumour that he would march towards Seringapatam and some of his belongings were sent daily to that place. One day he fell back from Turuvekere. Gopal Rao felt assured by this news and slackened his night watch. Haidar now advanced with 12/13,000 *gardi* troops 4,000 cavalry and 25 guns. Peixoto says that Haidar's troops numbered 2,000 horse and 6,000 foot. By rapid marches he approached the Maratha camp. Now occurred an

¹⁴ *Lekha Samgraha*, IV, intro.

¹⁵ This account of the night attack is based on *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 899.

incident that was very interesting. A Muhammadan *gardi* of Haidar came running to the Maratha camp to inform them that Haidar was coming to make a night attack. But the Maratha troopers would not believe him and they began to crack jokes with him. They spent several hours discussing this till at last somebody awakened Gopal Rao and informed him. Gopal Rao found himself in a fix. If the news proved to be false he would become a laughing stock. But if he remained unprepared, he would be overwhelmed. The Moslem *gardi* assured Gopal Rao that he had been once in the service of Peshwa Balaji Rao and the happy memories of that service had impelled him to come to give this information in all sincerity. He said, "If this news happens to be false, kill me, but be on your guard." Before Gopal Rao could be fully ready Haidar's guns began to boom and his rockets came in showers. Below we give Peixoto's description of the night attack: "With about 2,000 horse, 600 foot, 8 field pieces, 700 rocket boys, with flambeaus ready to be lighted, 16 pieces of hand artillery, the attack was launched. As soon as those who were to begin the attack were perceived by the enemy, they beat to arms but did nothing but endeavour to retreat, leaving their camp and tent and many of their worst horses behind them and waited for daylight to see whether they could recover anything. When we had gained the entrance to the camp the 8 field pieces began to play as fast as possible and the

rocket boys to throw their rockets, but the effect could not be seen for the great darkness and it was found that we had fired into the camp only. The two advanced battalions were in great confusion and would, if they had been opposed by any enemy, have been certainly surrounded and lost. Day came on and showed us the enemy's horse within pistol shot of our advanced battalions. Austin de Menezes made the enemy retreat. The Nabob gave orders for the whole of the artillery to fire with a high elevation. The enemy then retired out of the reach of our shot but facing us. The enemy's camp was plundered. The Nabob, finding that the enemy was watching for an opportunity to avenge themselves if any one should offer itself, resolved to let his troops rest until 4 o'clock in the afternoon, ordering the whole to form a circle in the midst of which a small tent was pitched for himself and then we ate what we had without delay. The time came to retire. The Marathas followed us all the way but made no impression upon us. We took two colours from the Marathas, also took some horses alive, with many tents and utensils. About 200 horses were killed, but few people. On our side the loss was only three men." The Maratha version of their total loss was 55 horses and 25 men. The wounded on the Maratha side did not number more than 150.¹⁶

¹⁶ Peixoto, V, paragraphs 185-195.

The campaigning season was practically over. The Peshwa now withdrew. But he left Trimbak Rao Pethe in command of the Carnatic force with Gopal Rao Patwardhan and Murar Rao to help him. Trimbak Rao was not an unworthy successor as is proved by later events.

As we review the campaign of 1769-70 we find that the plan of Madhava Rao was to deceive Haidar by a show of taking forts and make a quick march at an appropriate moment and crush him in collaboration with Gopal Rao. Haidar would in such a case have been taken in between the two armies. He was conscious of this. When the Peshwa fell upon Nijgal and Devraidurg with Haidar stationed at Banawar, the Peshwa was in a position to realise his plan. Perceiving this trend of the Peshwa's operations, Haidar quietly retired to Seringapatam.

Though Madhava Rao failed to crush Haidar in an open fight, he succeeded in occupying so many of the important forts of Haidar in the northern part of his dominions that Trimbak Rao Pethe, who was left by the Peshwa in command during the rains, was in a position to commence his next campaign with advantage.

Throughout this campaign Haidar was on the defensive but he hoped to terrorize the garrisons placed in the newly captured Maratha forts by means of Mir Reza's operations. He expected to carry on operations on the interior lines himself and crush at least Gopal Rao, but failed in his objective.

CHAPTER XI

Relations with the Marathas, 1770-71; the battle of Chinkurali

The campaigning season of 1770-1771 opened definitely in favour of the Marathas. Unfortunately for the Marathas the Peshwa could not come on account of his ill health. He had begun his march from Poona, but suddenly became so ill that he had to cancel his programme. However, he sent 10,000 troops and ten cannon under Appaji Balwant and Malhar Rao Panse to join Trimbak Rao.¹

Trimbak Rao who commanded the Maratha army in the Carnatic during the Peshwa's absence, besieged Gurumconda towards the end of September, 1770. Saidu Mian, Mir Reza's nephew, whom Mir Reza had left in charge of Gurumconda, resisted stubbornly. Gopal Rao Patwardhan, with his army, was at a distance of 10/12 kos towards Seringapatam. This advance outpost prevented any succour arriving from the Mysore capital. Mir Reza himself continued to sulk in the camp of Haider.² Though the siege lasted two months and a half, no

¹ S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 224.

² *Lekha Samgraha*, letters no. 1016, 1028, 1029.

succour could be sent by Haidar, and all attempts to divert Maratha attention failed disastrously. Gopal Rao defeated three Mysore generals, Chandroji Jaday, Balaji Pant and Syed Muhammad, who were surprised by him, at Punganuru. Syed Muhammad ran away. The other two were made captive. After taking Gurumconda, Trimbak Rao encamped between Kolar and Mulbagal.

Gopal Rao Patwardhan died on the 7th February, 1771. Sometime before his death, he had gone to Adoni, then to Kanakgiri and thence, as his health broke down completely, he withdrew to Miraj. Vaman Rao, his eldest surviving brother, was asked by Trimbak Rao to come quickly with troops.³ He found the main army at Devraidurg. This advance from the Kolar-Mulbagal region towards Tumkur was in pursuance of the order of the Peshwa. He wanted that the Maratha army, strengthened with the troops and cannon sent by him, should march towards Bidnur.⁴ This explains why Vaman Rao found Trimbak Rao at Devraidurg. Relieved by the absence of Madhava Rao and more confident of his strength, Haidar might have decided to give Trimbak Rao a fight in the open, or to prevent an invasion of Bidnur. Whatever his motive might have been, he came out of the protection of his forts. He possibly calculated

3 *Lekha Samgraha*, letters no. 1086—1089.

4 *Ibid.*, letter no. 1069.

that with a Mysore army in the rear, the Bidnur invasion plan must be abandoned by the Marathas.

Trimbak Rao in the meantime had advanced from Tumkur to Hebbur. Haidar had 8,000 good horse, 15,000 gardi troops, 10,000 Canarese infantry and 45 guns.⁵ Trimbak's army numbered 40,000 horse, 10,000 foot and he had also 30 pieces of heavy guns, not less than 32 pounders.⁶ Haidar came to Magadi. He intended to deceive Trimbak by tying 2,000 torches to the horns of bullocks and sending them in the direction of the Maratha camp. He hoped thus to mislead Trimbak as to the point of attack and then to fall on the flanks of the Maratha army. When he found that Trimbak had seen through the stratagem, he retreated to the Magadi forest. The Maratha army came from Hebbur to Turvekire. Haidar left Magadi forest and near Nagmangala took shelter in the mountains of Melukote. He wanted to move from one strong position to another. When Trimbak heard of this, he decided to attack Haidar on the move. Haidar's rear-guard had an encounter with the advance guard of the Marathas, in which about 1,500 Mysore troops were engaged. On the Maratha side about 100 men were killed or wounded and 300 horses of Haidar

⁵ This is the Maratha estimate. According to Stuart, Haidar had 14,000 infantry and 6,000 horse. But he says that Haidar had 50 field pieces.

⁶ Stuart puts the total number of Maratha troops at 80,000, obviously an exaggeration.

were taken. The Maratha army was at a distance of 1 *kos* from Haidar. Overnight Haidar moved a little to the west of Melukote to Machi. In Trimbak's report we read, "Hearing this news, I advanced to have a view of the place which was guarded by Haidar's guns. There was a deep forest for a *kos* or a *kos* and a half on all the four sides. A big *maidan* was surrounded by mountains and high cliffs. To take our guns to *maidan* was a difficult task in view of the fact that our enemy was Haidar. If he attacked us, it would be difficult to retreat with the guns. I came back. There was a path for him to go to Seringapatam on which I kept guard." An attack on Haidar from the west was not easy but was practicable. Haidar himself apprehended an attack from that side. A large number of Maratha troops was kept there but the guns were taken to the mountains on the east of Melukote to fire upon Haidar's camp. The Mysore army formed nearly a crescent facing west. The Maratha troops stationed on the mountains in front of Haidar sent arrows and taking up *jizails* began to rain shots from them. They also took guns of large calibre up there. "The annoyance was without an interval and, however slovenly, was extremely harassing and not ill-adapted to the single object of driving him from the position, without risking an action or exposing a point to attack."⁸ For eight

7 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 226.

8 Wilks, Vol. II, p. 141

days this state of things continued. As his provisions were failing him Haidar decided to retreat to Seringapatam. The retreat began on the 5th March in the night of the new moon. "To delude the Marathas, Haidar ordered fires to be lighted as it was the usual time of cooking supper and marched with the baggage in front of his army in a single line for the convenience of passing the narrow defile."⁹ How could the Marathas get information about Haidar's movement? Stuart says that two miles from the mouth of the defile, the soldiers of the wing of the first line saw a party of Maratha horse and fired on them. Wilks says that Narayan Rao, the officer commanding the regular infantry, fancied he saw or heard the enemy in front. Most inexcusably and not without some suspicion of treachery he opened a gun which communicated the intelligence of this night march to the Marathas. Trimbak Rao's report, however, gives a different version. The Maratha guards on the mountains, seeing that everything was peaceful in the camp of Haidar, reported this unusual calm to Trimbak Rao. Therefore he sent some troops in the direction of Banawar and Kadur and at midnight sent Krishna Rao with troops towards Seringapatam.¹⁰ Haidar had in the meantime advanced about three miles. When he heard the gun, he could at once foresee an engage-

9 Stuart's account.

10 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 226.

ment next morning and made his arrangements accordingly. He collected the baggage in as square a body as possible. "He then formed the cavalry placing at the angles the spearmen and the rocket boys. He thus formed a grand square and ordered his cavalry to cut down without any question any sepoy who would quit his rank."¹¹ In the meantime the Maratha guard, placed on the road leading to Seringapatam, had sent news to Trimbak Rao, who began to gather all his troops. Krishna Rao, sent ahead in the direction of Seringapatam, had the first brush with Haidar. When the night had four hours left the fight began.¹² The Mysore army advanced fighting continuously on the way. Trimbak reached there with all his troops, but as he had not been able to bring his guns, nothing very effective could be done. Haidar continued to move on till he reached Chinkurali.

*Battle of Chinkurali*¹³—The Marathas were, however, on his left and kept pace with him. They divided into small parties and rode within

¹¹ Stuart's account.

¹² S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 221.

¹³ Orme Ms., No. 8, pp. 51-54, gives Mr. Stuart's account of the battle fought on the 5th March, 1771, between Haidar and Trimbak Rao. Stuart writes that he led four battalions of Haidar in this engagement. This version of the encounter has been compared with the Maratha version as embodied in the newsletters contained in S.P.D., Vol. 37, and Khare's *Aitibhasik Lekha Samgraha*, Vol. IV. The Marathas have named this battle of Moti Talab after a large tank near Melukote.

100 yards of the Mysore army to draw away their fire. So great was the strain on the Mysoreans that they wilted under its pressure. Stuart writes, "They succeeded, for notwithstanding I had given orders to my European sergeants to cut down any man who presumed to fire without order, yet it had no effect, for upon two sergeants putting my orders into execution they swore they would murder us hat fellows and would have kept their oath but were prevented by the cavalry which killed 8/10 of the most turbulent which quieted their mutiny."¹⁴

The Marathas repeatedly charged the rear face of the army. The Maratha artillery arrived at one o'clock and with their 30 pieces of no less than 32 pounders, they commenced a heavy cannonade. Haidar's army being very close together, they did great execution. A shot fell among a string of camels carrying rockets and falling on one of the boxes of ammunition blew them up. Haidar was, however, pushing towards a hill which would give him great advantage. The Marathas perceiving this divided into three bodies, made a general charge attacking simultaneously the rear as also the right face and the left face. The left face, in which the worst troops of Haidar were stationed, immediately gave way and fled up the hill which was skirted by a mass of loose angular stones. The Marathas entered the square. The cavalry of Haidar instead

of resisting fled, riding over the right face of the square. The rear face was attacked front and rear and could no longer stand. Thus the Marathas gained a complete victory. Haidar was in the front face and when the left face was broken, he had to quit his horse and in the rush, he was carried up the hill. "Standing on a millstone, he viewed on all sides with furious anger, the victorious career of these wild men, the Marathas, as they charged and pursued his troops. At that moment, Ghazi Khan Bede (a Mysore Pindari) presented himself and with the greatest difficulty forced him from the field and attended by only 14 good horse escorted him to Seringapatam."¹⁵

The entire equipment of the Mysore army, its store, all its artillery, fell into the hands of the Marathas. They got 40/45 guns, 20/25 elephants and 7/8,000 horses besides baggages and treasure. Among the captives were Mir Ali Reza, Yasin Khan and other big *sardars*, besides 50 Europeans. Lala Mian was slain. Yasin Khan very much resembled Haidar Ali and gave himself out as the Nawab. The Marathas discovered his identity several hours after the capture and this perhaps facilitated Haidar's escape.

Trimbak Rao was slightly wounded by a bullet on the right ear. Mir Faizulla who was with the Mysore army, but in disgrace and without any

military command, succeeded with a few followers in cutting through the Maratha ranks while they were intent on plunder.

Wilks writes that this was no battle and although the day was lost to Haidar it was not won by the Marathas. They did not follow up the victory. The capital was practically without any means of resistance and an immediate vigorous effort would have completed the downfall of Haidar. But the Marathas were so much intent on plunder and division of spoil that they let 10 precious days pass before they appeared before Seringapatam. In the meantime Haidar had succeeded in gathering fugitives and preparing means of resistance. In this connection we should keep in mind a statement of De La Tour which explains this unaccountable lapse of the Marathas. "As it is not customary in India to make prisoners of common soldiers or even subaltern officers, the greatest part returned to him, though without horses or arms; but by means of his resources, Haidar established his army, in a short time, in a better state than before. It will scarcely be credited that he purchased again of the Marathas themselves the greatest part of the arms and horses they had taken from him: but this arises from the nature of their government, which is purely feudal, every man having a right to dispose of his share of the plunder as he thinks."¹⁶

It was a great Maratha victory from the point of view of military tactics and strategy, but the fruits of victory could not be garnered because of the defects of Maratha character and military organisation.

Wilks seeks an explanation of this surprising defeat of Haidar in the fact that "Haidar had drunk in the evening to an imprudent excess; and not having relieved the effects by his usual period of sleep was in a state of stupid inebrity."¹⁷ But the retreat which began at 9 p.m. must have been planned before the evening and a man with such an active military career, responsible for so many night attacks in his numerous campaigns, cannot be pictured as so much of a toper that he would drink to excess before commencing his fateful retreat to Seringapatam, with the Marathas on the watch ready to cut his army down. Strategically and tactically the Melukote-Chinkurali affair shows the limitations of Haidar's generalship and it is not necessary to seek an explanation in the use of "strong liquor as a sensual indulgence or as a soporific."

In the confusion of the night of the retreat, Tipu though repeatedly summoned could not be found to lead the van and Haidar, beside himself with rage, gave him "a most unmerciful unroyal beating with his cane." Tipu therefore swore that

¹⁷ Stuart on whose account Wilks seems to depend does not in any manner support this view that Haidar was drunk and thus bungled.

he would not draw his sword that day and he kept the oath. In the confusion of the defeat he succeeded in retreating in the garb of a Maratha Pindari and joined his father at Seringapatam when, overwhelmed with grief at the thought of having lost his son, Haidar Ali was praying for him in a tomb to the north-east of the fort. Syed Muhammad is said to have narrated to Wilks that he and Tipu begged their way through the Maratha ranks as a travelling mendicant and his attendant.

CHAPTER XII

Relations with the Marathas, 1771-1772

Haidar's complete defeat at Chinkurali on the 5th March, 1771, was not followed by a collapse of his military power. Peace was not concluded until July, 1772, and though Haidar lost valuable territory, he was far from being crushed for ever. His power and prestige suffered diminution, but his defeat only became a spur to a great recovery in the future.

The campaign from March 1771—July 1772 has been dismissed very summarily by Wilks with the comment, "The minor operations of this desolating war, offer no illustrations of character." His very inadequate treatment of this campaign is due possibly to the fact that he had no access to the Marathi records dealing with this campaign. In that case, he could have found a guiding thread through the mazes of detail.

The Peshwa wrote to Trimbak Rao that he was not in favour of a siege of Seringapatam. He was of opinion that 10,000 troops under one Chieftain would be sufficient to checkmate Haidar. With the remaining troops Trimbak was to go to

Bidnur, which the Peshwa thought he would be able to take in two months. In the opinion of the Peshwa Bidnur was the easiest place to take of the three still in Haidar's possession. Bangalore and Seringapatam were more difficult propositions.¹ But Trimbak did not follow the Peshwa's plan. He continued the siege of Seringapatam for a month and three days. He then left a part of the army to watch Haidar and at the beginning of the campaigning season himself went to plunder Baramahal, Dindigul and Coimbatore. He perhaps wanted to secure the co-operation of Muhammad Ali and his allies, the British, for prosecuting successfully the siege of Seringapatam. *Vakils* were also sent to Pondicherry. He required a park of artillery manned by Europeans skilled in siege operations. The Madras Government observed about the Marathas, "By their numerous and superior cavalry they can ravage and lay waste the countries they invade with little opposition but they find it very difficult to reduce forts of strength for which reason they are very desirous of securing the assistance of Europeans."² The French were not perhaps in a position to agree, neither could Trimbak prevail upon the British to join him in his campaigns against Mysore. His operations thus did not lead to any fruitful results. But the plan of the Peshwa was

1 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 1124, 21st March, 1771.

2 Military Department—Despatches to England, 28th February, 1772, para 14.

calculated to succeed, and if pursued with vigour, might have compelled Haidar to cede Bidnur when he concluded a treaty in July, 1772. We do not wonder that even Parasuram Bhau wrote that Trimbak was prolonging the war for his own sake because he was enjoying a semi-royal position, listening to daily music and exercising command over 40,000 troops and their camp followers.³

On an auspicious day,⁴ Trimbak encamped near Seringapatam and began cannonading. Haidar had, in the meantime, raised his army to 10,000.⁵ Trimbak tried to stop Haidar's communications with Mysore. He himself, Vaman Rao Patwardhan and Murar Rao Ghorpade were on different sides of the beleagured city. The siege lingered. Haidar had devastated the country around so completely that he could calculate that famine in the Maratha camp would compel them to withdraw. There was also no fodder in the surrounding country. Fodder from housetops had to be brought by the Marathas from a distance of 20/25 kos. Before the flood of the Kaveri, Trimbak would be compelled to move away. Haidar, of course, began to negotiate through the Maratha chief Ananda Rao Raste. He agreed to pay 45 lakhs

3 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 1166.

4 "Chaitra Suddha Pratipad." This tendency to make astrology dictate military operations was a great weakness of the Maratha military system.

5 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 1122.

in course of three years if he got back his lost territory. The terms were clearly unacceptable to the Marathas. Haidar felt the strength of his position at Seringapatam and he was not in a mood to yield.

Trimbak Rao withdrew after a month and three days and came to Moti Talab, 10 miles northwest of Seringapatam.⁶ His plan was to enter into cantonments during the rains and at the beginning of the next campaigning season to march southward and conquer Haidar's territory in the south, then march back on Bidnur and take it.⁷ In the meantime Chennapatna, Maddur, Sidlaghatta and other places that still remained to be taken had already been occupied by the Marathas. Haidar sent a detachment under Muhammad Ali Kumedan to protect his territory. Trimbak Rao attacked him on the way. Many of his men were killed and wounded and he was almost encircled. He killed the wounded in his own army so that their wailings, as they felt that they were being deserted, might not communicate the news of his flight to the Marathas. After this horrible deed, he succeeded in escaping.

During the rainy season Trimbak Rao remained at Bellur. Towards the end of September, he began to take those forts of Haidar which he had

6 Fort St. George, 20th May, 1771: 'The Marathas suddenly decamped. We impute this to the want of forage and provisions.'

7 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 1128.

previously been unable to garrison. Negotiations were going on through the faithful Appaji Ram as Haidar's envoy. Trimbak Rao demanded the payment of 60 lakhs and also wanted Haidar to join him if he attacked Arcot. "If we go below the ghats, he should join us," so said the Maratha leader. Trimbak Rao consented to give back the places around Seringapatam but for the restoration of Chik Balapur, Nandigad and other *taluka*, he advised Haidar to approach the Peshwa.⁸ But Haidar knew that the Peshwa was dying and he could count upon the chaos that would overtake Maharashtra on the demise of the Peshwa. The negotiations were naturally abortive.

At this stage Trimbak Rao received an appeal from the ruler of Tanjore who was besieged by Muhammad Ali of Arcot. Trimbak was very eager to go below the ghats and also to plunder Haidar's territory on the way. He left Vaman Rao and other Maratha chiefs with a part of the army to watch Haidar and to protect the territory so recently conquered from him. With 35,000 troops Trimbak marched towards Tanjore from which place Muhammad Ali had already withdrawn.⁹ From the Tanjore King Trimbak Rao got four lakhs and he also

8 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 1151.

9 A battery was opened against Tanjore by Muhammad Ali and the English on the 22nd October. Approaches were carried till the 27th when a practicable breach was completed and peace was made between the Nawab and the Raja.

got some money from the Nawab of Arcot.¹⁰ Trimbak Rao heard that Tipu was coming in that direction with a Mysore detachment. Apprehending some secret understanding between Tipu and the chief of Arcot and the English he wrote to Vaman Rao asking him to come to the region of the ghats. But Vaman Rao heard that a large detachment of Mysore troops was besieging Narayangarh. He had to rush there, defeat them and raze the fort to the ground. He then came near the ghats and remained stationed at Uttaradurga. Tipu had to return as quickly as he could to Seringapatam. Trimbak entered Baramahal and realized tribute from different places. He also looted Coimbatore. From September, 1771 to February 1772, he plundered Haidar's possessions there. Then Trimbak Rao returned and encamped near Bangalore. Thence he marched to Dod Balapur where Vaman Rao too joined him. With only Bangalore, Seringapatam and Bidnur left to him, with the Maratha army of occupation harassing his communications, Haidar's prospects were indeed very gloomy. Trimbak now thought of attacking Bidnur and planned a wholesale devastation of the country. But the Peshwa wrote to him that as there was no

10. Select Committee Proceedings, 15th April, 1772. "We have now the pleasure to acquaint you that the Nabob's Vakil has accommodated with the Maratha general and they are returned into the Balaghat by which we have been eased from the apprehensions we hve been under."—Fort St. George, 7th March, 1772.

prospect of his recovery, the campaign must be concluded as soon as possible. At last after two months' negotiations a treaty was concluded.

The Marathas were to retain Sera, Hoskote, Dod Balapur and Kolar with their dependencies, with the exception of Bangalore in exchange for which they would get Madgiri. Gurumconda was also left in their hands. The Marathas agreed to give up the rest. Haidar promised to pay Rupees 50 lakhs and ten lakhs in addition as *Darbar* charges, to be paid to Trimbak Rao and other *Sardars*. He paid 24 lakhs in cash, 5 lakhs in kind and gave bankers' securities for the remainder. The campaign ended in July, 1772.¹¹

This campaign, so inglorious in Haidar's career, was largely responsible for the strong anti-British turn of later Mysore foreign policy. Haidar's caustic reply to a query of Srinivas Rao, the British *vakil*, in July, 1782, explains what opinion he formed of the value of the alliance with the British after his experience of these months. He said, "When the Marathas had entered my country, I wrote them in a variety of ways, desiring them to send succour. In reply they at first told me that

¹¹ *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 1171, dated 18th May. Wilks says that Haidar promised to pay Rs. 30 lakhs, one half at once, the remainder hereafter—5 lakhs as *darbar* charges. S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 233 states that Haidar paid 25 lakhs in cash, 6 lakhs in kind, and remaining 19 lakhs in 3 equal annual instalments.

they would send them, and after sometime they said they had written to Europe and expected orders from thence. To this I urged that it would be a year and six months before their orders could be obtained from Europe and of what use would their succour be then. The Governor's answer was that without orders from Europe they could do nothing and yet at length after a long time had elapsed, they pretended that till then they had received no directions."¹² Trimbak Rao contributed materially to bringing about this estrangement. Haidar could not easily forget these months of stress and strife. The deep artifice of Trimbak Rao led to no immediately fruitful results. The British did not join him against Haidar, nor Haidar against the British. But in Haidar's eyes the value of British friendship stood clearly revealed.

CHAPTER XIII

Relations with the Marathas, 1772-1776; conquest of Coorg.

The unscrupulous ambition of Raghunath Rao was the most disturbing factor in post-Panipat Maratha politics. Both the domestic history and the foreign relations of the Maratha state were affected by the activity of this man, who, inspite of his occasional noble impulses, was capable of a very steady and unwavering pursuit of his own selfish ends, irrespective of what it might cost to the state. A close study of his relations with Haidar Ali shows that from the beginning, he looked upon the ambitious Mysorean as a possible support in his bid for power and as an asylum in case of failure. As early as 1765, we find him pursuing a policy of friendship with Haidar in the most sedulous manner possible. To Raghunath Rao's intervention Haidar owed a peace very favourable in the existing circumstances. From the letters of the Peshwa, it appears that he was not willing to grant such favourable terms but yielded to the persuasions of Raghunath Rao.¹ He was later detected advising

1 See pp. 80-81.

the Nizam to join with Haidar and make an attack on Poona. At that time he was in captivity for his ceaseless and active opposition to the Peshwa. To create an alarm in the mind of the Nizam he informed him that the Peshwa and the Bhonsle would soon march against him, so that he should forestall them by advancing in co-operation with Haidar.² The excellent intelligence service of Madhava Rao unearthed this secret correspondence. But before his death in November 1772, Madhava Rao set Raghunath Rao free. The dying Peshwa represented to his successor Narayan Rao and his uncle Raghunath Rao the necessity of concord for mutual safety. But the two fell out and six months after this Raghunath Rao was again incarcerated. In captivity, Raghunath Rao opened a correspondence with Haidar Ali. In order that he might not awaken suspicion, Raghunath wrote to Appaji Ram, Haidar's *vakil*, and Appaji Ram wrote to Haidar. The messenger was seized and even Appaji Ram was watched.³

As Raghoba himself became the Peshwa after the murder of Narayan Rao, he had to abandon the policy of courting Haidar. The interests of the state were for sometime identified with his own. In his captivity, he is said to have entered into an "agreement with Haidar's *vakil* to restore to his master the

² S.P.D., Vol. 38, letter no. 198.

³ *Mostyn's Diary*, 12th April, 1773. S.P.D., Vol. 27, letter no. 236. Mostyn goes so far as to say that a guard was put on Appaji Ram.

whole country conquered by Madhava Rao, only reserving a chauth of 15 lakhs a year provided he would effect his release and settle him in the Peshwaship." Mostyn says that in September, 1773, the *vakil* was "demanding the performance of the treaty but as Haidar in no shape contributed to bring about this new revolution it is uncertain how this affair will terminate."⁴ Shortly after the murder of Narayan Rao, Raghoba wrote to Haidar as also to Murar Rao Ghorpade to help the Raja of Tanjore, who was besieged by Muhammad Ali and the English. To induce Haidar Ali, Appaji Ram was to acquaint his master that he would give back to Haidar the forts of Madgiri, Dod Balapur and Hoskote. But before this offer could be communicated to Haidar, Tanjore had fallen.

Raghunath Rao knew that he was not popular and that there was secret opposition to his regime. He wanted to heal domestic discord with the balm of national triumph and the two enemies against whom victories would redound most to his credit were the Nizam and Haidar Ali. He defeated the Nizam but granted him terms so favourable that they betray either a want of political sagacity or a definite desire to attach the Nizam to himself by his generosity. He then planned an expedition into the Carnatic and his grand scheme was the expulsion of Haidar from the Maratha districts as also the

4 *Mostyn's Diary*, an entry dated 25th September, 1773.

punishment of Muhammad Ali and the English. In January, 1774, when Raghunath Rao was engaged in this expedition, he came to know of the *Bārābhāi* conspiracy and of the attempt to oust him from power, almost all the important ministers having been banded against him. His attitude towards Haidar was bound to change in these circumstances. He was now eager to have Haidar as an ally. Mostyn made an entry on the 4th February, 1774, that Haidar had settled matters with Raghoba but whether he would assist him was not certain. Appaji Ram, Haidar's *vakil*, was astute enough to notice that detachments of the army had begun to withdraw. He could not therefore be in a very yielding mood. By the treaty of Kaliandrug, Haidar recognised Raghunath Rao as the Peshwa and agreed to pay him and him only an annual tribute of 6 lakhs. The territory conquered by Madhava Rao in his three expeditions was ceded to Haidar. Baji Rao Barwe was left as Raghunath Rao's agent at the court of Haidar. Taking advantage of the complications in Maharashtra, Haidar took between February, 1774, and April, 1776, Sera, Madgiri, Dod Balapur, Hoskote, Gurumconda, Bellary, Cuddapah and Gooty and made Kurnul tributary.

Raghunath Rao had a glimpse of success. He succeeded in defeating and imprisoning Trimbak Rao. But this gave, as Grant Duff puts it, only a momentary life to a drooping cause to which the birth of Madhava Rao Narayan on the 1st April, 1774,

dealt a mortal blow. Raghunath Rao withdrew to the north and, as Sindhia and Holkar deserted him, he retired towards Gujarat. The subsequent events of Anglo-Maratha history are well known. The treaty of Surat was concluded on the 6th March, 1775. After this Raghoba wrote a letter to Haidar proposing that he should take possession "of the whole of the Maratha territory up to the right bank of the Krishna and be ready from that advanced position to assist him in the execution of his designs with military as well as pecuniary aid. In pursuance of this Haidar despatched 16 lakhs of rupees."⁵ Grant Duff, however, says that Haidar's help was confined to 80,000 rupees. Baji Rao Barwe, Raghunath Rao's agent at Seringapatam, tried his utmost to quicken the zeal of Haidar but the latter was in no haste and would only proceed according to his plan without being hustled by his ally. Regular correspondence was, however, maintained. From this we learn that Haidar demanded a *sanad* for the ceded territory as also a receipt for the amount⁶ which he had paid.

When the British temporarily deserted the cause of Raghoba and concluded the treaty of Purandar with the Government of Poona in March, 1776, Raghoba decided not to agree to the terms of this treaty. He contemplated seeking an asylum in Haidar's court. After the treaty of Purandar he

⁵ Wilks, Vol. II, p. 173.

⁶ S.P.D., Vol. 36, letter nos. 283, 305.

remained at Surat with 200 men. He then came to Daman and asked the Portuguese to give him an asylum or conduct him to Haidar Ali's territory by the water route. Raghunath Rao even contemplated going from Malwan to Kolhapur and thence to Haidar's territory by sea.⁷

Even when the British ultimately decided to take up the cause of Raghoba in right earnest, Raghunath Rao was not without misgivings about the expediency of this alliance with the British. The Governor of Goa wrote in December, 1778, "In the conferences which I have continually had with the said envoy of Raghoba, he sufficiently affirms the mistrust that his master has that the English may dominate him in the same way as the Nabobs of Bengal and of Surat and not only with the object of avoiding this subjection but also of maintaining himself respected in the possessions that he intends to have, he desires earnestly the help of our troops, an alliance with this state and protection from our august sovereign."⁸ So Raghunath Rao was insistent on Haidar's co-operation even at the time when the British were doing their best for him. "March up to Miraj and attack them from behind," so wrote the importunate Raghoba⁹ to Haidar. But

7 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter nos. 1918 and 2196.

8 *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. XI—"Some unknown dealings between Raghoba and Portuguese." (Pissurlencar).

9 S.P.D., Vol. 36, letter no. 305.


as his prospects became more and more unpromising, Haidar became less and less liberal. Raghoba's people at Seringapatam complained that Haidar would not meet their expenses and the bankers would not give them loans.

But Raghunath Rao served Haidar a very useful purpose. As the civil war became merged in the Anglo-Maratha War, Haidar's bargaining power with the Government at Poona increased. As every year rendered a war between Haidar and the British more and more inevitable, he was in a position to make a virtue of necessity and ask the Poona Government to confirm him in the possession of the territories, ceded to him by Raghunath Rao, as a price to induce him to embark on war. In this bargaining he succeeded. The death of Madhava Rao, the murder of Narayan Rao and the quarrel between the *Bārābhāi* and Raghoba, gave Haidar a welcome respite from Maratha invasions and an opportunity not only to regain what he had lost to the Marathas but also to conquer Coorg and reconquer Malabar.

Haidar's relations with Coorg began in 1763, after his conquest of Bidnur. It has been asserted that Coorg was to some extent dependent on the Ikkeri family of Bidnur and Haidar having absorbed that Kingdom could claim some sort of suzerainty over Coorg. But all that Haidar did after the conquest of Bidnur was to make an enquiry about the right of Coorg over the Suliya region in the Mangalore *taluka*.

He was told that in the days of the Bidnur chief Soma-sekhara Nayak the Coorg chief Dodda Virappa had got this tract partly by purchase and partly as a present. The district of Yelusavira was also a disputed region. Dodda Virappa¹⁰ had fought for this district with the Mysore chief Chikka Deva Wodeyar, a compromise being effected by which Coorg retained the district and Mysore receiving a portion of the revenue. Haidar made a demand that these tracts, for which the Coorg chief paid the revenue to Mysore, should be surrendered to him. Chikka Virappa yielded to the demand and gave these tracts to Mysore. But Haidar was not to be so easily satisfied. Coorg provided him with the best communication with Malabar. Before embarking on his

10 The following genealogy of the Rajas of Coorg is extracted from Rice, *Mysore and Coorg Gazetteer*, Vol. II.



Malabar expedition, he sent Faizulla Khan to Coorg in 1765. But after repeated engagements Faizulla had to confess defeat and fell back. Haidar thereupon expressed a desire to conclude peace with the Coorg chief and even offered him the Uchingi district, provided he agreed to pay 3 lakhs of pagodas. The Coorg chief agreed to these terms, paid $\frac{1}{4}$ th of the promised sum and even sent his *Dulwai* as a hostage to Faizulla Khan. But the district had not been handed over when Chikka Virappa died, being succeeded by Muddu Raja and Muddaya, who held joint sway. They requested Faizulla Khan to give them the territory promised. Faizulla demanded payment of the balance of the three lakhs promised by this predecessor. The rulers replied that from the trend of events it appeared that he wanted to take the money but keep the territory to himself. Fighting began again. Half of the troops of Faizulla Khan were cut down. As he attempted to withdraw to Mangalore, most of his belongings fell into the hands of the Coorg chiefs. Hearing of these defeats Haidar proposed peace and, for the sum of 75,000 pagodas already paid, surrendered two other districts but not Uchingi. He fixed the boundary between Mysore and Coorg at Sarve. This was in 1768. Haidar badly needed peace in this region in view of dangers elsewhere. This explains the mood of accomodation so unusual with him.

Mudda Raja and Muddaya died in quick succession in 1770. Coorg was now rent by a succ-

ession dispute. Linga Raja wanted to make his nephew King, whereas Mallaya wanted to place his own son on the throne. Mallaya prevailed and himself ruled in his name. They pressed Linga Raja so hard that he with his nephews sought shelter in Mysore. He wrote to Haidar and saw him in his *Darbar*. Haidar was naturally very pleased to find division in the Coorg ruling family. But at that time he was in the midst of a life and death struggle with the Marathas.¹¹ After the withdrawal of the Marathas in 1772, the death of Madhava Rao and the murder of Narayan Rao, he got leisure to indulge in these schemes of ambition, his cherished object being the conquest of Malabar. Coorg must now be occupied if the occupation of Malabar was to be permanent.

The Coorg tradition is that Linga Raja encouraged Haidar. The Marathas had left desolation and famine behind them. Linga Raja suggested that plenty of grain would be found in Coorg. In pursuance of his advice Haidar in 1773 marched into Coorg by way of Arkalgad but was repulsed with loss. He had to fall back. He wrote to Linga Raja about the impassable nature of the roads. Linga Raja advised him to advance through that part of Coorg which was full of his supporters, whom he assured that, if successful, Haidar would restore the kingdom to him. Haidar's troops this

11 See Chapters XI-XII.

time found little difficulty in entering Kiggatnad and were joined by Linga Raja's partisans. They now marched straight to Mercara. Devappa Raja fled to Kottayam where he was plundered. Still feeling very insecure he fled in disguise to the Maratha country, reached Harihar, where he was caught by Haidar's men and sent to Seringapatam. He was there put to death along with his children.

Coorg was restored to Linga Raja on his agreeing to pay a yearly tribute of Rs. 24,000, but he was compelled to cede to Mysore Suliya, Yelusavira and the two other districts that Haidar had previously surrendered in return for 75,000 pagodas. In return he was permitted to take a portion of Wynad. Linga Raja died in 1780. His sons being of tender age, Haidar assumed entire possession of Coorg and placed a Muhammadan garrison in Mercara. The princes were taken to the Hassan district in Mysore. Haidar proclaimed that when these princes grew up and learnt their business, their kingdom would be handed over to them. Subbarasaya, formerly treasurer of Coorg, was placed in charge of administration.¹²

Haidar had already succeeded in retaking Sera, Madgiri, Chenraidurg, Gurumconda, Hoskote and Dod Balapur. But two important places, Bellary and Gooty, yet remained to be conquered. Dodappa Nayak, the chief of Bellary, owed his alle-

¹² This account of Haidar's relations with Coorg is based on *Tarikh-i-Coorg*.

giance to Basalat Jang of Adoni, but in 1769 he had transferred it to Haidar Ali and considered himself free to withhold tribute from the Adoni chief. Actually, he did not pay his tribute to anybody. For this Basalat Jang's minister Devichand and the French corps of Adoni under Lally besieged the place. He was persuaded to apply for relief to Haidar, according to Wilks by Haidar's emissaries, who usually performed the functions of a fifth column. But according to a Maratha news letter¹³ as also the *Mackenzie Manuscript*, Krishnappa Nayak, ruler of Raidrug, suggested the plan to Haidar, who made a forced march from Seringapatam to Bellary. He fell on the rear of the besieging army. Devichand was killed and Lally escaped with the greatest difficulty. Haidar knew already that the chief of Bellary was on the point of surrendering. As the surprise was complete, Haidar got all the siege materials and found the approaches in tact. The ruler of Bellary had no alternative but to run away.¹⁴ Haidar annexed

13 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 1539.

14 *Mackenzie Ms.* (Local Records, Vol. XXIV, Kaifiat of Bidaruru) gives us the following account of the taking of Bellary: "Due to an internal strife the Kurubars of Bellary were expelled from the city. They went over to Arikiri and Adoni and assisted the Mughals to invade and occupy Bellary. Information of Mughal occupation was sent to Haidar by Krishnappa Nayak, the Samsthanik of Raidrug. Haidar came and conquered the place. Dodappa Nayak with a few followers ran away from Bellary.

Bellary. Basalat Jang had to purchase Haidar's forbearance by paying three lakhs of rupees.¹⁵ Ranmosth Khan, the ruler of Kurnul, also paid three lakhs.¹⁶ Haidar then besieged Gooty.

The capture of Gooty was an event of great importance. Murar Rao of Gooty was the only independent chief south of the Tungabhadra who might be regarded as a menace to Haidar. From Kurnul Haidar sent him a message that he should surrender to him his share of the spoils of the Maratha victory at Chinkurali,¹⁷ the guns as also the places given to him by Trimbak Rao,¹⁸ and make a present of a lakh of rupees in lieu of grain and forage for his horses. Murar Rao hurled defiance and insults, referring to Haidar having begun career as a *Naiḱ* which he contrasted with his own position as a *Senapati* of the Maratha Empire. Haidar thereupon advanced to Gooty. The place resisted for three months. Murar Rao hoped, not unnaturally, that he would get succour from Poona or Hyderabad. Nana Fadnavis tried his best, but to no purpose. Between Miraj and Kolhapur, the Marathas had about 40,000 troops but there was no leader to lead them to the relief of Murar Rao. As

Krishnappa Nayak of Raidrug was entrusted with the care of Bellary, in addition to his original *talukas*."

15 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 1763.

16 Or. 1865, p. 17.

17 See Chapter XI.

18 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 1698.

a writer remarked in disgust, this was the business not of one man but of *Bārābhāi* and that accounted for the want of purpose.¹⁹ The French guns from Bellary and a battering train from Seringapatam began to hurl destruction, but the fort of Gooty was so strong that only famine or treachery could reduce it. The town and lower forts were however carried by assault, but on the immense rock that formed the upper fort no impression could be made. If the siege dragged on, reinforcements might reach Gooty. This was the consideration uppermost in the mind of Haidar. As Murar Rao's supply of water almost failed, he too was ready to pay seven lakhs in cash and arranged that he was to pay two lakhs in cash and valuables and for five lakhs he was to furnish hostages.

Mir Reza, who was in charge of the negotiations, brought to Haidar's camp cash, valuables as also six hostages. One of them was the young son of Yunus Khan, formerly commander-in-chief of Gooty, who had died in 1768. Haidar treated him with such a show of consideration that the young man was thrown off his guard and in an outburst of confidence, not knowing that he was being gulled, he told Haidar that his chief would not have agreed to such terms if the supply of water had not almost failed. Thereupon the appraisers under instruction from Haidar delayed and reported that the total

19 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter nos. 1529, 1788.

amount including cash and valuables was worth only 5 lakhs. Haidar announced that negotiations were at an end and recommenced the siege in the full knowledge that there was no water in the reservoir. Murar Rao had now to surrender unconditionally. He as also his sons Venkat Rao and Narsing Rao were taken prisoners. They were sent to Kabaldurg, where Murar Rao died shortly after. Other members of the Ghorpade family lingered in the Mysore Bastille.²⁰

With the fall of Gooty Haidar got under his control all that was included within the Maratha sphere of influence south of the Tungabhadra. Ranade's comment on the fall of Gooty deserves mention. He writes, "Tanjore suffered the same fate as the other Maratha settlement at Gooty and for the same fault, namely, that it cut itself off from the confederacy and began to shift for itself. This is the lesson that the story of this settlement is well calculated to teach, and it is a lesson which illustrates the strength and weakness of the Maratha power—strong when confederate and unable to retain independence when the union is broken up."²¹

20 My account of the capture of Gooty is based on the following Marathi news letters: *Lekha Samgraha*, letter nos. 1698, 1763, 1780, 1788-89, 1800, 1829, 1838. Gooty was taken on the 16th April, 1776.

21 Ranade, *Rise of the Maratha Power*, p. 254.

However true this statement may be with regard to Tanjore, it is inapplicable to Gooty. Up to 1761, Murar Rao no doubt appears as a mere condottiere chief, but with the advent of Madhava Rao, Gooty under Murar Rao very loyally played the part assigned to it by the head of the Maratha state—that of an advance outpost in a land where Maratha suzerainty was exposed to the active hostility of a rival power. The fall of Gooty was due to the distractions in the Maratha state and its want of leadership. For three long months Murar Rao carried on the fight with his own limited resources but no arrangement could be made to relieve him. This shows only the weakness of the Maratha confederacy, not its strength.

CHAPTER XIV

Relations with the Marathas, 1776-1778.

Haidar supported Raghoba. The ministerial party at Poona succeeded in winning over the Nizam. Haidar's conquest of Bellary and Gooty, his threat to Adoni and his persistent northward advance united the Nizam and the Poona *Darbar* against him. Before the plan and the preparations could be completed, Haidar was already on the move. He sent Sripat Rao and Krishna Rao Shimga to the Tungabhadra to create troubles in Maratha territory.¹ They came in April to Harihar and Halyal and directed their attention against Lakshmeswar. After them, Mir Reza came with 7/8,000 troops. He took Bankapur. After Mir Reza, Haidar came in person and realized tribute from the Poligars of the district. But he now heard that a treaty had been concluded between the British and the Poona ministry (Treaty of Purandar, March, 1776) and the Maratha troops from Gujarat were coming to the South. The nominal King had died; there was some trouble at Seringapatam and the Nairs in

¹ *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 1865.

Malabar were in rebellion. Haidar went back to Seringapatam in June, leaving Mir Reza with 7/8,000 troops at Bankapur. Mir, at one stage, advanced up to Dharwar, looting and burning. Though he was also recalled to Seringapatam the operations were successful in the sense that the people felt that the Marathas could give them no protection against such looting. Haidar's agents who were left there had no difficulty in realising tribute between June and October, 1776. The Poona *Darbar* could not yet organise an expedition. The cultivators could not be blamed for becoming reconciled to the yoke of Haidar Ali. With the Kitturkar Desai, terms were settled at 4 lakhs.

Throughout this period the Maratha *Darbar* was busy suppressing an imposter who posed as Sadasiva Rao Bhau. The ministerial party heads now arranged with the Nizam that his general Ibrahim Khan Dhaunsa and the Maratha general Haripant would march against Haidar Ali and divide the conquered territory equally between the Poona Government and the Nizam.² But Haripant had not paid his troops for three years. They were clamouring for payment and Haripant was not in a position to start. Konher Rao and Pandurang Rao, the Patwardhan chiefs, informed the Poona Government that they would advance with 10,000 troops.³ It was shameful, they argued, that the

² *Or.* 1865, p. 19.

³ *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 1936.

Mysoreans should be allowed to besiege Dharwar. Haripant could come after them and undertake the more ambitious scheme of conquest in co-operation with Ibrahim Khan Dhaunsa.

Besides the Patwardhan chiefs, Pandurang Rao and Konher Rao, several other Maratha chiefs also took part in this expedition. They were Krishna Rao Panse, Sivaram Ghorpade (nephew of Murar Rao), Nilkantha Rao Sindhe of Manoli, the Desai of Nargund and other zemindars of Dharwar district. As the Marathas advanced, Haidar's troops had to raise the siege of Dharwar. They fell back on Bankapur, but 2/3,000 Canarese infantry remained under cover of forests in Dharwar and continued to harass the cultivators. In December, 1776, the Marathas recaptured Hubli.

The ruler of Sirhatti who hated the Marathas wanted Haidar's complete victory. He asked Haidar for reinforcements that would overwhelm these chiefs. Haidar sent Muhammad Ali Kumedan with 6/7,000 disciplined infantry, 2/3,000 cavalry and 9 guns. Baji Rao Barwe, the agent of Raghoba in the court of Haidar, was there with some Maratha troops to co-operate with Kumedan. Out of his eagerness to free Patwardhan territories Pandurang Rao advanced too far. Kumedan had a safe retreat at Bankapur. The forests protected him and the ruler of Sirhatti supplied him with information. Muhammad Ali Kumedan at Bankapur

had an army of 7,000 cavalry, 10,000 infantry and 11 guns.⁴ While the Patwardhan army was at a distance of 4 *kos* from Saunsi, Muhammad Ali Kumedan reached that place which belonged to the ruler of Sirhatti, who accompanied him. The Marathas posted themselves at a distance of 2 *kos* from the Mysore army at Awashi. Apprehending a night attack Pandurang Rao stood at a distance of 1 *kos*, alert and watchful. He decided to attack the Mysoreans in the morning. Heedless of the remonstrance of the more cautious and experienced commanders, he started for Saunsi. The Kumedan kept 6 guns and 5/6,000 disciplined troops in ambush. On both sides of the fort of Saunsi he kept 3,500 cavalry in two batches. The remaining troops under the chief of Sirhatti were kept in the fort.⁵ The Marathas could see only the cavalry, not the hidden infantry. As they advanced a tremendous fire of grape and musketry poured in on their flank. The cavalry and infantry made a concerted attack. The Patwardhan troops fled and soon the rout became so widespread that it could not be checked. Konher Rao was killed, Pandurang Rao was wounded and taken prisoner and so was Shiv Rao Ghorpade. Krishna Rao Panse alone among the chiefs succeeded in escaping with 3/4,000 cavalry. Pandurang Rao died in captivity.

4 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 1961.

5 *Ibid.*, letter no. 1968.

The other prisoners were released after 4 years for a heavy ransom. Shiv Rao Ghorpade was not, however, released.

The Poona Government now felt that they must do something to retrieve the situation. Haripant was not yet ready. Parasuram Bhau, who was at Kolhapur, was asked to advance against the Mysoreans in the Dharwar-Bankapur region. He reached Manoli on the 22nd January, 1777. The fugitives from Saunsi and troops from Kolhapur were altogether 8/10,000 in number. They were gathered at Manoli. As Bhau had not enough money, his troops began to loot even in Maratha territory. It was impossible to face Muhammad Ali Kumedan with such troops. The Mysoreans had besieged Dharwar, which was at a distance of 14 *kos* from Manoli. From Manoli a mountain track through deep forest led to Dharwar. It was called Manoli *Bari*. Other very small bypaths also existed but this alone could be used by the troops with their equipments. The forts to the west of the *Bari*—Murgod, Ekodi, Dodwad—were in Maratha hands. From Dodwad, Dharwar was only 10 miles distant. Parasuram Bhau's task was to protect these forts, to force the Mysoreans to raise the siege of Dharwar, to prevent their seizing the forest, to hold on till Haripant came and then to take the offensive.

It was settled that 5,000 troops should remain at Ekodi and guard the region upto Dodwad and

watch the movements of Muhammad Ali's troops. The Pindaris were sent to Hubli. To besiege a strong fort like Dharwar with the Marathas so near, Muhammad Ali required one contingent to face them, one to guard the camp and another to man the batteries. As he had not sufficient troops to effect all these, he fell back. He had sent some of his guns and equipments to Bankapur, but finding that Bhau did not attack he brought these back to Hubli and remained there very cautious and watchful. The Pindaris at times penetrated to Lakshmeswar and the Mysore Berads and Pindaris looted each other alternately. These skirmishes, however, did not lead to any battle. Though Bhau apprehended that it would be difficult for him to bring fodder from Manoli, he could not move away very far as the Desais of Kittur, Nawalgund and Dambal would then join Muhammad Ali. He, therefore, decided to remain near about Manoli, ready to march quickly if Kumedan attempted to take the forest. Muhammad Ali was receiving reinforcements. Bhau also wrote to Poona and to Miraj for reinforcements, but no succour came to him. The troops from Gujarat had returned in July, 1776, but even now their accounts had not been settled. Kolhapur troops were looting places in the Miraj territory on the other side of the Warna. It was rumoured in the army of Bhau that Haidar had supplied the Kolhapur people with 3 lakhs of huns in order to prevent the Marathas giving undivided

attention to the Dharwar-Bankapur region. Troops had to be diverted to that region.

Bhau had to remain at Manoli, and Kumedan at Hubli. Kumedan decided to take Manoli *Bari* by a surprise attack. He sent 4,000 troops on the eastern side of the forest as an advance guard to watch the movements of the Marathas. Bhau daily crossed the *Bari* up to a certain distance with a view to mounting watch and feeding his horse on the excellent crop that was then growing. He also wanted to show his enemies his *sangfroid*. To lure the Marathas, Kumedan retreated 10/12 *kos* towards Bankapur. He wanted to throw Bhau off his guard and then make a night attack. While Bhau was encamped at Ugargal, he with 10/12,000 disciplined infantry, 7,000 cavalry and guns attacked him on the night of 22nd March. But Bhau could not be easily duped. He knew beforehand that the attack was coming. He skirmished but withdrew with his equipments to the other side of the *Bari*. Bhau encamped at Manoli and Kumedan at Ugargal. Bhau kept on harassing and Kumedan was in such constant danger that he had to retire to Hubli. Thus Bhau did all that could be expected of such a small army as his. The Kittur chief and the Nawalgund chief could not desert to Haider. The Manoli *Bari* remained in Maratha hands.⁶

6 *Itihas Samgraha*, letters no. 1998, 2004, 2012, 2041, 2058, 2064.

Haripant and Haidar (July, 1777)—Haripant came to the support of Bhau but his army being in arrears, his soldiers were disobedient and it was necessary to pay them before the Maratha army could move with a definite purpose. A loan from Ramachandra Narayan Huprikar was secured and the troops were paid one lakh of rupees. The troops of Parasuram Bhau were also in arrears for 4 months. The Poona *Darbar* sent 2 lakhs of rupees to Haripant. Apprehending that the return of the disaffected soldiery would mean the ruin of Maratha power in the Krishna-Tungabhadra region, they promised to send more in following months.

The troops of Haripant came to Sirhatti on the 19th July. The chieftain of Nawalgund paid Rs. 65,000 as tribute and after realising this sum Bhau came with his troops to Sirhatti on the 29th July. Together they took the *pettah* and besieged the fort. The troops within the fort expected succour from Haidar's troops stationed at Saunsi and Bankapur. On the 31st August, Bhau attacked but failed to carry the fort. Next morning he renewed the attack and the fort was taken.⁷ With the exception of Saunsi, all the other important places in this region were now once again in Maratha hands. Parasuram Bhau marched against Saunsi, the last important possession of the Sirhatti chief, who was

⁷ *Lekha Samgraha*, letters no. 2157, 2162.

both Haidar's lackey and his ally, and Haripant advanced to realize tribute from Savanur. Now they heard the news that Haidar was besieging Chittaldrug. The ruler of Chittaldrug sent his minister Purushottam to Haripant Tatyā applying for succour. But Haripant was himself very uneasy, as he was not quite sure of his own hold over his troops. Receiving no assurance from the Maratha chiefs the ruler of Chittaldrug began to negotiate with Haidar who insisted that he should pay 14 lakhs as *nazarana* and furnish contingents for his army. The Chittaldrug ruler agreed to pay in instalments. But regarding the valuation of Chittaldrug coins there was a difference of opinion, Haidar's valuation being half that of the ruler of Chittaldrug. Hearing that the Maratha generals had not gone away, the latter refused to pay anything and fight began once again.⁸ The ruler of Chittaldrug made frequent sorties and killed large numbers of Haidar's troops. But Haidar did not flinch. In the meantime he was carrying on negotiations with the Poona *Darbar* through Lachman Rao Raste. His proposal was that the Tungabhadra should be regarded as the boundary between the two kingdoms. He promised to pay three years' arrear tribute and release Pandurang Rao, who had been taken prisoner at Saunsi. But the Maratha *Darbar* wanted territory on the other side of the Tungabhadra as also the

8 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 2148.

release of Murar Rao but in this matter Haidar was adamant. Negotiations naturally broke down.⁹

The troops of Haripant continued to be heavily in arrears. The Poona *Darbar* could not make the payments it promised. Bhau took Saunsi and Misrikot. The Maratha chiefs then heard that having come to terms with the chieftain of Chittaldrug, Haidar was marching towards the Tungabhadra. But the river being in flood there was no possibility of his crossing it and taking them by surprise. Bhau gave Dharwar and Koppal to Ramchandra Huprikar for which he paid 4½ lakhs. The tribute of Savanur was fixed at three lakhs 15 thousand rupees.¹⁰ Haidar having come to terms with the ruler of Chittaldrug advanced 5 *kos* from Harihar. Both the armies were waiting for the floods to subside. The Chittaldrug chief now broke the terms of the treaty in the hope of getting Maratha aid.¹¹ He wrote to the Maratha generals proposing to meet their expenses.

Abaji Mahadev and Tulaji Puar, agents of Raghunath Rao, were active, sowing the seeds of treachery.¹² They were at Bankapur. They paid liberally and succeeded in corrupting some Shilhedars. Haripant had his suspicions but had no full knowledge. Khare writes: In this expedition

9 *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 2156.

10 *Ibid.*, letter no. 2165.

11 *Ibid.*, letter no. 2156.

12 *Ibid.*, letter no. 2153.

30/35,000 troops were engaged, more than half of this belonging to the feudal lords. But they too were unable to pay their men. If the expenses amounted to Rs. 20/- per month per horseman, the total comes to 7 lakhs and four months' campaigning must have cost 28 lakhs. The realisation amounted to 14 lakhs 30,000 in all:—

2 lakhs from Poona,

4 lakhs loan raised by Bhau,

4½ lakhs Dharwar & Koppal *taluka*,

65,000 Nawalgund tribute.

315,000 Savanur tribute.

Besides the horsemen there were infantry and *tope-khana* which must have cost wellnigh 12 lakhs in four months. The army was altogether in arrears to the extent of 26 lakhs in round numbers. Therefore there was much dissatisfaction and Haider's agents found a very congenial soil in which they sowed the seeds of treachery.

The Chittaldrug chief promised to pay Rs. 125,000 at their first halt if they crossed the Tungabhadra at Galagnath. About this time he also got 4½ lakhs from Poona. Haripant and Bhau with their troops crossed the Tungabhadra on the 24th November at Galagnath. Haider thereupon moved from his position 5 kos from Harihar to Harihar. When he heard that the Marathas were going to Chittaldrug he prepared to meet them. The Chittaldrug chief promised the Marathas a sum of 5 lakhs of rupees for their support. But Bhau was

now ill, suffering from dysentery and fever. This was a great handicap. The routes lay through mountains and jungles in which it was very difficult to advance with his full equipment. Hari-pant therefore decided to take a different route—to proceed towards Bellary where he hoped to meet Dhaunsa, the general of the Nizam, and then advance along the plain country to Chittaldrug. He therefore directed his march towards Hampi.¹³

That terrain too, was not suitable for cavalry. Haidar was at the back of the Maratha army at a distance of 5 to 10 *kos* with 10/12,000 cavalry, 25/30,000 infantry and guns.¹⁴ He began to pursue and sought a convenient strategical position for attack. The Marathas found it difficult to turn back and attack, the mountain terrain making cavalry movements so difficult. The Marathas crossed the Sondur *Bari* and came to the plains of Adoni *taluka*. Haidar took his station at Daroji at a distance of 15 *kos* from them. The Marathas kept their camp equipages at Ramdurg and their army was stationed at Rarawi. The Marathas halted there for a fortnight. Bhau had recovered sufficiently to be at the head of his detachment once again. The Marathas were expecting the arrival of Dhaunsa, Nizam's general, and their plan was to proceed to Chittaldrug with the combined army.

¹³ *Lekha Samgraha*, letter no. 2197.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

“Do not meet the enemy before I come,” so wrote Dhaunsa, but the prospect of his turning up was now more remote than ever. The Marathas were in a very difficult position. Haidar kept a very big detachment at Daroji and he placed another at Murgod at a distance of 17 *kos* from Bellary. The Marathas were caught between the two forces. Reinforcements could arrive only with great difficulty. Haripant’s plan was to send all his baggages beyond the Tungabhadra and to adopt the traditional Maratha method of guerilla fighting till Dhaunsa arrived.

When Haripant’s baggages were being removed to the other side of the river, Haidar suddenly attacked (1st January, 1778). A small detachment had gone out to protect the supplies that were coming. They were surrounded on all sides. They succeeded, however, in rejoining the main army, though Govind Rao was killed and Mahimaji and Anand Rao were wounded. The Maratha army formed a circle to enable the bazar to remove peacefully to the other side of the Tungabhadra.¹⁵ Haripant and Bhau suspected treachery in their ranks. They decided not to take the offensive but slowly retreated and the two armies were almost within sight of each other near Rarawi. Haripant knew that Manaji Sindhia was in league with Haidar. Manaji Sindhia was actually caught with

¹⁵ *Lekha Samgraha*, letters no. 2220 and 2221.

a letter from Haidar. To punish him Haripant and Parasuram suddenly attacked his camp, but Manaji escaped. His wife and mother-in-law were found there and his camp was looted. Manaji had received one lakh of huns besides jewellery and cloth from Haidar and out of that 75,000 huns were found in his camp. Jaswant Rao Mane, an accomplice of Manaji, was blown from the mouth of a gun.¹⁶ One Jamadar *gardi* was also beheaded. This incident caused some stir among other Maratha Sardars in the camp, for after a few days when Mahadaji Raji Bhonsle and Nilkantha Rao Morat, two big Maratha Sardars, were caught for the same offence, they were sent to Poona for their trial. Haripant had to continue his retreat, his cavalry covering it successfully from Haidar's harassment. After crossing the Tungabhadra the Maratha met Dhaunsa, the general of the Nizam. But Dhaunsa proved to be absolutely undependable.¹⁷ Either because he was really chicken-hearted or on account of the Nizam's hesitant policy, he would not take the offensive. To show that he did not care for the Maratha-Nizam coalition, Haidar even sent batches of his troops to loot Maratha territory on the northern bank of the Tungabhadra. He looted all the places in the Koppal *taluka*, received one lakh of huns from the Dambalkar Desai and took back all the

16 *Lekha Samgraha*, letters no. 2228, 2231.

17 *Ibid.*, letter no. 2234.

places from the Lakshmeswar *pargana*. His son Tipu with 10,000 selected horsemen attacked Dharwar. Haripant had kept there a garrison of 3,000 troops. But Tipu looted the town and the mint before he was forced to retreat, and on his way back to the main army he succeeded in taking Hubli by holding out threats. Dhaunsa's slow marches, his plunder of Maratha territory and his unmistakable unwillingness to stir also helped to paralyse the army of Haripant.¹⁸ Haripant naturally asked the Poona Government for reinforcements. Moraba and Holkar were scheming against Nana Fadnavis who was reluctant to send reinforcement. But he was persuaded to send Appa Balwant with 5,000 troops to reinforce Haripant. The Marathas decided to cross the river at Singtalur and go again to the assistance of the ruler of Chittaldrug. But from Dhaunsa they met with a flat refusal. He said, "If you insist on crossing, I would retreat."¹⁹ Bhau and Pant told him plainly that in case he refused to cross they would treat him as an enemy. He at last agreed to join. On the 24th March, 1778, they again crossed, for the second time.²⁰ But after 10/12 days they were obliged to fall back on account of the treachery of Moraba Fadnavis. Letters from Nana reached Bhau and Tatya on the 5th April and on the 6th they turned back.

18 *Lekha Samgraha*, letters no. 2250, 2251, 2254.

19 *Ibid.*, letter no. 2251.

20 *Ibid.*, letter no. 2273.

Moraba Fadnavis, the cousin of Nana Fadnavis, was one of the most important members of the ministerial party. With the aid of Holkar, he succeeded in getting the upper hand and compelling Nana to retire to Purandar. Moraba was thinking of the restoration of Raghoba. But Nana was a man of deep artifice. As the Kolhapur chief was creating disturbance in the interest of Raghoba, Mahadji Sindhia was deputed against him. Nana's plan was that Mahadji and Haripant should unite at Merich and march upon Poona for the restoration of his ascendancy. It was publicly given out that they were to form their rendezvous at Kolhapur and march against Haidar. This well-concerted plan deceived both Haidar and Moraba. Nana reassumed his former power. But Haidar was thus left free to subdue not merely the chief of Chittal-drug but also all the territory between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra. Grant Duff says that Haripant outwitted Haidar by realizing from him a large sum of money as the price of his withdrawal which for other reasons was absolutely necessary. But this view does not seem to be corroborated by any contemporary Marathi record.

Haidar had now an open field. He took one after another all the important places in the Krishna-Tungabhadra Doab. Only Dharwar resisted for a considerable period. The Desais of Nargund, Sirhatti and Damal submitted readily and were confirmed in their respective territories on promising

to pay their usual tribute to Haidar. Each of these chiefs had to pay as his *nazarana* a sum equal to the annual revenue. With the Savanur Pathan chief Haidar later formed a marriage alliance. The Chittaldrug Poligar was besieged for the second time. This time he had no escape, especially because the Muhammadan troops in his service were seduced. The Poligar surrendered and was sent with his family as prisoners to Seringapatam. Shaikh Ayaz, a Nair *chela*, was left as the Governor there. Mir Sahib was sent against Cuddapa. After taking Chittaldrug Haidar joined him. The Pathans surrendered after some resistance against overwhelming odds. Cuddapa was thus annexed. The Pathan Nawab had withdrawn to Sidhout; but his position was untenable and he had no other alternative but to surrender. He was taken as a prisoner to Seringapatam. This completes the story of Haidar's conquests.²¹ As a French document puts it, "By steps rather slow but sustained, by a constant good fortune, he has formed a new power, comparable to a torrent that upsets and destroys all that it meets on the way."²² His annexations in the north up to the Tungabhadra and between the Krishna and Tungabhadra were made at a time when the Maratha power was paralysed by

21 *Or.* 1865, p. 22. Haidar, always ambitious, thought that he wasted his money if he paid his troops in peace.

22 *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. XIII, paper by K. A. Nilakantha Sastri.

internal feuds. When the Maratha state recognised all these acts of aggression Haider attained the zenith of his power and prosperity.

Two facts governed the political situation in South India. There was in the first place the deep-rooted Maratha-Mysore rivalry. The second factor was the British attitude that ranked Haider Ali as 'their natural enemy.' A French memorandum notes, "By an adroit policy the English have fomented division and maintained the war between these two powers (the Marathas and Mysore). It is a work of more than ordinary policy to prepare by negotiations the reunion of rival powers."²³ Haider's career after this is to be studied as part of a wider conflict against British ascendancy, the opportunity for this being provided by British diplomatic bungling. No doubt he had his first war with the British in 1767. But there is no reason to think that at that time he looked upon the British power as irrevocably hostile to him. There was a strong desire, on the other hand, to enlist British support against the Maratha power, geographically and traditionally his rival. Not until 1775 was his disillusionment complete. He may not inappropriately have said, "I wasted several years of my life by the supposition that England was a great nation." He told the ambassadors of Muhammad Ali that war

²³ *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. XIII, paper by K. A. Nilakantha Sastri.

was perhaps inevitable. Once this decision was made, a rapprochement with the Marathas was the next step, provided the Marathas showed willingness. The diplomatic revolution,²⁴ for which the administration of Nana Fadnavis was responsible, was the logical outcome of what was inherent in the situation. But we must give to Nana's government due credit for its capacity to get rid of the 'weak and childish' feeling of traditional rivalry that does not take note of the new orientation in politics and diplomacy.

²⁴ The full story of this Maratha-Mysore alliance and how it worked will be narrated in the second volume of this book.

CHAPTER XV

*Relations with the British, 1769-1775.**

Wilks, in his estimate of Haidar, says that 'he had no passion, good or bad, to disturb the balance of the account.'¹ Between 1769 and 1775 Haidar became convinced that, as matters stood, he must join the combination opposed to the British. We cannot also deny that he had just grounds to complain of the English Government.

The 2nd article of the treaty of 1769 that ended the First Anglo-Mysore War provided that 'in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked they shall from their respective countries, mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out.'² No doubt this article was very inconvenient to the East India Company, giving them all the embarrassments of an offensive alliance without any of its advantages. But this ought to have been an argument

* Read at the Allahabad session (1938) of the Indian History Congress.

1 Wilks, *History of Mysore*, Vol. II, p. 379.

2 Military Consultations, Vol. 33, 1769, p. 231. Observation: "We were fully sensible of the difficulties in which we might be involved. But no peace could be expected without it."

against the conclusion of the treaty and not an argument against its observance after it had been concluded. This treaty of 1769 was naturally regarded by Haidar as the most important part of his plan of resistance to the Maratha invasion which might come at any time. The Maratha State, under the wise guidance of Madhava Rao, the greatest of the Peshwas, had recovered from the effects of the stunning blow at Panipat. Twice before, in 1765 and in 1767, Haidar had to oppose the invasion of Madhava Rao and he knew that this most formidable enemy would again invade his country and try to occupy the largest portion of it permanently.³ In view of this Maratha menace and the genius of the Maratha leader, Haidar could not expect success unaided. This treaty of 1769 was, therefore, the sheet anchor of his foreign policy.

When in January, 1770, Madhava Rao was in the field, accompanied by organized garrisons and a field force, Haidar sent a *vakil* demanding British aid. Madhava Rao also sent his *vakil* to Madras. But the Government of Fort St. George decided that 'it must be our endeavour to remain neutral.' In their letter to the Bengal Government they argued as if the treaty of 1769 was non-existent and there was no obligation imposed by it. They wrote that if Haidar was helped that would not be sufficient to crush the Marathas and would expose the Carnatic

3 For details, see chapters VI, VII.

to Maratha ravages, but if the Marathas got British help, they might blot the Mysore State out of existence and thus become more dangerous, and if Haidar found the British willing to assist the Marathas, he would accommodate matters with them and turn in his anger upon the Carnatic. "Our greatest apprehensions at present are," wrote the gentlemen at Fort St. George, "that affairs will be settled between them".⁴ They feared that if the campaign ended before the campaigning season was over, the Marathas might enter the Carnatic. They protracted the negotiations under various pretences. The Madras Government did not expect the campaign to last long. But though Madhava Rao was taken ill, he left Trimbak Rao behind him to continue the campaign. Trimbak Rao was not an unworthy successor of Madhava Rao in command of the Maratha army. At Chinkurali on the 15th March, 1771, Haidar was completely defeated. Soon after the battle, he solicited the assistance of the Company and made an offer of considerable presents to the Company, the President and Mr. Hastings, provided his request was complied with; but he got no reply. Only the gentlemen at Bombay on Haidar's application sent him 500 stands of arms. The desolating war continued for 15 months even after Chinkurali. A treaty was con-

4 Select Committee Proceedings, 1770. Letter from Fort St. George, 13th February, 1770.

cluded and the third Maratha-Mysore War came to an end in June, 1772.⁵

As the campaign continued, the Madras Government ordered detachments to Trichinopoly and Vellore, with a view to put on the appearance of being in readiness should either of the two contestant parties invade the Carnatic. They wanted thus to keep alive the hopes and fears of both the parties.⁶ But this attitude underwent a remarkable change when it became evident that the Marathas were trying to subjugate Mysore permanently. In that case the British would find their territory constantly exposed to Maratha ravages and devastations. The Government of Fort St. George now became apprehensive that they might subject themselves to the imputation of a breach of faith. But the Nawab of Arcot showed his disinclination to co-operate against the Marathas. He had refused to execute the instrument of his participation in the treaty of 1769, and as the war dragged on, he showed more and more anxiety to comply with Maratha request for help. But the Madras Government also became more and more conscious that good policy required them to assist Haidar. On the 12th June, 1771, they wrote, "Haidar Ali still continues to press us for assistance which we have it not in our power to grant, as it is impossible for us to attempt anything

5 For details, see chapters X-XIII.

6 Select Committee Proceedings, 1770. Letter from Fort St. George, 15th April, 1770.

without the revenue and resources of the Carnatic, which are entirely under the control of the Nawab, who pressed us earnestly to a junction with the Marathas to subdue Mysore. In this system he is warmly seconded by Sir John Lindsay, Crown representative at Arcot,"⁷ the Nawab being taken especially under the protection of the Crown by the 11th article of the Treaty of Paris. About the end of the year 1771, the Bombay Government instructed Mr. Sibbald, their Resident at Onore, to learn from Haidar Ali whether he would deposit a sum of money adequate to the expense they might incur in affording him assistance. The Government of Fort St. George also wrote on the 21st December, 1771, "We have desired he will inform us what supplies of money and what provisions he can furnish should the orders we expect from Europe authorize us to assist him."⁸

As we examine the records relating to the infraction of the treaty of 1769, we find the Madras Government at no stage willing to abide by its terms. It pledged them to all the evils of an offensive alliance which they had been anxious to avoid. Throughout the war (from January, 1770, to June, 1772) the Madras Government followed a line of conduct that amounted to a passive infraction of the treaty. The Nawab of Arcot and Sir

7 Select Committee Proceedings, 12th June, 1771.

8 Select Committee Proceedings, 3rd Feb., 1772.

John Lindsay, the royal ambassador, urged an active violation of the treaty by joining hands with Madhava Rao for the destruction of Haidar. Wilks writes, "The Government, feeling the impossibility of executing the treaty in opposition to the Nawab and the representative of his Majesty and resolved not to destroy the power which they were bound by treaty to defend, evaded the whole question, by representing both to Haidar and the Marathas the necessity of waiting for the result of a reference which they had made on the subject to their superiors in England."⁹ The line of conduct adopted by the Madras Government is thus sought to be justified. Some merit is actually claimed for this passive attitude because the intricate political system placed insuperable impediments against the performance of their engagements to Haidar. But if we look at the matter from Haidar's point of view a different interpretation is not unjustified. When a treaty is concluded, the contracting parties are expected to accept terms with a full sense of responsibility, a clear knowledge of its implications including the constitutional difficulties and handicaps. The elementary principles governing interstate relations were thus violated. To add insult to injury, in the 24th month of this long-protracted war, in which they were pledged to defend him, the Madras Government asked him what money and

provisions he could furnish if they were to assist him and some time after he was informed that the Home Government had forbidden any assistance to either of the two contestants.

This infraction of the treaty of 1769 was not the only event that alienated Haidar from the English. British attitude regarding his supplies of military stores caused further ill-feeling. After the conclusion of the treaty of 1769 by the Madras Government, the Government of Bombay deputed two men to enter into an agreement for what remained to be adjusted for the benefit of the Company on that coast. A treaty was concluded in 1770, by which it was arranged that the British were again to have a factory at Onore for pepper and sandal wood and an exclusive right was given to the Company for purchasing the entire quantity of these articles "the amount of which (as expressed in the treaty) or as much of it as the Hon'ble Company choose to be made good in guns, saltpetre, lead and in ready money." Repeated applications were made by Haidar in consequence of this treaty for warlike stores. In 1772, however, the Court of Directors disapproved of this treaty. After the intimation of the disapproval, the Government of Bombay evaded supplying him with military stores and Haidar naturally turned to the French, who began to supply him liberally. The Bombay Government was of opinion that it would have been much better to send him to some extent the articles he desired,

as otherwise the French were getting the profits of these highly charged articles at the same time that they were acquiring an ascendancy in his counsels.¹⁰ In March, 1775, the Government of Fort St. George sent to the Bengal Government a résumé of the state of affairs in their part of the Deccan. They wrote that Haidar possessed a valuable extensive territory, a well-regulated government, a numerous well-disciplined army, with a revenue said to amount to three crores. He had by then recovered the whole country he had previously lost to the Marathas, taking advantage of the confusion in their affairs following upon the death of Madhava Rao and the assassination of Narayan Rao. The French supplied him with military stores and French adventurers entered into his service.¹¹ But for this the British were not entitled to make any complaints as they themselves were directly responsible for the pro-French turn of his policy. It cannot be denied that in 1771, when the Marathas were encamped in Haidar's territory, they proposed to compromise their differences with him provided he joined them in an attack upon the Carnatic. The offer might not have been sincere. But "Haidar made known these proposals to the British Government and even went so far to say that he was willing to forget the causes of personal animosity towards Muhammad

10 Secret Proceedings, 8th March, 1775.

11 Secret Proceedings, 13th March, 1775, p. 298.

Ali and to hope that the English would mediate a reconciliation, he authorised his envoys to propose as the condition of prompt and effectual aid the immediate payment of 20 lakhs of rupees and the cession to the English of the provinces of Baramahal, Salem and Atur; finally the ambassadors were directed openly to announce in the event of the rejection of all these advances Haidar's reluctant determination to throw himself on the French for support (October 1771)''.¹²

The British helped Muhammad Ali to seize Tanjore by storm on the 17th September, 1773. Calculating that this acquisition of Tanjore would bring about an estrangement between Muhammad Ali and the Marathas, Haidar once again made an attempt to enter into an alliance with the British and the ruler of Arcot. He made the first advances for amicable settlement and sent his deputies. He proposed a treaty that would renew the violated conditions of the treaty of 1769, to be executed by the British, Muhammad Ali and Haidar. When the Government of Bombay seized the island of Salsette, thus making a war with the Marathas inevitable, Haidar naturally hoped that the Nawab of Arcot as also the President and gentlemen at Fort St. George would be more than willing to accept his offer.¹³ Muhammad Ali dragged on these negotiations, and even suggested some modification of the terms pro-

¹² Wilks, *History of Mysore*, Vol. II, p. 219.

¹³ Secret Proceedings, 13th March, 1774, pp. 335-336.

posed, thus expressing his willingness to enter into an alliance provided the terms were modified. Haidar proposed the following terms.

“In case the Mughals (meaning in particular the Nizam) or Marathas should proceed against the country of my Circar in order to remove and expel them therefrom a sufficient force with a commander of importance, should be sent to act in conjunction and alliance with me, and to make a war upon the enemy and I also in case the Mughals or Marathas should attack the country of the Nabob Wallaujah or the English, will send the forces of my Circar to act against the enemy, in conjunction and alliance with them and drive them out. Whether peace or war be determined on towards the enemy, myself, the Nabob and the English are to be of one mind and to act entirely in concert, either in continuing the war or concluding of a peace—the expenses of the troops to be paid in this manner—To a European soldier 15 rupees—and to each sepoy seven and a half rupees per month and the officer shall be paid as I may be advised from them at the time I require them. The pay of my troops to be to each horseman 15 rupees and each sepoy $7\frac{1}{2}$ rupees per month and the officer to be paid as I shall write from hence at the time.

Whatever articles etc. out of friendship may be wanted out of the dominions of each other, shall be purchased by the subjects of each without molestation on either side.

If the Moghul or Maratha chief with a design to create a misunderstanding between us, should begin a correspondence, they (the Nawab and the English) shall not take any measure in compliance thereto, but shall communicate the papers to me and I also, if they write to me will from hence give advice thereof, which must tend to the increase of sincerity and the confirmation of union between us.

The security between us for these articles of Agreement shall be a solemn oath in the name of God, the Saint of God and on the glorious Koran".¹⁴

The Nawab proposed the following terms:—

"In case the Marathas or any other enemy should come into the country the above person (meaning Haidar) should send a sufficient force, with an officer of rank, who shall act in conjunction and concert with my forces and those of the English Company in order to expel and drive out the enemy from my dominions. In like manner, whatever foe shall enter the country of the said person, I will send a sufficient force, under a leader of importance, who shall act in conjunction and unanimity with his army to effect his expulsion. The pay of the troops on both sides to be at the rate of 15 rupees per month for a horseman and 7½ for a sepoy and that of the officers to be settled at the time they are required, advices thereon being sent along with the auxiliary troops.

¹⁴ Secret Proceedings, 23rd October, 1775. Copy of a paper sent by Haidar Ali.

“With regard to the merchandise that may be wanted from each other’s countries, it is necessary that the particulars thereof shall be first transmitted.

“If the Marathas or other chief in order to create a disunion between us should begin a correspondence neither side shall act in compliance therewith, but shall give mutual notice of the writings that come to them.

“No protection shall be afforded to the subjects of enemies of each other and those that have fled away in disgust shall be delivered up again.”

We should keep in mind the British comment on the treaty. “We are not aware of any advantages that could be derived from such a treaty either to the Nabob or the Company.....although its direct object is peace, it would alternately draw us into hostilities and distant operations, in supporting Haidar Ali Cawn”.¹⁵

In the meantime, as internal dissensions increased in Maharashtra, Muhammad Ali could see for himself that there was no immediate danger from the Marathas. He now became lukewarm, his ambassadors Ali Nawaz and Fateh Ali began to amuse Haidar with their evasions and ultimately Haidar dismissed them with a civil letter. One of the ambassadors himself mentioned that “they wasted seven months in the hope of the arrival of

¹⁵ Secret Proceedings, 23rd October, 1775. Copy of a paper sent by Haidar Ali.

the treaty and Haidar, at length thinking that the Nabob did not wish for friendship established by a written negotiation and only meant to keep up appearances till an opportunity should offer for executing measures of a contrary nature, said that it was his business therefore to be upon his guard and take measures on his part."¹⁶ Haidar himself was quite outspoken. He told Ali Nawaz Khan that for seventeen months he had been desiring a confirmation of friendship with the Nawab but the Nawab paid no attention. "Though the English have assisted Raghunath Rao, yet whatever he gained by so poor a support? He will not be successful against the Poona army. Members of the Poona administration desire my alliance and assistance on the part of the son of Narrain Rao and have sent me envoys of consequence. What we agree upon will in time be known."¹⁷ When the ambassadors returned they reported that Haidar would now seize Cuddapa, Kurnul and Adoni, after which he would reduce the whole country south of the Krishna, would form an alliance with other nations like the French and the Dutch, who were opposed to the English, establish good relations with the Marathas and come to a rupture with Muhammad Ali and the English.¹⁸

From 1769 Haidar tried his utmost to remain on terms of friendship with the British and

¹⁶ Secret Proceedings, 23rd October, 1775. The verbal narration of Ali Nawaz Khan.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Muhammad Ali. But convinced now that this was impossible he definitely went over to the other side. It was the bungling diplomacy of the British and the short-sighted policy of Muhammad Ali that forced Haidar Ali into the arms of the Marathas and the French, thus making things so difficult for the British between the years 1779-82. When we speak of the irreconcilable enmity that existed between Haidar, Tipu and the British, we should take the circumstances of the years 1769-75 into consideration. Haidar had undoubtedly just grounds to complain of the English Government.

CHAPTER XVI.

*Relations with the British, 1775-1779 **

In 1775, Haidar informed the ambassadors of Muhammad Ali that as their master did not wish for his friendship, it was Haidar's duty to be upon his guard and take measures on his own part.¹ After this, every year Muhammad Ali would report the progress of Haidar's preparations and the certainty of his invasion. But his predictions came to be treated with ridicule by the Madras Council which regarded these repeated warnings as merely false alarms. The only consequence of all this was that the Madras Government affected to disbelieve the news service of Muhammad Ali and remained utterly unprepared.

But Haidar was true to his word, and made no secret of his attitude or of his preparations. The chaos prevalent in Maharashtra gave him respite from the annual Maratha inroads and he could take Ratnagiri and Bellary. It was now apparent to

* Read at the Poona session (1938) of the Indian Historical Records Commission and published in the *Proceedings*.

1 Secret Proceedings, 23rd Oct., 1775: The verbal narration of Ali Nawaz Khan.

everybody that he would next attempt to take Gooty from Murar Rao, Adoni from Basalat Jang and Kurnul from its *Foujdar*. These chieftains were naturally uneasy and were anxious to enter into an alliance with the British. Muhammad Ali argued, "There is no time to be lost, for should Haidar get possession of Cuddapa and bring the neighbouring sardars under subjection, it may then be too late to attempt to stop him".² He thus gave sufficient warning, but in 1776 the Government of Madras would not raise a finger in support of Murar Rao, when Haidar was besieging Gooty. After a prolonged siege Haidar took it and sent Murar Rao and his family to his state prison. Three years later, when mutually recriminatory letters were passing between Haidar and the Madras Governor, the latter wrote, "If I were disposed to complain, you have furnished me with ample grounds in the reduction of Murar Rao, who was included in the treaty of 1769 as our friend and ally and by your proceedings against the zamindars of Cuddapa and Kurnul with respect to Basalat Jang, against whom I also hear you have some designs."³ Perhaps conscious of the impolicy of having allowed Haidar to overpower Murar Rao, the Government of Fort St. George showed the greatest zeal in supporting Basalat Jang, thereby alienating the Nizam. They thus sought to make up for

² Translation of a letter from Nawab, to Governor Wynch, 4th December, 1775.

³ Secret Proceedings, 13th May, 1779.

a sin of omission by a sin of commission. But chronologically the episode of Basalat Jang comes later.

The Maratha preoccupation lasted up to the end of May, 1778. Haidar had not the opportunity, even if he had the inclination, to face the British at this time. There was partial identity of interest as both Haidar Ali and the British supported Raghunath Rao against the ministerial party. This was undoubtedly an opportunity to bind him closely as an ally. But the aspect of affairs was altogether very unfavourable for the British. The President and Council of Fort St. George wrote, "Haidar has long solicited and even importuned this Government to enter into a close union with him but the consideration of temporary inconvenience arising from the terms of such a union, which could only be founded upon agreements of mutual assistance and support, has hitherto obstructed the measure and Haidar has been consequently left in difficulty and distress to seek aid of foreign nations, particularly the French. The reluctance on our part to accept the repeated offers made by Haidar at a time when our assistance might have been useful to him, will no doubt render it more difficult to obtain assistance or at least a neutral conduct on his part".⁴

The President and Council of Bombay proposed in a letter, dated 9th May, 1778, to appoint a Resi-

4 Secret Proceedings, 10th August, 1778.

dent at the court of Haidar Ali to penetrate and counteract French and Dutch designs. The French and the Dutch maintained Residents at the court of Haidar Ali. But even in this matter there was some difficulty as it was necessary to bring Muhammad Ali to consent to it. In a letter written from Bengal to Madras, we read, "We request you will use your endeavour to convince him of the appointment, to obviate any jealousy it might create." The Madras Government naturally argued that, considering the situation of Haidar with respect to the Carnatic and the Company's possessions on the coast, it was better to send an intelligent person from the Madras Presidency to reside at Haidar's court than from Bombay.⁵

But now the British and the French found themselves at war and this introduced a complicating factor in Anglo-Mysore relations. Had not the British commenced this war with so great a superiority by occupying Pondicherry in October, 1778, Haidar who was so strongly inclined in favour of the French might have taken a more decisive attitude from the beginning. To keep Haidar neutral amidst so many enemies opposed to the British, it was necessary to preserve the superiority of British arms and to be thoroughly prepared for any contingency. But the disastrous retreat of Tulegaon and the Convention of Wargaon showed such a glaring

5 Secret Proceedings, 25th June, 1778.

weakness on the western front that Haidar's attitude stiffened and more so because he fully knew how unprepared the Madras Government was. The Government of Madras was not altogether unconscious of this aspect of affairs. As early as the beginning of 1777, the President and Council of Fort St. George wrote, "We have resolved on the increase of the number of our battalions by reducing the present establishment of 1,000 men in each to 700, which will enable us to garrison the forts of the Nabob under our charge and take the field at a short notice with 2 battalions of Europeans, 3 Companies of artillery and 9 battalions of Sepoys. But troops cannot be maintained, military operations cannot be conducted without money and herein we fear we should fail. The very report of a force of 1,500 Europeans and 12,000 black troops assembled with the means of payment in our treasury would command respect from all and would be likely to deter any from attempting to disturb the Carnatic."⁶ But diagnosis is not cure. The same Government reported in February, 1779, "It is certain that we are by no means in a condition with respect to resources ever to oppose any powerful attempts either of the French or of Haidar Ali."⁷ Even now Haidar might not have been free to begin a war with the British had not the escape of Raghoba from the

6 Secret Proceedings, 20th January, 1777.

7 Secret Proceedings, 18th March, 1779.

custody of Sindhia to General Goddard's camp induced the ministerial party at Poona to change their attitude to Haidar and enter into an offensive alliance against the English.

The British expedition to Mahe has been regarded as one of the events that precipitated the Second Anglo-Mysore War. Mahe was a French possession through which Haidar received his military supplies. When the British expedition under Braithwaite was sent, Haidar's *vakil* formally acquainted the President of Madras that his master looked upon the settlement of Mahe together with all the settlements on the Malabar coast as under his protection. Haidar himself wrote, "In my country there are factories belonging to the English, Dutch, Portuguese and the French. Besides these there are many merchants here who are considered as my subjects. If any one entertains designs against those traders, I will without doubt take the best and most considerable methods to give them assistance."⁸ The British Government could not be expected to acquiesce in this. The question, however, was one of expediency and the Madras Government quite logically argued, "It became a question with us whether it would be safe or prudent to pursue this expedition we had set on foot against Mahe. We saw the additional risk to which it was exposed and the inconvenience of sending such a body of troops at

8 Secret Proceedings, 18th March, 1779. Letter from Haidar Ali to the Governor.

this time out of the Carnatic but we perceived also the particular advantages that would result from the successful execution of our measures. We saw that this was the only opportunity that might offer for removing the disadvantageous impressions which have been occasioned everywhere by the late defeat, that the appearance of diffidence and timidity on this occasion would strengthen and confirm these impressions and probably operate more to our prejudice than any failure that would happen from the prosecution of the enterprise, and lastly that the withdrawing of our troops would be inevitably followed by the capture of our settlement at Tellicherry which, though perhaps not important in itself, would in the eyes of the country powers be considered as a victory of no small consequence to the French and perhaps induce those now wavering to declare openly in their favour.'"⁹ Mahe fell on the 19th March, 1779, in spite of the fact that Haidar's troops assisted in its defence and his flag had been hoisted on it. But it must be admitted that even if the British had withdrawn from Mahe in view of the protest of Haidar, that would not have prevented the war, made almost inevitable by other causes unconnected with the French war.

Another incident that is said to have precipitated the Second Anglo-Mysore War was the stipulation of the Government of Fort St. George

9 Secret Proceedings, 1st March, 1779, pp. 326-27.

for the unconditional defence of Basalat Jang. Briefly narrated the facts were these. Basalat Jang, a brother of Nizam Ali, was in the enjoyment of his *jagir* of Adoni, Guntur and other places. As he was suspected of being very pro-French and the treaty between Nizam Ali and the British entailed Guntur on the East India Company on the demise of Basalat Jang, the Government of Fort St. George was authorised by the Government of Bengal to take steps to remove the French influence from the court of Basalat Jang. Though approaches were made to Nizam Ali, no further steps were taken until December, 1778, when the President and Council of Fort St. George, in consequence of overtures made by Basalat Jang, "proposed an agreement for farming the Guntur Sircar during his life and for obtaining the dismissal of French troops in his service by supplying their place in the protection of his country by detachments of the Company's forces."¹⁰ But in this excessive eagerness to foil the French they did not take cognizance of other circumstances relating to Basalat Jang. This loose condition of defending the other possessions of Basalat Jang was what created difficulties. In order to give his assistance for the protection of Adoni and Raichur threatened by Haidar's onward march, the Government of Fort St. George ordered a Company and a half of European artillery, 2

10 Secret Proceedings, 20th March, 1780, p. 415.

Companies of infantry and 4 battalions of sepoy. "But the route of this army by the province of Cuddapa and Kurnul amounting to at least 200 miles road distance was across the territories of 2 powers, namely, Haidar and Nizam Ali, and no previous notice was given nor permission obtained to pass a military force through these territories. Naturally the Nizam and Haidar Ali appeared extremely jealous of these proceedings and used all their endeavours with Basalat Jang to make him keep the Guntur Sircar in his own hands and stop the march of troops. The Nizam went so far as to propose in strong terms to his brother that his district should be given at rent to Haidar and Haidar, with a view to terrifying him, invaded his country with a considerable force and threatened the entire conquest of it if he hesitated to break off his agreement with the Company. Basalat Jang submitted to the will of the powerful chiefs and the march was countermanded."¹¹ But it cannot be denied that this incredible bungling, besides making British opposition too patent to Haidar, served also to alienate the Nizam. The reasons are not difficult to find. "The brothers in the despotic Governments of India are all pretenders to the masnad, despotism being only supported by a few of the great military servants of the prince and by their envy and mutual suspicions of each other. There

11 Secret Proceedings, 20th March, 1780, p. 416.

is foundation for jealousy and Basalat Jang being a prince of the governing family, the Nawab will never be easy while British troops remain with him. A proper provision of jagir and personal security may be guaranteed to him. But as long as a party continues with him, it will be difficult either to satisfy the Nawab's pride or remove his suspicions. Haidar is no less jealous of our getting a footing in Adoni, having marked that country as a quarry for the first favourable opportunity."¹² Thus it is apparent that this was the most impolitic step in the whole course of transactions and was undoubtedly largely responsible for stiffening the attitude of Haidar and Nizam Ali. The British method of dealing with him further exasperated Haidar. He told the British *vakil* Srinivas Rao later that in the course of three years he must have written to his *vakil* at Arcot, Banaji Pant, a hundred times that he wanted to preserve peace. But every day brought to him news of a fresh dispute on the frontier of Dindigul. He threatened that he would enter the Carnatic, waste the whole country and burn and reduce all to ashes. But in reply the Madras Government referred to Muhammad Ali and Muhammad Ali again referred back to the Madras Government.

Haidar recapitulated his grievances against the Government of St. George in the following terms :

"Your territories lie contiguous to mine from Dindigul to Cuddapa and continual disturbances are raised by you in my country. The Chief of Telicherry gives protection to the Nairs dependent upon me, keeps their families in his factories, assists them with lead, powder, firearms and commits disorder in my country. When you are thus acting in this unruly manner what treaty subsists between you and me or which of us has violated it?"¹³

Let us review the principles of Haider's foreign policy, so far as it concerned the British. In his early years his close association with the French gave him an anti-British bias. Their attitude during the critical years 1760-61 was not conducive to better relationship. When they suddenly joined the Nizam against Haider, he was surprised and antagonised but he turned the table on them, won over the Nizam, cornered them, and dictated his terms at the gates of Madras. As a realist, however, he must have felt that a defensive alliance with the British must be the mainstay of his foreign policy. The Nizam was entirely undependable and in any case, not a strong pillar of support. The Maratha was the principal enemy who had twice defeated him and seized valuable territory from him. In these circumstances, British military power might be utilised in a defensive alliance against the Marathas. But the third Maratha invasion con-

13 Secret Proceedings, 8th May, 1780, p. 607.

vinced him that there was no reliance on British promises. The Madras Government was shifty, intractable and absolutely undependable. Even then he tried his utmost to court Muhammad Ali and to bring about a closer rapprochement. He could feel that the Maratha menace could not be countered in any other way. But Muhammad Ali and the British were in no mood to meet his advances. Failing to win them over and disgusted with their exasperating delay, their shifts and their subterfuges, he decided to abandon once for all his futile policy of trying to make friends with them. But it was not possible for him to remain aloof from the momentous happenings in the south and to throw two bridges across, one to Poona, another to Madras. Once it became apparent that the British were not going to join him in a defensive alliance against the Marathas, he had to reckon with the prospect of their joining an offensive alliance against him in future. That possibility must for ever be eliminated and here was the grand opportunity which the First Anglo-Maratha War provided. As the Court of Directors put in their despatch, "Grown to a formidable height of power, with a genius so aspiring reasons so various, his authority throughout every part of his dominions so completely established, he became an object of first importance in the political system of India."¹⁴ The

14 Military Dept—Despatches from England, 3rd April, 1780.

Marathas with a better sense of the realities of the situation naturally approached him and the active anti-Maratha phase of his career ended. War with the British being more or less inevitable after this, the main preoccupation of his life, as that of his son later on, was to crush the British. Haidar became convinced that he must make a supreme effort in this direction, in alliance with the Marathas and the Nizam if possible, without them if necessary. As he told a British ambassador later, he decided to expunge the English name from the Carnatic.¹⁵ It became the dominant motive of his life henceforth and determined every military venture, every diplomatic move.

The capture of Mahe by the British, the Basalat Jang affair, the boundary disputes, the friction in Malabar—all these exasperated and perhaps contributed to the growth of the anti-British frame of mind but about Haidar we must never forget that he never allowed his feelings to influence his policy. As Wilks puts in another connection, "Everything was weighed in the balance of utility." We are told that Haidar on his death-bed regretted this change of policy. If this was so, it must be put on record that perhaps no change of policy was, before adoption, better calculated or more carefully pondered over.

15 Forrest, *Selections*, Vol. II. Proceedings, 26th Aug., 1782.


CHAPTER XVII

Conquest of Kanara and Malabar; relations with the European Powers on the west coast; Navy.

Haidar conquered Bidnur in 1763 and Sunda in 1764. These conquests brought the ports of Onore (Honaver), Mangalore, Bhatkal and Piro (Sadasivgad) in his possession. The King of Sunda, thus kicked out of his dominions, sought shelter with the Portuguese at Goa, who gave him a pension of 12,000 Xerafins, which was later increased to 20,000. He was first sheltered by the Portuguese in the miserable village of Bandona but was later given a country house near Goa. The more humane treatment accorded to him by the Portuguese in later years was due to a fear that he might otherwise join Haidar or the Marathas, thus carrying to them his rights over Ponda, Canacona and Sanguelim, of which they might be eager to take advantage.¹

Having got possession of Honaver, Mangalore, Bhatkal as also Sadasivgad, Haidar could now

¹ Portuguese documents II, III, VI.



think of having a navy of his own. The English and the Portuguese had their navies on which so much of their power depended. Even the Peshwa had a fleet of his own. Without a navy Haidar would be at the mercy of these maritime powers on the sea coast. He naturally thought of having a naval arsenal on the western coast and drew up a scheme for the construction of ships of war. In 1765, according to the Portuguese, Haidar had 30 vessels of war and a large number of transport ships.²

Having concluded a treaty with Madhava Rao in 1765, Haidar was free to explore new avenues of expansion. He decided to attempt a conquest of Malabar. Before undertaking this venture, he kept a corps of observation consisting of 3,000 horse, 4,000 regular infantry and 10,000 peons at Baswapatna in order to watch the Marathas and descended into Canara with a view to marching towards Malabar. This was in January, 1766. After 4 days' halt at Mangalore the army resumed its march, a fleet advancing by sea. Peixoto thus describes the fleet: It consisted of 80 vessels, 13 topsail vessels, several manchoos of war, besides a great many shybars and small craft for the transport of war materials and provisions for the passage of the army across the rivers. The Dutch account

² Sen, *Studies in Indian History*. Officios Dos Governadores Maco 3, no. 44.

differs from the Portuguese. According to the former, the fleet had 2 ships, 7 smaller vessels and 40 gallivats, besides more than 50 other vessels laden with provisions. The fleet had two commanders, one a Muhammadan, who directed everything on board except what related to navigation and duty on board, which were entrusted to a European commander named Mr. Stannett.³ In the Malabar campaign, the fleet of Haidar rendered the greatest assistance. It accompanied the army up to Calicut, conveying the necessaries. Thence the greater part of the fleet returned to Mangalore, the smaller craft remaining to facilitate passage across rivers.

The conquest of Malabar was perhaps Haidar's most arduous feat of arms. It would not have been possible but for the complete disunion that prevailed among the fighting section of the people—the Nairs. Geography offered the greatest difficulty to the would-be conqueror. "After a mile or two of a narrow strip of sand near the coast, the scene changes and the country begins to swell towards the barrier of the ghats, at first in range after range of low red laterite hills with paddy flats fringed with cocoanut gardens winding in front of the recesses and later in the long spurs, deep ravines and thick jungles that mark the rise of the hills. Towering over all, their slopes clad in dense

3 Peixoto, Book III, para. 53. He was not under the orders of the Muhammadan except in the embarkation and disembarkation of troops.

forests, the majestic mountains of the western ghats keep watch over the favoured land at their feet. The long array of the ghats maintain an average elevation of 5,000 ft. occasionally soaring up into peaks upwards of 8,000 ft. high. They run parallel with the coast at a distance of some 20 miles as far as Vavul Mala or Camel's Hump abreast of Calicut. There they turn sharply eastward and after bending northwards round the Nilambur Valley recede inland as far as the Vada Malas north of the Palghat gap. South of the gap they rise again in the Ten malas or Southern hills, some 4/5,000 ft. high and gradually swell once more into the giant Anamalas."⁴ Most of the rivers are navigable only for a few miles from their mouths. Communication was at that time extremely difficult on the landside. Wheeled traffic was practically unknown in those days and even bullocks were not used. Horses were not to be found. Highways did not exist and the roads were "only narrow footpaths running at random through paddy lands." Rain-fall between June to September, during the period of south-west monsoon, is so heavy that small water-courses feeding rivers overflow their banks and convert the green paddy flats into placid lakes. Between October and December, the period of north-eastern monsoon, the rainfall, if not so heavy

4 *Madras Gazetteer*, Malabar and Anjengo, Vol. I, by Inus and Evans.

as during south-west monsoon, is considerable. On the slopes of the ghats a fall of 300 inches in the year was not uncommon. The campaigning season, therefore, could not be a long one and the rebel was sure of immunity from attack for the greater part of the year. At the beginning of his conquering career in Malabar Haidar was not in possession of Coorg to which Malabar gave access *via* the Perambadi *ghat* nor was he in possession of Malabar Wynad to which led the Periya pass. The Tamarasseri *ghat* led to Mysore, the Karakkur *ghat* to the Nilgiri district. But the Palghat gap (25 miles wide) leading to the plains of Coimbatore was by far the most important for the movement of his armies from the landside so long as Haidar did not conquer Coorg. These difficulties of communication determined the movements of Haidar's army in Malabar.

The political condition of Malabar was very favourable to the ambitious Mysorean invader and this enabled him to overcome his natural difficulties. Northern Malabar had been at one time united under the Kolattiri whose territory extended from Mt. Delli to the Kotta river. But disintegration had advanced very far and North Malabar was in a state of anarchy, 'a sea of intrigues, conflicting interests and mutual jealousies.' The Kolattiris' sway was now confined to the town of Chirakkal. The Muhammadan chief Ali Raja was master of Cannanore. The Kadattanad chief ruled between

the Mahe and the Kotta rivers. There was an offshoot of the Kilattanad family north of the Kavvyi river. The Kottayam *taluka* was partly in possession of Iruvalinad Nambiyars and partly of the Puranad or Kottayam Rajas. The malcontents of the Kolattiri family had at one time invited the intervention of the Bidnur chief and in course of his advance Haidar asserted that he had come to collect a Bidnur claim of two lakhs of pagodas against the Kolattiri.⁵

The Nairs who formed the feudal and military aristocracy of the west coast have been classed by Burke with the Mamelukes of Egypt. Feudalism makes for anarchy and Malabar was no exception to this rule. At Cannanore, there was Ali Raja, the Muhammadan chief, 'lord of the deep.' He was a thorn in the side of his nominal suzerain, the chief of Chirakkal. He went to Haidar at Mangalore when Haidar conquered Bidnur and he became Haidar's agent in Malabar.⁶ Peixoto tells us that Ali Raja told Haidar that he could conquer Malabar with ease and find there great wealth. Haidar ordered him to go to Cannanore, gather his troops together and provide adequate ammunition.⁷

Haidar's army according to the Dutch numbered 40,000, including 10,000 cavalry and 450

5 *Madras Gazetteer*, Malabar and Anjengo.

6 Peixoto, Book III, para 50.

7 *Ibid.* He presented to Haidar a silver table worth Rs. 400/- and a new vessel he brought from Calicut.

Europeans. He took with him 4 months' provisions. The route was Mangalore-Manjeswar-Koomla-Mt. Delli. The fleet accompanied the army. Haidar advanced ravaging, pillaging, burning and killing. At Beliapatam 500 Nairs defended the fort for one day. But the artillery bombardment was successful and the Nairs fled.⁸ Small craft conveyed light baggage to the other side. The Nairs abandoned the fort of Chirakkal which was soon occupied by Ali Raja. The Kadattanad chief, who was very much under the French influence, resisted the Nawab. From Chirakkal, the Mysore army advanced to take possession of Kottayam. They had to pass the Anjarakandi river. The river banks were very high and hence difficult for artillery and horse. The Nairs on the opposite side numbered 30,000. Haidar mounted two batteries with 26 guns of all calibres. As these began to fire the Nairs withdrew. About 1,000 Nairs were killed; some fled to the woods, some to Tellichery and Mahe.

Haidar then advanced to the territory of the four Nambiars. Gul Muhammad Khan, younger brother of Faizulla Khan, was sent to explore the country. The detachment was composed of 50 European cavalry, 4 regiments of light foot and some horse, two field pieces and one regiment of topasses. The Nairs took cover behind their plan-

8 Peixoto, Book III, paras 54, 93.

tations. They poured forth a terrible musketry fire. The Nairs repelled three attacks. Reinforcements under Lala Mian reached the Mysore army. They feigned a retreat, 500 of the best horse being placed in ambush. The Nairs were turned and had 832 killed and about as many wounded. Gul Muhammad lost 200 troops. This action took place on the 16th March, 1766. Next day the whole army advanced against the Zamorin of Calicut, the cavalry in advance scouring and ravaging the open country.

In South Malabar, dominated by the Zamorin, the Nairs forming the feudal and military aristocracy played as important a part as in the north. Haidar required no agent like Ali Raja to give him an idea of this part of the country. The Zamorin of Calicut had attempted in 1756-57 to conquer the territory of the Palghat Raja. Haidar was then the *Foujdar* of Dindigul. The Raja of Palghat applied to Haidar for assistance and Haidar sent 2,000 cavalry, 5,000 infantry and five guns under Makh-dum Ali. Makh-dum Ali advanced almost up to the sea coast. The Zamorin now fell back, restored the districts of the Raja of Palghat, and promised to pay an indemnity of 12 lakhs. The indemnity was not paid and Haidar was now in a position to enforce it. The Zamorin died in 1758. His successor, in his attempts to absorb Cochin, came into collision with the Travancore state, strengthened by Martanda Varma, and ultimately concluded a

treaty with his successor Rama Varma in 1762.⁹ Before the Zamorin could recover from the effects of these wars the storm broke.

The Nairs fought resolutely, taking advantage of strong places. Many burnt themselves in their own houses. Some threw their families into wells, filling them with straw, setting fire to it and leaping into it. Venkata Rao Barakki was detached with some cavalry to capture the Zamorin of Calicut. He advanced rapidly and succeeded in surrounding the Zamorin who had to surrender.¹⁰ The Zamorin hoped that like the chieftain of Raydurg he would be granted favourable terms. Calicut was occupied by Haidar who assured the Zamorin that Calicut would be returned to him after he had restored order and enforced obedience among the chiefs. He promised the Zamorin territorial integrity as a subordinate ally. But the Zamorin's nephew, his heir presumptive, still continued to resist. With a large number of Nairs he sustained many attacks. Haidar sent large bodies of cavalry against him. Haidar really intended permanently to annex the whole country as far as Ponnani. One of his generals, Hafizulla Khan, was beaten off with the loss of 300 men and 2 captains of topasses, one of them an Englishman. He was recalled and rebuked, after which he died of anguish. The Zamorin could not prevail over his nephew to stop his

9 Panikkar, *The Dutch in Malabar*.

10 Peixoto

resistance, nor was he in a position to collect the amount he had promised to pay. He heard that Haidar was putting pressure upon his people for payment. Apprehending that he was no better than a prisoner, the Zamorin, with the help of 4 or 5 Pathans who were with him, had cloths soaked in oil with which he put fire to the house in which he was kept and burnt himself to death. The Zamorin's suicide, according to De La Tour, was due to a feeling of remorse caused by letters which he received from his nephew and the Kings of Travancore and Cochin containing the bitterest reproaches and execration.¹¹

The Zamorin's nephew and family withdrew to Cranganore.¹² The Dutch, however, advised the Cranganore chief to remain neutral. The conquest of the Zamorin's territory was completed about the middle of April as is proved by a letter of the Dutch factors from Cranganore to Cochin, dated the 13th April, 1766. At Calicut Haidar made regulations for the government of the kingdom. He enlarged and improved it. In order to secure his hold, he established additional posts in different parts of the country and stored these with food and ammunition. A detachment of 3,000 regular infantry under Reza Ali was posted in Malabar to serve as a moving column. Aided by the Moplahs of Ali Raja, they

¹¹ De La Tour, p. 71.

¹² Dutch record, no. 5. The Zamorin's family with 19 elephants took refuge in a pagoda in the state of Cranganore.

were to maintain peace. The civil government of Malabar was entrusted to Madanna. Haidar withdrew to Coimbatore.

After they had been at Coimbatore for 25 days, news reached them of the rebellion in Malabar. Malabar had in reality been only half-subdued. The revenue measures of Madanna which were in violation of the customs of Malabar precipitated a crisis. It was too much to expect that the warlike Nairs would submit so tamely. The Zamorin princes came to the north from Cranganore with about 1,000 men. Their troops very soon increased to 4/5,000. They marched to about 4 or 5 miles west of Ponnani, where they maintained their position. North of Calicut, the Kodattanad, Kolattiri and Kottayam chiefs collected about 25,000 men. Ali Raja was bottled up. The blockhouses that Haidar had built were cut off from reinforcements by the rivers which had swollen into torrents on account of rains. They were also cut off from the movable column at Calicut. News of this widespread rebellion reached Haidar Ali at Coimbatore, his agent at Ponnani succeeding in communicating the news by means of a Portuguese sailor, who ascended the river in a bamboo boat travelling only in the night.¹³

Haidar prepared to return to Malabar in spite of the difficulty of the roads and the waterlogged condition of the paddy fields. He began his march at

¹³ Peixoto, Book IV. Dutch record, no. 5.

the height of the rainy season. The foot soldiers were to take nothing but blankets, without drums or colours. The horses had no saddles and the riders were to be as uncumbered as the horses. Even the Nawab was without saddles. No bazar could accompany the army. Elephants carried ammunition and provisions. 10,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 300 Europeans and 12 pieces of cannon advanced. The movable column of 3,000 left by Haidar in Malabar had been practically immobilised by the Nairs at the junction of the Tuta and Ponnani rivers, whence it could neither advance nor retreat. The Nair princes were overtaken by Haidar in a prepared position at Putiyangadi in the Ponnani *taluka*. They had entrenched their camp, fortified with a ditch and a parapet planted with palisades well-furnished with artillery. Though the first attack failed, the place was ultimately carried and the Nairs were completely routed. The Nairs were magnificent light troops in an ideal country for guerilla warfare but they were no match for disciplined troops in pitched battles. Peixoto, who accompanied Haidar in his Malabar expedition, records, "The Nairs are more afraid of 5 men on horseback than 500 sepoys. Many a time more than a hundred armed Nairs ran away before a single horseman. In the Malabar kingdoms there were no horses nor were they ever invaded by horse."¹⁴ Organised resistance was

¹⁴ De La Tour says (p. 68), "Haidar perfectly acquainted

now at an end. Haidar established his headquarters at Manjeri, in the midst of the Moplah fanatical zone. Thence his troops sallied forth, carrying fire and sword. Madanna and Raja Saheb formed two bodies to ravage all the Nair districts, killing all who were of the Nair caste, even women and children. The rate of payment was five rupees for the head of every able-bodied Nair, four for old men and three for women and children.¹⁵ For captives brought alive the rate was the same. The troops were more eager to bring people alive, for that would save the trouble of carrying the heads. It has been said that about 4,000 in one village destroyed themselves. For those who were taken alive Haidar formed the plan of transplanting them to other parts of his dominions. The experiment was not a success. All these operations took about a month. Haidar then left Malabar, stationing Madanna at Coimbatore and Raja Saheb at Palghat, where he erected a fort to secure communication between Malabar and Coimbatore. Madanna was in charge of civil and Raja Saheb of military administration of Malabar.

After the conquest of South Malabar, Haidar naturally wanted to bring Cochin and Travancore also under his control. The Dutch power had declined. Martanda Varma, the famous King of

with the genius of all the people of India held himself assured of the victory and founded his expectation on his cavalry."

15 Peixoto, Book IV.

Travancore (1729-1758), had defeated them completely at Colachel in 1741 and had put an end to Dutch dreams of conquering Malabar. The Dutch attitude towards the contending Malabar princes was henceforth one of nervous neutrality, which changed into one of 'servile subservience' towards the Mysore conqueror.¹⁶ At Cochin and at Cranganore the Dutch still looked a formidable power. They had their forts and ships in those places. They did not betray any weakness in this region. Haidar was eager to be very friendly with the Dutch and the reasons are obvious. He hoped that they would be of some use to him against the British. The Dutch expressed a wish that the Rajas of Cochin and Travancore should be allowed to enjoy with them the friendship which the Nawab had expressed for them. Haidar's minister in charge of these negotiations advised the Dutch envoy at Cannanore to plead only for the security of Cochin in view of the Company's special interest there but not to mention Travancore as that would be disagreeable to Haidar. The Dutch envoy agreed. Haidar, on the other hand, assured the Dutch envoy that he would not alarm the Raja of Cochin provided that chieftain sent his envoys to make a settlement.¹⁷ Regarding Travancore the Dutch were willing to negotiate with Haidar with only one end in view : as

¹⁶ Panikkar, *Malabar and the Dutch*.

¹⁷ Dutch record, no. 5 and no. 13.

they had advanced large sums to Travancore for pepper their investments should remain undisturbed in case Haidar occupied Travancore. But about Cochin and Cranganore, the Dutch were willing to placate Haidar by all means in their power. These chieftains were very much dependant on the Dutch.¹⁸

Martanda Varma of Travancore had defeated the Dutch and, with the help of a Brahmin bureaucracy and a mercenary army and foreign experts like the Fleming De Lannoy, had made Travancore the greatest state on the Malabar coast. But we cannot be very enthusiastic about his political sense or his patriotism. When pressed hard by his enemies, he had at one time sought the aid of the Mughal governor of the Carnatic. Against the Dutch he had even approached Dupleix. It was his own speedy victories which had saved him; otherwise his allies might have established their grip on Travancore. When Haidar was *Foujdar* of Dindigul, he had already established his reputation of being a good soldier who had resources that might be of use to Travancore if his alliance could be secured. Martanda Varma, hard pressed by rebel chiefs in north Travancore, had invited him to come to his help. But peace was speedily restored. This foolish and unpatriotic proposal of Martanda Varma provided Haidar with his opportunity. He was willing to offer his assistance but Martanda Varma

¹⁸ Dutch record, no. 5 and no. 13.

backed out, his chiefs having already made their submission. Haidar demanded compensation which was not paid and this partly explains Haidar's stiffness with regard to Travancore. Moreover, he could never feel secure in Malabar with Travancore unsubdued. Rama Varma, the successor of Martanda Varma, has been described as a prince in the true tradition of Malabar chivalry. When Haidar demanded of him 200,000 ducats and 10 elephants he refused to comply with these unreasonable demands.¹⁹ He drew closer to Muhammad Ali and the British. The ruler of Travancore also enquired whether the Dutch Company would assist him in case he were attacked by the Nawab. The Dutch attitude was not, however, encouraging. The most effective reply of Rama Varma to Haidar's intended aggression was the completion of the celebrated Travancore lines, already begun by De Lannoy in 1764. The long line which De Lannoy built was easy to defend. It has been thus described by George Powney, the English East India Company's agent at Trivandrum, in a letter to the Government of Madras in 1790, "They run from west to east and extend to Annimalai mountains where they terminate on the top of one of them. The lines consist of a ditch about 16 feet broad and 20 feet deep with a thick bamboo hedge in it, a flight parapet and good rampart and bastions on rising grounds almost flanking each

¹⁹ Dutch record, no. 5 and no. 13.

other. From one entrance of the lines to the other they are only assailable by regular approaches from the north."²⁰

Haidar was preparing for an attack on Travancore. He believed that the Nairs found their refuge in Travancore whence they emerged to create disturbances in his territories. But the defensive measures taken by Rama Varma against a possible attack by Haidar Ali made the subjugation of Travancore a very difficult proposition. Before Haidar could embark on this venture, he heard the news of the treaty between the Nizam and the English and the second invasion of Madhava Rao. He had to devote his whole attention to meet this menace. After the withdrawal of Madhava Rao came the First Anglo-Mysore War, which was followed by the third invasion of Madhava Rao. In 1769, however, Haidar overran seven villages at the foot of the Western Ghats on the north-western side of Travancore—Gudalur, Kambam, Puddupatti, Anumandanpatti, Kuchanur, Chakkayankottai and one half of Uttamapaliyam. These places had been conquered by Martanda Varma in 1756.²¹ This shows that

²⁰ Travancore Resident's letter quoted by Panikkar. The Dutch Resident at Cranganore wrote on the 3rd June, 1766, that the *Dulwai* of the King of Travancore was seriously engaged in cutting down the forest trees, in order to make a line of defence up to the Cranganore river.

²¹ An extract received from the Director of Records, Travancore.

Haidar would not let slip any opportunity of injuring Travancore. But as a realist he could not overlook the fact that events elsewhere were more pressing. Travancore, therefore, had a respite.

While Haidar was engaged in his distant expeditions and at times suffering reverses, the hope of independence revived among the Nairs. They took several of Haidar's blockhouses and Haidar's lieutenants in Malabar were in constant alarm. Then came the British expedition to Mangalore, its initial success and its ultimate failure. The pressure of his difficulties made Haidar decide on abandoning Malabar. He was quite sure that he could reconquer it whenever he would be free from his difficulties. Madanna informed the chiefs that Haidar was going to give up Malabar if only the chiefs reimbursed the expenses he had incurred. The Malabar chiefs paid the price willingly, the purchase, as Wilks puts it, of a dream of independence.²² Peixoto says that from the Zamorin Haidar received 1,200,000 rupees and his kingdom was delivered up on the 8th March, 1769.²³ This gives us an idea of the sums which other chieftains must have paid. The detachments of Haidar in Malabar would have been cut down. But this artifice enabled them to extricate themselves and return in triumph loaded with money. But Haidar left out Palghat and Can-

²² Wilks, Vol. II, p. 61.

²³ Peixoto, Book IV.

nanore in his negotiations. These were calculated to serve as *points d'appui* in future.

After the murder of Narayan Rao on the 30th August, 1773, and the end of Maratha aggression, Haidar embarked without misgivings on his plan for the reconquest of Malabar. To facilitate this reconquest he occupied Coorg and Wynad. Before this, his army had to go to Malabar either via Bidnur and north Canara or via Coimbatore Palghat gap. Now a short direct road from his dominions was opened. Haidar erected the fort of Mercara in a central position in Coorg, almost midway on the road from Seringapatam to Mangalore. The Nair chiefs were too much divided among themselves to put up a concerted resistance.

Two of Haidar's officers, Syed Saheb and Srinivas Rao Barakki, advanced through Wynad descending on Calicut. It soon fell. The allied Nair chiefs were attacked from two sides. They had to fall back. The Zamorin withdrew to the hills in the interior. The other chieftains also took refuge in the mountain recesses. The Zamorin, who had retired to the south, thought of going to Travancore. He was not allowed by the Dutch to enter Cranganore. The King of Travancore did not want to embroil himself in these troubles by giving shelter to the Zamorin. But he eluded all vigilance, seized two boats and landed at Chertala in Travancore. He was there taken prisoner. The rulers of Cranganore and Cochin hastened to come to terms

with Haidar and paid him heavy sums of money. Cochin paid Rs. 200,000 and Cranganore Rs. 50,000 in two instalments and 3 elephants. Haidar's people searched for the rumoured hidden treasures of the Zamorin at Cranganore. Very little was actually found. It has, however, been estimated by the Dutch that in this expedition of Haidar the forced contribution amounted to more than 10 lakhs and 90 elephants.²⁴ Travancore, though eager to give Haidar no offence, made no payment. Rumour went forth that Haidar would take the next favourable opportunity to enter Travancore. The Nair chiefs arranged their terms of dependence and Srinivas Rao Barakki was left as the Governor of the province.

Haidar's relations with the Portuguese on the Malabar coast have certain distinctive features. The Chief of Sunda, driven out of his dominions, surrendered to the Portuguese his possessions below the ghats, comprising Ponda, Canacona, Cape Ramos, Sanguelim, Piro (Sadasivgad) and other important places. This was in 1764. We might naturally expect that Haidar would now attempt to secure these places from the Portuguese by force of arms, and the Portuguese at Goa were actually apprehensive. Haidar succeeded in taking Piro (Sadasivgad) and even besieged Cape Ramos (Cabo de Rama). The Portuguese had a sufficient number of troops

24 Dutch record, no. 13.

to defend in it. They also apprehended that Haidar would attack Anjidiva Isles whose fortifications were also improved. De La Tour informs us that the French officers under him refused to fight with the Portuguese²⁵ and Haidar had to make peace with them as it was not possible for him to take the place without the help of his French engineers. A Portuguese record corroborates this statement of De La Tour to some extent. The Secretary of State, Francisco Xavier de Medonca Furtado, was thus informed: "This new potentate, after conquering the whole kingdom of Sunda, came with a great army to attack the fortress of Cabo de Rama. I was compelled to take on my shoulders its defence which by the grace of God fortunately succeeded. The reputation of the royal army made the enemy withdraw after reaching close to the fortress."²⁶ Haidar was thus compelled to conclude a peace with the Portuguese. He retained Piro (Sadasivgad). The Portuguese were courted both by Peshwa Madhava Rao and Haidar Ali while they were fighting with each other. The Peshwa expressed his desire to receive help from the Portuguese, proposed that the Maratha and Portuguese fleets together should wage war against Haidar in all his ports in Malabar and that he would offer, besides pay for the men, the lands he once took from the Portuguese in the north and future conquests would be shared equally between

25 De La Tour, p. 59.

26 Portuguese Document, V.

the two allies. Haidar on his part offered the help of his army through his general Faizulla Khan.²⁷ This is the Portuguese version of the negotiations. The Portuguese succeeded in maintaining their neutrality.

Portuguese trade in Haidar's dominions in Malabar was not inconsiderable. Before Haidar's conquest of South Canara, they had a factory in the port of Mangalore which was fortified with artillery and a military garrison. The Portuguese subjects traded freely in Mangalore and other ports in Canara. Bidnur gave them a concession in the prices for rice and the Portuguese missionaries had a free and safe entry in that kingdom. The Portuguese ran a brisk trade in chillis besides exporting rice from Haidar's territories because the local produce of this staple commodity did not suffice for more than six months. To maintain friendly relations with the Portuguese Haidar restored to them their factory and trade privileges in Mangalore. But in 1768, when the British attacked Mangalore, the Portuguese are said to have given them a free entrance through their factory. When the British captured the battery of the bar, Shaikh Ali, the governor, ordered the Portu-

²⁷ Portuguese Document, VII. A Dutch record gives us an information not corroborated by any other source—"The Rajahs of Molondin, Bonsol de Maratas and Sunda with the aid of the Portuguese had combined their forces and had joined to resist Haidar Ali Khan and that on a place far from the frontier of Goa between the allies and the forces of Haidar Ali, a naval battle had taken place and that the Nabob had suffered the greatest loss."

guese captain to open fire against the English, holding out threats that otherwise he would be arrested and the fortifications of his factories would be sealed. But Cunha Cusmao, who was in charge of the factory, recruited many Portuguese and Indians to defend the factory against the governor and sent information to the English where to embark with the least risk to safety and gave them assurances of help. But when the English conquered the port and the land, they took away from Cunha Cusmao his sepoy and retinue and compelled him to pull down the Portuguese flag. He was removed from his post and sent to Goa.²⁸

The Portuguese gave Haidar another provocation.²⁹ They apprehended that the English would try to take Piro (Sadasivgad) belonging to the Nawab and they heard that there was a proposal of an Anglo-Maratha alliance and a possible division of maritime ports. They thought that they could not allow Piro to fall into the hands of the English or the Marathas without bringing ruin to Goa. Therefore they made a very clumsy attempt to occupy Piro with a view to embarrassing the British. This was an outrage which Haidar had every right to resent. But Haidar really desired to retain the friendship of the Portuguese and on the Portuguese making their apologies, an order was sent to Shaikh Ali which permitted the Portuguese to establish their factory in

28 Portuguese Document, XIII.

29 Portuguese Document, XVII.

Mangalore. The restitution was complete and the factory at Mangalore yielded them an income of 16,253 Xerafins. Haidar even permitted the vicars of the church to have all their old liberties and one of the clauses of the new agreement provided that "The voluntary wish of any gentile to become a Christian should not be objected to on the part of the Sarcar."³⁰ Haidar went further and released the five priests he had imprisoned for their pro-English attitude.

But in 1776, Haidar suddenly revoked all these privileges; he stopped the Portuguese merchantships, confiscated the cargo, arrested the crew and sent them to be employed in the public works.³¹ He brought down the Portuguese banner from the factory at Mangalore, imprisoned the factors, as also the Portuguese garrison, and removed their artillery. Some years elapsed before he would agree to receive a Portuguese envoy. He was then on his march against the British. He enumerated his grievances against the Portuguese, accused them of being pro-British and demanded an alliance against the British people as a condition precedent to the restoration of privileges. He had another string to his bow. The exiled King of Sunda had died in Goa. The guardians of his minor son were won over and Haidar proposed to restore to the boy King his ancestral dominions. As Martinho de Melo e Casto com-

³⁰ Portuguese Document, XXXI.

³¹ Portuguese Document, LXXXII.

mented in his letter to the Governor of Goa. "It is necessary for a man to lose his faculties of reasoning to believe these professions of Haidar." Of course Haidar had no intention of really restoring the boy King to his possessions; the boy King of Sunda in his custody would give Haidar a convenient pretext for attacking Goa with a view to reconquering for his ward that part of Sunda which had been dismembered by the Portuguese. The boy King was not, however, allowed to go out of Portuguese territory. The Portuguese could not conclude an offensive alliance with Haidar in view of the existence of an alliance between the English and the Portuguese in Europe. But even Martinho de Melo e Casto is constrained to comment in the following words, "We ought to yield to the obligation of defending the port of Mangalore. This was what we had to do once we were established there even if we would not abide by any treaty. If this was not done in 1768, it was only on account of the mean perfidy and pusillanimity we acted with on that occasion when our Portuguese factor allowed them to enter through the factory and went to attack treacherously the stronghold of Piro under the fictitious pretext of occupying the same in order to defend it. From this abominable deception we will have to bear contempt and humiliation which Haidar Ali Khan characterised the Portuguese nation with."³²

³² Portuguese Document, LXXXII.

With the Dutch on the western coast³³ Haidar had much to do and he hoped that he would be able to enlist their support against the British. In 1763 an envoy of Haidar came to Cochin on his way to Ceylon and the Dutch agreed to look after the envoy on his voyage to Ceylon. The Dutch took advantage of this to draw Haidar's attention to their privileges in Canara. When it became apparent to them that Haidar was determined to conquer Colastrye, the Dutch, while congratulating him on his victories, drew his attention to their privileges and mentioned the sums which they had advanced to the chiefs and to Ali Raja. But so long as Haidar did not extend his territories beyond Canara, they were not very willing to supply Haidar with arms and ammunition. As rice was Canara's only produce and as the Dutch Company did not intend establishing more offices between Surat and Cochin, the Dutch did not think it worth while to cultivate sedulously the goodwill of their potent neighbour. But the onward advance of Haidar changed the Dutch attitude. The Dutch governor of Cannanore had been hitherto very careful not to give any offence to Haidar. He would not plead even on behalf of the Prince Regent of Colastrye lest Haidar might be displeased. The Mysore chief was willing to be on friendly terms with the Dutch and he even agreed

³³ Dutch Records, no. 5 & 13, and letters from Cochin—5th Oct., 17th Nov., 17th Dec., 1775; 3rd Aug., 3rd Oct., 31st Oct., 28th Nov., 21st Dec., 1781.

to pay the money which the Dutch Company had advanced to the chiefs for pepper, "though he had refused this to the French and the British." The Dutch were assured of the enjoyment of their existing privileges. But Haidar's counter-proposals were significant. He said that he had heard that the Dutch had their differences with Muhammad Ali Khan which might lead to war. In that case he proposed to help them with an army of 30,000 and his entire fleet provided they agreed to help him in his need. The Dutch avoided these commitments. It was too much to expect that the Dutch would embark on a war with the British merely to accommodate Haidar.

The Dutch policy was to keep Haidar in good humour without offending any other power. The best and largest elephants from Ceylon, carpenters and blacksmiths to build ships for him at Calicut as also military stores were supplied by them to Haidar. But Sardar Khan, Haidar's governor at Calicut, was not willing to recognise the Dutch claim that the Cranganore chief was their vassal. Sardar Khan even attacked Cranganore whence he was repulsed. The Dutch complained, "he is acting as an enemy who has declared war."³⁴

34 This movement of Sardar Khan was intended to threaten Travancore. North Cochin was overrun and Trichur fort captured. But the Travancore lines stopped further advance and the next few years were wasted in fruitless negotiations for an alliance and for a free passage through the Dutch territory along the coast. *Gazetteer of the Malabar and Anjengo Districts.*

When Haidar was for the second time at war with the English, the Dutch were also at war with the English in Europe. Haidar sent assistance to the English at Negapatam. He entered into an agreement to live in close alliance and friendship with the Dutch on the Coromandal coast. Haidar also offered to help the Dutch on the Malabar coast with his troops. They declined active military help. They said, "The King of Travancore is a faithful ally of the Dutch, the fort of Cranganore has a strong garrison. The King of Cochin is a faithful ally. We do not need the help of your troops which you so kindly offered." They were, however, eager to settle the existing differences with the Government of Mysore regarding their rights over Cranganore and other places. The Dutch tried to help him as much as they could by providing him with information and furnishing him with military supplies. But the British command of the seas stood in the way of their being more helpful. In November, 1781, Haidar wrote to the Dutch authorities for the supply of 24 pounders. They replied that they had no 24 pounders but they were ready to send two 18 pounders with 100 balls but on account of the proximity of the English war ships, Haidar must carry them.

This brings us to a consideration of Haidar's naval power. We have already drawn attention to the strength of Haidar's navy at the time of the Malabar expedition of 1766 and to the immense service which it rendered in that expedition. Ali

Raja of Cannanore is said to have conquered the Maldiv Islands and blinded its King. For his cruelty Haidar deprived him of the command of his fleet³⁵ with which alone he might have conquered the Maldives, and appointed Stannett in his place. The Moplahs were great navigators and they formed an excellent crew to man the ships that Haidar built. But the difficulty was about command. The fleet, according to Peixoto, had two commanders, Stannett and Latif Ali Beg. In 1768, when the Bombay Government sent a squadron of ships with 400 European troops and a large number of sepoys to attack Haidar's seaports on the Malabar coast, Haidar's naval power completely collapsed. The British ships appeared off Onore. Latiff Ali Beg was not liked by Stannett and the latter took the earliest opportunity of joining the English with two ships, two grabs and ten gallivats. Though the British expedition miserably failed on land, Haidar's navy met with an untimely end. Wilks and Law attributed this desertion of the English commandant to his disgust with the superintendence of Latif Ali Beg, formerly a cavalry officer. Wilks, however, adds that this desertion was in conformity to a previous pact.³⁶ We must not forget that the treachery (*dāgābāzi*, to use the language of Jaswant Rao Holkar) of a European officer in the employment of an Indian power was a rule rather than an exception in India of the 18th country. Dr.

35 De La Tour, p. 63.

36 Wilks, Vol. II, p. 58.

S. N. Sen's conjecture is that Haidar appointed Latif Ali Beg as a joint commander because he could not implicitly trust the Englishman.

Undaunted by his first failure Haidar attempted to build and equip a new fleet in his seaports. William Townshend from Onore reported in October, 1775, that at Onore Haidar's craftsmen were working as speedily as possible. The shipbuilding programme³⁷ there included the following:

One Grab—103½ feet keel

„ „ — 56¼ „ „

„ „ — 54 „ „

„ „ — 98 „ „

„ „ — 72 „ „

One Gallivat — 42 „ „

According to Portuguese reports in 1778, Haidar was for the second time building a large fleet. He ordered the construction of sailing ships in all places on the coast where such work could be undertaken. He is said to have offered very favourable terms to Colen Dinamarquez, a distinguished shipbuilder of Goa. But the patriotic shipbuilder declined the offer in order to serve his own state.³⁸

He approached the Dutch in 1775 for more carpenters and blacksmiths to build ships for him at Calicut. In December, 1778, he had eight three-masted ships carrying 28 to 40 pieces of artillery

³⁷ Secret Proceedings, 12th February, 1776. Letter from Onore, 3rd Oct., 1775.

³⁸ Portuguese Document, XXI.

and many other ships of smaller tonnage. In the Gulf of Bhatkol, he began to build a huge mole where at full tide a large fleet would find it easy to anchor. He also planned a large enclosure for merchants. He entrusted the execution of this ambitious scheme to a Dutchman named Jose Azalares. The estimated cost was 17 lakhs of pagodas. The work was not, however, finished and the scheme was far too ambitious. In 1780, Sir Edward Hughes entered Mangalore harbour and destroyed two ships, a large grab, 3 ketches and many small vessels at anchor. Thus Haidar's second attempt to build a navy failed completely.³⁹

Referring to Haidar's attempt to establish navigation on the Tunga, Buchanan says, "I doubt not that Haidar's lighters of 8 ton burthen were found very useless. The attempt is, however, no impeachment on the sagacity of Haidar, who having been educated in a place remote from every kind of navigation, could have no idea of what boats could perform, nor of what obstacles would prevent their utility." Haidar's own ignorance of navigation placed him at a great disadvantage in his attempts to build up a navy. His technical advisers were European adventurers who could not be expected to have the necessary zeal in his cause. It would also be idle to expect that Haidar would so soon be able to build a navy strong enough to cope with the

39 Law, *History of the Indian Navy*, Vol. I. Sen, *Studies in Indian History*, pp. 146-54.

British. If he had a comparatively longer period of peace, he might have with his energy and resources made some real progress and given the English a fair fight. As it was, his first clash came only four years after he had begun his shipbuilding experiment and the second after a preparation of only 5 or 6 years. Where the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French failed, he could not expect an easy success, nor had he had the necessary respite.



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ENGLISH: PUBLISHED WORKS

Orme, *History of Military Transactions in Indostan*. Vols. I & II.

The account of Orme is that of a contemporary who was present on the scene. It comes down to 1761. The references to Haidar are incidental and therefore all the more valuable. Orme succeeds in giving a vivid picture of the period inspite of the confusion prevailing then.

Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai.

This 'Indian Pepys' was a vèry acute observer. He kept an account of what happened at Pondicherry and also recorded other historical events that had repercussions in the French Indian capital. Of the twelve volumes available in English, volumes VII-XII only were useful to me. It was inevitable that he would sometimes record mere bazar rumours, or give to trivial things exaggerated importance. In such cases, we have to be guided by the law of probability.

Wilks, *Historical Sketches of the South of India in an attempt to trace the History of Mysore*. 3 Volumes. 1810-17.

Wilks says that he was induced to collect materials "without any definite object beyond that of rescuing from oblivion, before it should be lost for ever, the information possessed by living characters and an imperceptible consequence was the examination

of written authorities." The volumes of Wilks are valuable to us not so much because of the "written authorities" which are still available to us as because of the evidence he derived from "living characters." "I went over the ground accompanied by men of observation and intelligence who witnessed them." "It is stated by the family of Khande Rao and particularly by Butcherow who was then sixteen years of age and distinctly remembers the particulars." "Rani Lachmi whom the raja married in 1760, was a sensible and amiable old lady whose observations on the incidents of her eventful life are highly interesting and intelligent".—Such statements abound in the work of Wilks. The inner history, the crisscross of personal rivalries and antagonisms that might otherwise have remained unrevealed, are thus presented as a living picture. For principles and policy, ample recorded evidence is available. These bits of information are at times imperfect fragments, at times obscure, sometimes even contradictory. Occasionally we have no alternative but to compare and to conjecture. But invaluable details of many revealing episodes have been preserved only in this way. We may be better informed about data, but Wilks gives us a living picture.

Forrest, *Selections from state papers of Governor-General Warren Hastings*. 3 Volumes.

Forrest, *Selections from the letters, despatches and other state papers*. (*Maratha Series*).

Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*. 3 Vols.

W. J. Wilson, *History of the Madras Army*, Vols. I & II.

Rice, *A Gazetteer of Mysore and Coorg*.

Gazetteers—Malabar, Canara, Madura, Trichinopoly, Dharwar.

Gense & Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, comprising Mostyn's diary and Mostyn's letters.

Gense & Banaji, *The Gaikwads of Baroda* (English documents). Vols. I-III

Ramchandra Rao, *Memoirs of Hyder & Tipoo* (1849). Translated by C. P. Brown.

Henderson, *The Coins of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan*.

Caldwell, *History of Tinnevely*.

Panikkar, *Malabar and the Dutch*.

Mill, *History of British India*.

M.M.D.L.T., *History of Haidar Shah and Tipu Sultan* (trs., revised and corrected by Prince Gholam Muhammad.)

Stewart, *Memoirs of Hyder Ally*. 1809.

Robson, *Haidar Ali*. 1781.

Asiatic Annual Register, 1800. The biographical memoirs designed to illustrate the rise of Hyder Ally Khan.

PORTUGUESE

Chevalier Panduranga Pissurlencar, Archivist, Nova Goa, sent me reprints or transcripts of rare Portuguese documents from Nova Goa and Libson. A descriptive list is given. I follow his numbering. Mr. Estanislau Mesafonte Sousa helped me to translate the documents.

Doc. I—dated January, 1764—Report of the progress of Haidar, written by the Portuguese Viceroy, Count of Ega.

Doc. II—official letter of the Viceroy dated 26-1-1764—giving an account of the career of Haidar Ali—translated by Dr. S. N. Sen and incorporated in his book, *Early Career of Kanhoji Angria and other papers*.

Doc. III—dated February, 1764, an account written by Noronah, "the fighting bishop of Halicarnassus", of the career of Haidar Ali.

Doc. IV & V—Contemporary accounts narrating the progress of Haidar Ali.

Doc. VI—Concerns the kingdom of Sunda.

Documents VII-LXXXII—Contemporary papers on Haidar's relations with the Portuguese.

Peixoto's *History of Nawab Haidar Ali Khan Bahadur*, edited by Charles Philip Brown. Ms., Eur. D 295, India Office.

Brown worked from an English translation made by one who had an imperfect command of style. The original was written in Portuguese. Peixoto was a Portuguese, his mother probably a Kanadi. He became a commandant of artillery under Haidar whom he served from 1758-67 and from 1769-71. He gives us

much valuable information relating to Maratha-Mysore relations as also Haidar's first expedition to Malabar. He gives us a detailed account of the critical year 1760-61. He tries to appear more important than he really was but he was not very different from the typical European adventurer of the 18th century.

DUTCH :

Madras Record publication nos. 5 & 13.

Madras Record Office: Letters from Cohin

dated 5th October, 1775.

17th November, 1775.

16th December, 1775.

17th October, 1776.

3rd August, 1781.

3rd October, 1781.

31st October, 1781.

28th November, 1781.

21st December, 1781.

Father Fruitier translated these records for me. They give us some new information about Haidar's Malabar expedition and naturally form the most important source of information about his relations with the Dutch in that region.

FRENCH :

Michaud, *Historie des progress et le La chute de L Empire de Mysore sous les Regnes d' Hyder Ally et Tippoo saib*, chap II.

Michaud's book is written with sympathy and is perhaps the most interesting book I have read in this connection. The passages quoted in the book were translated for me by Dr. P. C. Bagchi, M.A., D.Litt. (Paris), of the Calcutta University. My proposed second volume will have more French material to depend upon.

Martineau, *Dupleix*. Vol. II.

Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, Vol. XIII, "Etat politique de l' Inde au commencement de la presente annu 1777." Translated by Prof. K. A. Nilkantha Sastri.

MARATHI :

Khare, *Aitibasik Lekha Samgraha*. Vols. II-VII.

Rajwade, Vols. I, IV, V.

Itibas Samgraha by Parasnis has not been of much use for this volume.

Selections from Peshwa Daftar. Vols. 20, 27, 28, 36, 37, 38, 39.

About the Marathi sources, I need only say that they have given me a new outlook and the extensive use I have made of *Aitibasik Lekha Samgraha* and *Peshwa Daftar Selections* proves how indispensable this material has been for me.

TAMIL, TELEGU AND CANARESE :

Mackenzie Mss: Local records, Vol. XI—p. 51.

„ XIII—p. 345.

„ XXII—p. 383.

Contents—Accounts of Sri Rangapattam and Kaifiyat of Haidar.

Document no. 17—5—11. Karnataka Rajakkal Savistara Chari-tam—Tami, Two extracts.

Local records, Vol. XXIV.

Haidar Kaifiyats, Kaifiyats of Bidaruru.

Canarese *Haidar Kaifiyat*, no. 18—15—15.

We had to ignore brief incidental notices on Haidar scattered among the accounts of different villages. The materials contained in these papers may be more fully utilised in my chapter on civil administration in the second volume.

Haidarnama—a Canarese Ms., portions of which were published in the Annual Report of Mysore Archaeological department and in the *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 3rd session. The date of this composition was 29th June, 1784. The published fragments do not justify the claim that the book is a corrective to existing accounts.

PERSIAN :

Royal Asiatic Society, Bengal, Ms. no. 200: *Nishan-i-Haidari* by Husain Ali Kirmani. Translated by Colonel Miles.

I compared the translation of Colonel Miles with the Asiatic Society Ms. and wherever I found that there was no material

deviation from the original I have quoted Miles. But this Persian account has not the merit we expect from the best Persian writings on history. Its chronology is not correct, the topography is unreliable and the sequence of events is very often wrong. Wherever the author describes Haidar's relations with the Marathas, there is wilful misrepresentation. It was with great caution that I accepted some of his statements concerning Haidar's early career.

Royal Asiatic Society, Bengal, Ms. no. 201: A history of Coorg from Canarese and Persian sources by Hussain Luhani, written by order of Maharaja Vir Rajendra Vadiyar. It gives the history of Coorg from 1637-1807.

British Museum Ms., Or 1865—date of composition November 1778: A contemporary account of Haidar. Absolutely useless. A patient attempt to extricate historical material from this Ms. is like "rummaging a rubbish heap on the problematical chance of discovering a cigar end."

Tuzuk-i-Walajah. Vols. I & II. Translated into English and published by the Madras University.

I thought it would throw some light on Haidar's early career and give some details of his relations with Muhammad Ali. How useless these volumes are for our purpose can be illustrated by one quotation—Vol. II, p. 103, "Haidar Nayak was brought up in the house of Abbas Quli Khan, the qiladar of Sera. Owing to a theft in his master's house, Haidar ran away fearing punishment and became an attendant of Karachuri Nandaraj". Wilful vilification cannot perhaps go further.

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